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INTRODUCTION

A battle is being fought over how to conceptualize sexuality in the workplace-a
battle with critically high stakes for sexual harassment plaintiffs. One side, which tends
to be associated with the feminists of the late 1970s and early 1980s, sees workplace
sexuality as a manifestation of sexual desire or attraction.' The other side, consisting of
the vast majority of modem or "second-generation" feminists,2 sees workplace
sexuality as an expression or manifestation of gender-based power dynamics.
The attraction-based view was highly influential in shaping the early development
of sexual harassment law. However, in modem times, at least within the academy, the
attraction-based view has fallen into extreme disfavor and the power-based view has
achieved ascendance nearly to the point of orthodoxy. 3 Within the academy the
attraction-based view is almost universally regarded as problematic at best, or
backward and archaic at worst. Modem scholars either attack the attraction-based
view, or they ignore it.4 Among those that attack it, some might deign to keep the
1. The early feminists actually offered up several theories of workplace sexual conduct,
including sophisticated theories based on conceptions of sex- and gender-based dominance and
power, as well as theories based on attraction. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). However, the theory that the early courts adopted
from this work-and, hence, the theory that tends to be associated with the early feminists-is
one based on sexual attraction.
2. Professor Schwartz lists Kathryn Abrams, Anita Bernstein, Katherine Franke, and Vicki
Schultz as examples of second generation feminists. David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of
Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1700
(2002).

3. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 588 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S.

1001 (1998) ("Harassment, like other forms of victimization, is often motivated by issues of
power and control on the part of the harasser."); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv.
813, 820 (1991) (indicating that sexual harassment is about men exercising power over women);
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1721 ("It has long been broadly acknowledged 'that men engage in

offensive sexual conduct in the workplace primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not
desire."') (quoting Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L.

REV. 691, 743 (1997)); see also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1 ("Central to the concept [of
sexual harassment] is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or
impose deprivations in another.").
4. E.g., Vicki Schultz, ReconceptualizingSexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686
(1998) (attacking attraction-based view); Franke, supranote 3, at 740-47 (same); Estrich, supra
note 3, at 820 (same); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassmentwith Respect, 111 HARv. L.
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attraction-based view within the arsenal of weapons available to fight sexual
harassment. However, these writers treat this view as an embarrassment-something to
be tolerated only for its potential usefulness in persuading unsophisticated judges,
juries, and laypersons to support plaintiffs in harassment cases, but certainly not a
paradigm to be analyzed seriously. 5 Others advocate discontinuing the use of the
attraction-based view altogether. 6
As a result of this treatment, the attraction-based view seems to have entered a
death spiral. Despite the fact that courts have been relying on this view for over twenty
years, the attraction-based paradigm has been completely under-analyzed. This underanalysis has resulted in confusion and frustration in trying to apply this paradigm.
Confusion and frustration have fueled criticism of the attraction-based view. And this
criticism, now to the point of derision, has tainted the attraction-based paradigm to the
point where no one will engage in any serious analysis of it.7 And so it continues.
Outside of the academy, courts and practitioners continue to rely on the attractionbased view. 8 However, as a result of the academy's derision of this view, as well as the
confusion and frustration that surround it, courts and practitioners are under increasing
pressure to reduce or discontinue their reliance on it. At least one influential judicial
opinion has criticized the attraction-based view,9 highlighting the possibility that the
barrage of academic criticism may ultimately bury this view in the courts as it has in
the law journals.
The stakes in this battle between the power-based paradigm and the attractionbased paradigm are twofold. At one level, the power-based theorists' attack on the
attraction-based paradigm is a struggle to enrich the conceptual understanding of
sexual harassment. Supporters of the power-based view fear that an attraction-based
view trivializes the personal experience and social significance of sexual harassment,
and may fail to provide a compelling narrative as to why we should be concerned about
sexual conduct in the workplace.
. But this battle is also a practical one. Proponents of the power-based view are
largely motivated by fears over doctrinal limits that seem inherent to an attraction-

REv. 445 (1997) (ignoring attraction-based view).
5. E.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 730 ("At best, [the attraction-based view] is an evidentiary
short cut that Title VII plaintiffs may use in order to prove sex discrimination."); Kathryn
Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1212 n. 125
(1998) (Arguing that if sexual harassment law were to abandon the attraction-based view, this
might "result[] in a characterization that may not adequately convey to legal decisionmakers and
the public the complex, multifaceted nature of harassment.").
6. E.g., Lucetta Pope, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Sexual Harassmentbut
Were Too Politically Correctto Ask (Or, the Use and Abuse of "butfor" Analysis in Sexual
Harassment Law Under Title VII), 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 253, 293 (2001) (urging courts to
"relinquish[]" modes of proof based on attraction).
7. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 734 (referring to the attraction-based view as "a
reversion to the primordial ooze of Title VII doctrine" and noting that "[the law and our culture
have evolved beyond that rather primitive view.").
8. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (Sexual
harassment plaintiff can rely on sexual attraction to prove that conduct occurred "because of'
sex.).

9. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 586 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that attractionbased theory "betrays a fundamental misconception that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter
of sexual desire run amok-in other words, that the harasser is attracted to the victim and simply
cannot restrain himself").
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based view of sexual harassment. By tying sexual harassment law to a power-based
view, these commentators hope to extend the reach of sexual harassment law to cover
cases that might escape its purview if it were based on an attraction-based view.
However, this Article will argue that, by marginalizing or abandoning the attractionbased view, sexual harassment law will likely cover fewer cases.
This Article challenges the prevailing academic wisdom and defends attractionbased theory against its critics. In so doing, it undertakes two projects. First, this
Article will offer, for the first time, a detailed analytical account of the role of the
attraction-based view in sexual harassment law. This account will show that the
attraction-based paradigm emerged more as a (largely successful) response to the
practical needs of sexual harassment plaintiffs than as a response to the conceptual
needs of a social movement. However, this Article will argue that, understood in this
context, the attraction-based view poses little threat to the compelling conceptual story
told by the power-based theorists. Second, this Article criticizes the power-based view,
which, in a mirror image to the attraction-based view, is conceptually powerful, but
practically limited. Put simply, an abandonment of the attraction-based paradigm in
sexual harassment law would leave many litigants without a viable claim for relief and
would leave the courts with the difficult job of developing practical doctrines to
implement a theory not developed with an eye towards the realities of legal practice.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I explains the significance of the
attraction-based view to the law of sexual harassment. This Part demonstrates not only
how the attraction-based view provides a theoretical basis for treating workplace
sexual conduct as a form of sex discrimination,' ° but also how this view works in
practice to provide relief for victims of workplace sexual conduct in a streamlined and
effective manner. This Part articulates in a comprehensive manner how an attractionbased paradigm can be used to construct a theory by which plaintiffs can show that
workplace sexual conduct has occurred "because of' sex ("discriminatory causation"
or "causation"), as required by most anti-discrimination laws." It calls the method of
proving discriminatory causation "attraction theory." This Part also explains the
powerful influence attraction theory has exerted on the development of sexual
harassment law.
Part II explores the limits of attraction theory. First, this Part explains the essential
criticisms offered by power-based theorists. In particular, despite its potential
usefulness in many cases, power-based theorists have argued that attraction theory will
not work to prove causation (1) in cases involving bisexual harassers (the "bisexuality
gap"); and (2) in cases where sexual conduct is motivated not by sexual attraction, but
rather by something else, such as animosity or a desire to humiliate or exclude the
10. When anti-discrimination laws use the word "sex," they are generally understood to
refer to the biological state of being either male or female. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir. 1996) (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (prohibiting sex
discrimination solely on the basis of whether the employee is a man or a woman); Smith v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Doe, 119 F.3d at600 (Manion,
J., dissenting) ("Thus, when Congress outlawed discrimination 'because of such individual's
sex,' it proscribed differentiating among individuals because of the employee's status as a man
or woman."). Accordingly, this Article will use the word "sex" in this fashion. Readers should
be careful to avoid confusion between "sex" in this sense, and "sexuality"-that is, sexual
behavior or conduct.
11. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). See
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1697 (discussing problem of causation); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc.,
299 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir.) (same), affd 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
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victim (the "nonattraction gap").' 2 This Part then explores a practical gap that may
result in attraction theory from difficulties in proving attraction and sexual orientation
(the conditions necessary for the use of attraction theory). This Part argues that even
though these theoretical and practical coverage gaps are real, they are not as large as
modem scholars have tended to suppose. Moreover, the practical gap from difficulties
in proof could be largely eliminated through the use of a presumption regarding sexual
orientation in all attraction-based cases, as opposed to the presumption currently
applied by the courts, which only applies to opposite-sex cases. In any event, this Part
concludes, none of these gaps are so large as to render attraction theory useless or to
justify the abandonment of the theory altogether.
Part III examines the normative criticisms that might be leveled at attraction
theory. It will conclude that, while attraction theory does pose some normative
problems, few of these are insurmountable-and none would appear to justify leaving
certain plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases without a remedy, which is what will likely
occur if we forego the use of attraction theory.
Part IV turns to the power-based theories, concluding that they are riddled with
practical limitations and are actually inferior to attraction theory as a vehicle for
providing relief. In particular, this Part explains that there are likely to be a set of cases
in which attraction theory will work to prove causation but in which a power-based
theory will be difficult or will not work. In these cases foregoing the use of attraction
theory, as many of the second-generation feminists seem to urge, could easily result in
leaving plaintiffs without a remedy.
I. AITRACTION THEORY AND CAUSATION INSEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
In the late 1970s, feminist theorists, led largely by Catherine MacKinnon, began to
12. For criticisms of an attraction-based view that seem to be based on concerns about the
non-attraction gap, see Estrich, supranote 3, at 840-42 (noting that sexual harassment doctrine
based on attraction fails to account for power dynamic between men and women in the
workplace); Franke, supra note 3, at 740-42 (understanding sexual harassment as being based
on desire in terms of sexual desire "is wrong for many of the same reasons that it is a mistake to
understand rape as primarily a crime of passion or lust"; that is, because it fails to account for
the fact that it involves "power expressed through the idiom of sex"); Schultz, supra note 3, at
1689 (focus on attraction tends to blind the observer to gender-based power dynamic).
For criticisms of the attraction-based view that seem to be motivated by concerns about a
bisexuality gap, see Franke, supra note 3, at 737 (observing that attraction theory will not work
where the harasser is not exclusively heterosexual or exclusively gay/lesbian); Estrich, supra
note 4, at 819 n. 18 (criticizing sexual harassment doctrine based on attraction as failing to cover
harassment by bisexual harasser); Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a
Paradigmfor Recognizing Sexual Harassmentof Homosexuals under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 383, 406-08 (1996) (same); Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual
Defense" Loophole in Title VII Sexual HarassmentCases,80 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1036 (1996)
(same); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Corp., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (fearing that
sexual harasser may avoid liability by claiming to be bisexual); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-37 (D. Wyo. 1993) (same).
As will be discussed more fully below in Part III.A.2, some writers have (wrongly) used the
gaps in attraction theory, particularly the bisexuality gap, as a way to attack the treatment of
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. E.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 357-58 (1992) (claiming that sexual

harassment law is bankrupt because it could not be used to hold a bisexual harasser liable).
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explore the problem of sexual conduct in the workplace. These writers articulated the
idea that such conduct was problematic, not merely as a matter of sexual morality or
workplace productivity, but as a matter of sex equality. 3 They understood sexual
conduct in the workplace as a manifestation of, and a significant force in maintaining,
inequality between the sexes--that is, male dominance. Accordingly,
these theorists
14
sought a remedy for such conduct under anti-discrimination laws.
However, a significant conceptual and practical gap needed to be bridged in order
to find an anti-discrimination remedy for workplace sexual conduct. Virtually all antidiscrimination laws require a showing of discriminatory causation; that is, such laws
require plaintiffs to prove that the conduct in question occurred "because of' a
protected characteristic, such as sex. 5 The challenge, then, was to articulate-and be
able to prove-how workplace sexual conduct can be understood as occurring
"because of' sex.
Feminist theorists and litigators at the time, including Professor MacKinnon,
offered up two possible approaches to showing causation: a power-based approach and
an attraction-based approach.16 Professor MacKinnon made clear that she preferred the
power-based approach, which argued that workplace sexual conduct reflected and
tended to perpetuate sex-based power imbalances at work and in society. 17 However,
Professor MacKinnon also offered up an attraction-based approach. She suggested
that, in the typical sexual harassment case of the time, in which a man made sexual
advances toward a woman, a fact-finder could infer8 that, had the target not been
female, the harasser would not have acted as he did.'
Professor MacKinnon did not provide much in the way of explanation for this
conclusion. However, it is apparent that her conclusion relies on an attraction-based
paradigm. The idea seems to be that males who make sexual advances toward females
do so based on sexual attraction, and that,
for those (heterosexual) males, such
9
attraction would be reserved for females.'
13. See MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 215-21.
14. As will be discussed more fully in Part LA, these theorists have been extremely
successful. Under modem law, sexual harassment is almost universally treated as a form of sex
discrimination. However, the flip side of this development is that, in most jurisdictions,
workplace sexual harassment is not actionable in and of itself; it is actionable only as a form of
discrimination based on sex. Thus, to obtain a remedy, victims of workplace sexual conduct
must generally look to anti-discrimination law.
15. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Although numerous statutes, ordinances, and other laws

prohibit sex discrimination, most sexual harassment claims are brought under Title VII.
Additionally, in writing and interpreting anti-discrimination statutes, it is common to look to
Title VII for guidance. This Article will therefore focus on Title VII.
16. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 6. Professor MacKinnon referred to the power-based
approach as an "inequality approach" and the attraction-based approach as a "difference
approach." Later writers have referred to MacKinnon's power-based approach as an "antisubordination" approach and her attraction-based approach as a "formal equality" or "but for"
approach. E.g., Franke, supranote 3, at 704 n.50, 705 n.53 (referring to Professor MacKinnon's
"inequality" theory as an "antisubordination" theory).
17. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 6-7.
18. Id. at 192-93. Professor MacKinnon appears to have been quite prescient, recognizing
some possible shortcomings of the attraction-based approach, and favoring the power-based
approach. The fact that she also offered the attraction-based approach, which was palatable to
the courts at the time, also suggests a deep understanding of realpolitik and practicality.
19. Id. at 199 (discussing sexual attraction); see also id. at 203 (referring to bisexual
exception, which, as will be discussed below in Part II.B, is a product of attraction-based
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Even though Professor MacKinnon did not elaborate on her attraction-based
theory of causation, and even though she would have preferred a theory of causation
grounded in a power-based view of workplace sexuality, the courts latched onto her
attraction-based view. 20 Based on this view, the courts adopted a remedy for sexual
harassment under anti-discrimination law, and proceeded to develop the law of sexual
harassment.
The courts' reliance on an attraction-based view makes sense. Properly theorized,
an attraction-based view can support a finding of discriminatory causation in a great
many cases, including those most prevalent at the time that sexual harassment law was
developed. Unfortunately, however, in nearly twenty-five years of using the attractionbased view, no one has endeavored to provide a comprehensive analysis of the link
between attraction and discriminatory causation. As a result, the role of attraction in
sexual harassment law has been misunderstood, the attraction-based paradigm has been
subjected to unfair (as well as fair) criticism, and the law of sexual harassment has
become muddled.
This Part will attempt to fill the theoretical void surrounding the attraction-based
view. It will begin by demonstrating how an attraction-based paradigm can be used to
show causation in certain types of sexual harassment cases. It will then show the
significant power that this theory, despite its under-articulation, had in shaping modem
sexual harassment law. It will also explain how the power of this theory derived, not
from any compelling conceptual narrative, but as a result of its practical ability to
provide a streamlined and effective way of evaluating causation.
A. Proving Causation with Attraction Theory
Although there are several concepts of causation in anti-discrimination law, the
attraction-based paradigm relies on a concept commonly referred to as "disparate
treatment. Disparate treatment is often referred to as "intentional" discrimination,
since it focuses on the intent, or motivation, of the perpetrator-that is, his or her state
of mind in deciding whether to act or how to act, or in selecting a target upon whom to
act. 22 In other words, disparate treatment is concerned with how the perpetrator made
the decision in question. If a protected characteristic, such as sex, played a sufficient
role in the perpetrator's decisionmaking process, the decision can be seen as having

theory).
20. Professor Franke suggests a reason why courts might have declined to rely on Professor
MacKinnon's power-based theory: "Unfortunately, her analysis is either too complicated or too
radical for most judges." Franke, supra note 3, at 729.
21. 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 4
(Paul W. Cane et al. eds., 1996) (listing theories of causation, including disparate treatment and
disparate impact); Franke, supra note 3, at 746 ("Sexual harassment claims usually are analyzed
as disparate treatment cases.").
Because attraction theory-and sexual harassment law generally-is based on the concept
of disparate treatment, this Article will focus on that concept. For an interesting discussion
about the possibility of treating sexual harassment as a form of disparate impact, see Robert A.
Kearney, The DisparateImpact HostileEnvironment Claim: Sexual HarassmentScholarshipat
a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185 (2003).
22. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 10-11 ("In an individual disparate

treatment case, the central question is always whether the defendant's actions were motivated by
discriminatory intent.").
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been made "because of' that characteristic.
.Thus, a critical question in sexual harassment cases is: How can we see inside the
harasser's decisionmaking process? How can a sexual harassment plaintiff prove that
the perpetrator considered the target's sex in the decision to harass him or her?
Although perpetrators in anti-discrimination cases may occasionally admit to
considering sex in making their decisions, 24 in cases without such admissions (most
cases), plaintiffs will need some other way to get into the mind of the perpetrator. In
cases involving certain types of sexual conduct, an attraction-based paradigm may be
helpful in solving this problem. This paradigm can be used to construct a theory of
causation that I will call "attraction theory."
Attraction theory is based on the concept that one may be able to prove what is
going on in the mind of a perpetrator by examining his or her decisionmaking habits.
When a person has a habit of acting in a particular way, a fact-finder may infer that the
person acted in that way in the case in question.25 This principle applies to proving
states of mind, as well as actions.
To understand this concept, suppose that we observe H hit T, a man. From this
alone we might not have much insight into H's decisionmaking process. It would be
difficult to say, based on this evidence alone, that H considered T's sex in deciding to
hit him-that is, that H hit T because T was a man.
However, suppose that we know that H has a habit of considering the sex of the
target in deciding whom to hit. For example, in deciding whom to hit, H might tend to
use the following rule of decision: If the target is a man, hit him; if the target is a
woman, do not hit her. If H tends to use this rule of decision in deciding whom to hit,
we could say that H has a habit of considering sex when making such decisions.
Based on such a habit, we might conclude that H considered T's sex on the
23. There is some question as to exactly how much of a role the prohibited characteristic
must play in the decisionmaking process in order to be actionable. Is it enough that the
prohibited characteristic played any role in the decisionmaking process? Or does the prohibited
characteristic need to have been a "but for" cause of the final decision? Compare Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that decision is
"because of' sex where sex is "a factor" in the decision) with id. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that a decision can only be considered to be "because of' sex where sex is
the "but for" cause of the decision). This issue was arguably resolved by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which amended Title VII to make clear that liability attached whenever a prohibited
characteristic, such as sex, was "a motivating factor" in a decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(2000). However, even under this standard, the defense can reduce its damages by showing that

it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor"which sounds a lot like "but for" causation. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Moreover, there is a
question about whether the "a motivating factor" standard applies in all cases, or only in socalled "mixed motive" cases. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282
n.10 (1976) (adopting "but for" standard in so-called single-motive cases); see also Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2150 (2003) (discussing need for direct evidence in
"mixed motive" cases). For purposes of this Article, I will not try to resolve these issues. Rather,
where one of my conclusions depends on which standard is adopted, I will simply note it.
24. For example, in one case I litigated, I asked a harasser who he targeted, other than the
female plaintiff. His response: "Well, [plaintiff) was the only woman---except for [one other
worker], who is large and who would hit me if I did that to her." In other words, the deponent
admitted he only picked on small, defenseless women. In my experience, such admissions are
rare.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 406 ("Evidence of the habit of a person... is relevant to prove that
the conduct of the person.., on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit .... ).
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occasion in question-that is, in deciding to hit a particular target. In other words,
based on the knowledge that H generally considers sex in deciding whom to hit, we
might infer that H considered T's sex in deciding to hit T. This concept-proving
intent in a specific decision by reference to a habit
26 of decisionmaking in a particular
way-is well entrenched in the rules of evidence.
Note that the habit does not have to be exclusive to be capable of producing an
inference of intent. Suppose, for example, that H usually or often uses-but does not
always use-a sex-based rule of decision in deciding whom to hit. 27 In such a case, the
fact that H often or usually uses the rule might lead a fact-finder to infer that H used
the rule on the occasion in question. Nor does the habit--or the application of the
habit on a particular occasion-need to be conscious: most courts and commentators
seem to be in agreement that such unconscious intent is actionable. 29
26. See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (prior bad acts can be used to prove intent).
27. A nonexclusive habit might be the result of a rule that considers sex, but not in a way
that is always outcome determinative. For example, suppose that H's rule of decision was: "If
the target is a man, favor hitting him; but if the target is a woman, try not to hit her." In such a
case, sex is considered, but might not be outcome-determinative. That is, T has a habit of
considering sex, but in a way that is not always outcome-determinative.
Alternatively, a nonexclusive habit might be the result of a sex-selective rule of decision
that is not uniformly applied. For example, H might apply a sex-selective rule of decision
regarding whom to hit in all situations that do not involve self-defense. However,'in situations
that require self-defense, H might hit any person who is a threat, irrespective of that person's
sex. In such a case, H has a habit of engaging in sex-based decisionmaking, although H does not
always make decisions in accordance with that habit.
28. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating that evidence is relevant if it tends to makes the
existence of a material fact, such as discriminatory intent, more probable than it would be absent
the evidence).
Of course, at some point, the habit in question may be applied sufficiently rarely that it
might not make sense for a fact-finder to infer that it was applied in any particular instance. This
Article will not address that limit.
29. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting
argument by employer that it could not be liable for disparate treatment based on unconscious
application of sex-based stereotypes), affd, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (plurality opinion), 259
(White, J., concurring), 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967,969 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that this portion of the earlier Hopkins
decision was upheld by the Supreme Court); Lenihan v. City of New York, 636 F. Supp. 998,
1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff "need not demonstrate that her employer bears a
conscious animus or malice . . . [because] discrimination often arises out of very subtle
stereotyping that may reflect a benign or protectionist view of women and their place in
society"); Sweeney v. Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll., 604 F.2d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1979) ("One
familiar aspect of sex discrimination is the practice, whether conscious or unconscious, of
subjecting women to higher standards of evaluation than are applied to their male
counterparts."). But see Costa,299 F.3d at 854 ("Disparate treatment claims require the plaintiff
to prove that the employer acted with conscious intent to discriminate.") (citing distinction
between disparate treatment and disparate impact theories).
A few commentators seem less certain that existing anti-discrimination doctrines
adequately account for unconscious aspects of decisionmaking. See Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal
Employment Opportunity,47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164(1995) ("While Title VII jurisprudence
gives lip service to the notion that actionable intergroup bias can be subtle or unconscious,
courts have so far failed to develop doctrinal models capable of addressing such phenomenaespecially subtle or unconscious race and national origin discrimination."); see also Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 1697 (suggesting that if courts considered unconscious discrimination as an
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In anti-discrimination cases outside of the area of sexual harassment, evidence of a
habit of discriminatory decisionmaking may be difficult to develop. In such cases,
plaintiffs may try to gather such evidence by comparing the perpetrator's treatment of
members of one sex with his or her treatment of members of the other sex.3° Such
"comparative" evidence can be thought of as evidence of habit.31 This evidence may
show a pattern-a habit-of discriminatory decisionmaking by the perpetrator from
which the fact-finder might infer that the perpetrator engaged in discriminatory
decisionmaking on the occasion in question. 32 However, proving habit in this way can
be difficult. In many cases, there may not be a large enough number of events to
discern a pattern. 33 In other cases, the relevant work unit may be single-sex, or nearly
single-sex, making it difficult to discern any sex-based patterns.
But in the area of sexual harassment, it may be possible to prove habit in a way
that does not require comparative or statistical evidence-at least where the conduct in
question involves the selection of potential sexual partners based on sexual attraction.
This is because we often tend to think of sexual attraction as involving sex-based
habits of selection-that is, sexual orientation.
Attraction theory sees sexual orientation as a habit of sex-based selection
applicable to decisions regarding choices of potential sexual partners. 34 That is,
heterosexuals are seen as being in the habit of choosing opposite-sex partners, and gays
and lesbians are seen as being in the habit of choosing same-sex partners.3" Thus,
actionable form of intent under disparate treatment doctrine, sexuality would always be proof of
causation-implying that courts do not currently do so).
30. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1711 ("The stock-in-trade of intentional discrimination
cases is comparative evidence; in order to succeed, one needs to show that a similarly situated
employee not in the plaintiff's group (a man in a sex discrimination case brought by a woman,
or a white employee in a race discrimination case by an African American employee, for
instance) was treated more favorably than the plaintiff.").
31. This Part discusses comparative evidence as a way to discern patterns. Sometimes
writers speak of using comparative evidence in a different way: as evidence of pretext. E.g., 1
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 27. This is a somewhat different concept. The point

in such cases is not to discern a pattern in decisionmaking, but to disprove that a perpetrator
uses a particular type of decisionmaking---that is, to show lack of candor. This method of
proving discriminatory intent via "pretext" may be relevant outside the area of attraction theory.
However, it is not directly relevant to attraction theory.
32. An observed sex-based pattern in a perpetrator's decisionmaking may reflect a negative
attitude toward the relevant group (in our hitting hypothetical, men). That is, we may think of
the observed pattern as part of a chain of inference in which we (1) infer attitude from pattern,
and (2) infer sex-based decisionmaking from attitude. But it is not clear that it is necessary to
consider attitude. It may be that one can simply make inferences about the decisionmaking
process from the pattern (that is, habit) itself.
33. Statistically, this can be thought of as a problem of small sample size. When the sample
size is too small, it becomes difficult to determine whether what is being observed in fact
represents a pattern, or whether it is merely a product of chance.
Comparative evidence and statistics are often discussed as two separate ways to prove
discriminatory intent. E.g., id. at 27. However, as this discussion suggests, statistics may really
just be a method of assessing the quality of certain types of comparative evidence.
34. Joannie M. Schrof & Betsy Wagner, Sex in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct.
17, 1994, at 74 (arguing that many people are habitually sex selective in choosing partners for
sexual relations--that is, in their sexual orientation).
35. I will try to avoid the use of the word "homosexual," as, unfortunately, this term has
tended to be employed as an epithet. Instead, I will use the words "gay," "lesbian," or
"gay/lesbian." Because the words "heterosexual" and "bisexual" have not tended to be used as
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monosexuals-persons who are heterosexual or gay/lesbian, as opposed to bisexualare assumed to be in the habit of engaging in sex-based selection in making decisions
regarding potential sexual partners. 36 Accordingly, when a monosexual harasser
engages in a particular act of selecting a particular sexual partner, attraction theory
suggests that the harasser acted consistently with that habit and therefore considered
the target's sex in his or her decisionmaking process.
Thus, attraction theory can serve to show discriminatory causation when two basic
conditions are present:
(1) Sexual Attraction. The harassment must be motivated, at least in
part, by sexual attraction; and
(2) Monosexuality. The harasser must be either heterosexual or
gay/lesbian, as opposed to bisexual.37
The second condition (monosexuality) provides evidence of a habit of sex-based
selection in choosing potential sexual partners. The first condition (attraction) suggests
is, that in the case in question, the harasser was in fact
that the habit is relevant-that
38
choosing a sexual partner.
Where these two conditions exist, a target of sexual harassment can show
discriminatory causation in a simple, straightforward manner. In most cases where
workplace sexual conduct is based on sexual attraction, it will not be difficult to prove
that fact.39 Once attraction is shown, if the harasser is monosexual, 40 the plaintiff can
rely on sexual orientation to demonstrate a habit of sex-based selection in such
decisions-thereby proving discriminatory causation.4 '
epithets, I will use those words.
36. This is not to say that monosexuals choose sexual partners based solely on the basis of
their sex or that bisexuals are completely indiscriminate in selecting sexual partners. It is only to
say that, by definition, monosexuals take sex into account in selecting sexual partners and
bisexuals do not. A heterosexual female might not be attracted to all men; but in selecting a
sexual partner, she will, by definition, prefer men over women (exclusively, if she is "purely"
heterosexual). Or a bisexual male might be attracted only to persons with a particular feature,
such as long hair, and thus might not be attracted to all persons of either sex. However, by
definition, the sex of the target is irrelevant to his selections. (The possibility of preferential
bisexuals-that is, those willing to engage in sexual relations with persons of either sex, but
who tend to prefer partners of a particular sex-will be discussed in Part II.B.2).
Transgenderism and transvestitism may play a role in the selection of sexual partners as
well. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
37. Actually, this statement of the second condition necessary for the application of
attraction theory (monosexuality) is somewhat oversimplified. As will be discussed in Part
LI.B.2, there is some question regarding whether monosexuality must be "pure"-or how this
theory can deal with the fact that people may not be "purely" heterosexual or "purely"
gay/lesbian.
38. As will be discussed below in Part II.C, sexual conduct-including sexual advancesmay be motivated by sentiments other than sexual attraction. For example, some sexual
advances may be motivated by a desire to demonstrate power or dominance.
39. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999) (factfinder may find that conduct was based on sexual attraction where conduct consisted of explicit
and implicit sexual advances).
40. Part Im.D.2 will discuss the potential difficulties of knowing-or proving-sexual
orientation.
41. This proposition was rejected in Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990).

In Trautvener, the court was concerned that a male harasser's sexual attraction toward a female
plaintiff might be based on factors other than the target's sex---that is, on her personal
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In such cases, there is no need to offer comparative evidence or statistical
evidence; no need to offer evidence of remarks made or attitudes held by the
perpetrator. Causation can be proven without recourse to these types of evidence,
which are often difficult to discover, inconclusive, or unpersuasive. Thus, where it is
applicable, attraction theory provides a relatively simple, streamlined way of
demonstrating causation in sexual harassment cases.
B. The Rise of Attraction Theory in Sexual HarassmentDoctrine
At the time the courts first began to deal with cases involving sexual conduct in
the workplace (and in the roughly twenty-five years since), attraction theory was not
articulated in any kind of comprehensive manner. In fact, at the time sexual harassment
law began to develop, attraction theory was not articulated at all beyond the simple
conclusory assertion that, had the target been a different sex, the harasser would not
have engaged in the conduct in question.
Yet, despite this dearth of analysis, attraction theory played an enormous role in
early sexual harassment law, as well as in the development of that law over the
subsequent twenty-five years. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that this
theory was responsible for the courts' initial willingness to adopt a cause of action for
sexual harassment under anti-discrimination law, and for the phenomenal growth in
plaintiffs' resort to this cause of action.
In early sexual harassment cases, courts struggled with the issue of causation. In
traditional sex discrimination cases (outside of the area of sexual harassment),
plaintiffs generally put on evidence of the perpetrator's state of mind to show
causation. However, in the early sexual harassment cases, the only evidence seemed to
be that a male harasser had made sexual advances toward a female target (generally
accompanied by an express or implied threat)., 2 The question, therefore, was whether
this evidence was sufficient to show discriminatory causation--in other words, that the
harasser had acted "because of' the target's sex.
Initially, some courts resisted the idea that there could be discriminatory causation
in such cases.43 For example, in Barnes v. Train, the court held that the plaintiff had
been "discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to
engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor."" Similarly, in Come v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., the court saw sexual advances by a male supervisor toward a female subordinate
characteristics, as opposed to characteristics peculiar to her sex. Id. at 1152. This argument
misses the point that if the harasser tends as a general matter to be attracted to personal
characteristics of women over those of men--that is, is heterosexual-such a habit might
suggest that, in the case in question, the harasser considered the sex of the target in deciding she
was attractive.
42. E.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J.
1976); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part,and vacatedin part
sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Come v. Bausch &Lomb, Inc., 390
F. Supp. 161, (D. Ariz. 1975), vacatedwithout op., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
43. E.g., Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163; Barnes v. Train, 13
F.E.P. Cases 123, 123 (D.D.C. 1974); Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Other early courts rejected Title Vfl claims for sexual harassment on grounds other than
lack of causation. E.g., Miller, 418 F. Supp. 233 (lack of responsibility on the part of the
employer); Come, 390 F. Supp. 161 (same) (alternate holding).
44. 13 F.E.P. Cases at 124.
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as being based on "nothing more than... a personal urge., 45 And in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co., the district court opined that the harasser was "motivated
by sexual desire," as opposed to the sex of the target, and that the sex of the target was
"incidental" to the harasser's decision. 46 Thus, these early courts found no causation in
sexual harassment cases. 47
However, at this time, some feminist writers, including Katherine MacKinnon and
Kerri Weisel, had articulated the outlines of attraction theory as a method of showing
causation in sexual harassment cases. Their point was that in the typical sexual
harassment case of the time, which involved males making sexual advances toward
females, the perpetrator would not have done the same thing had the sex of the target
been different-that is, had the target been male.48
Soon, courts began to pick up on this theory to find discriminatory causation in
sexual harassment cases, and a cause of action for workplace sexual conduct was
born. 49 These courts tended to see male harassers who made sexual advances toward
45. 390 F. Supp. at 163.
46. 422 F. Supp. at 556. Having focused on sexual attraction, Tomkins might have found
causation using attraction theory. However, the court's reasoning seems to suffer from another
flaw: It seems to reject the possibility of mixed motives-suggesting that, where a perpetrator
acts based on more than one motive, the decision is not actionable, or is not actionable unless
the discriminatory motive is somehow primary. The court posited multiple motives for the
harasser's actions (sexual desire and the sex of the target). Because the court seemed to assume
that sexual desire was the primary motive, and the sex of the target only a secondary
("incidental") motive, it held that there was no discrimination. As discussed above, this view
appears to have been rejected by Hopkins and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(16)
(2001)), which require only that sex be "a motivating factor" in the perpetrator's decision. A
similar "primary cause" argument was made, and rejected, in Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 657.
47. Some of the early courts that rejected the possibility of causation in sexual harassment
cases appear to have considered attraction theory as a way to find causation, but rejected this
theory on the ground that the theory might lead to the strange result that bisexuals could then
harass with impunity. For example, in Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., the court noted that
attraction theory "would mean that if the conduct complained of was directed equally to males
[that is, if the harasser were bisexual] there would be no basis for suit." 390 F. Supp. 161, 163
(D. Ariz. 1975); see also Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556 ('The gender lines might as easily have
been reversed, or even not crossed at all."). As a result, these courts refused to apply attraction

theory. As will be discussed more fully below in Part IV.A.2, this criticism of sexual harassment
law is flawed. In any event, this position was held only temporarily by a minority of courts, and
quickly gave way to the adoption of attraction theory by virtually all courts.
48. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 6; Kerri Weisel, Comment, Title VII: Legal
ProtectionAgainst Sexual Harassment,53 WASH. L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1977). Ms. Weisel's
comment contained the articulation of the broad parameters of attraction theory; she suggested
that it might be possible to infer causation (that is, that a male harasser would not have harassed
another man) if it could be presumed or proven that the harasser were heterosexual. Weisel,
supra, at 133-34. She did not explain how such an inference actually derived from the harasser's
sexual orientation (for example, by seeing sexual orientation as a habit of sex-selective
decisionmaking). And because she did not like this theory's reliance on sexual orientation, she
did not analyze it any further. Id. Professor MacKinnon's description of the theory was less
detailed.
49. See Kenji Yoshino, The Empistemic Contractof Bisexual Erasure,52 STAN4. L. REv.
353, 438 (2000) ('The impetus for [finding causation in early cases] came from feminist
activists such as Kerri Weisel, who contended that desire-based harassment was sex-based
harassment because an individual usually directs desire only at one sex or the other.").
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female targets as being (1) motivated by attraction, and (2) heterosexual.50 Thus, based
on attraction theory, these courts were able to find that the harasser took the target's
sex into account in deciding to harass her. Under this theory, sex was not to be seen as
"incidental" to the harasser's decision; it was seen as integral to that decision-a "but
for" cause of that decision.
The first case to hold sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII was
Williams v. Saxbe.5' In discussing causation in that case, the Saxbe court expressly
referenced the conditions for-and limits of-attraction theory. The court focused on
the sexual orientation of the harasser, noting that causation could be found if the
harasser was heterosexual or gay/lesbian, but not if the harasser was bisexual.52 In
other words, the court was focused on the second condition of attraction theory
(monosexuality), as well as one of the limits of attraction theory-that is, the fact that
the theory will not work to show causation where the harasser is bisexual.53
Reliance upon attraction theory is even clearer in Barnes v. Costle,54 which is
probably the most significant of the early harassment cases. In that case, the court
noted that the plaintiff had made allegations from which a fact-finder could find
causation: amorousness and heterosexuality 55-- the two conditions required for the
application of attraction theory. The Costle court also noted that there would
not be
56
causation in the case of a bisexual harasser-a limit of attraction theory.
Neither Saxbe nor Costle described their theory of causation as "attraction theory."
More notably, neither explained exactly why attraction theory worked to show
causation. However, these courts clearly understood--even if not in a self-conscious
manner-that causation could be found based on attraction and monosexuality (or, at
least, heterosexuality).
After Costle was decided, many other circuits simply relied on its reasoning---that
is, on attraction theory--to find causation in cases involving male-to-female sexual
advances. In Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., for example, the Third
Circuit relied on the Costle court's reasoning to find causation (and reverse the district
court decision discussed above)., 8 In Miller v. Bank of America, the Ninth Circuit
relied on Costle (and the Third Circuit's opinion in Tomkins) to find causation.5 9 In
Henson v. City of Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Bundy v. Jackson, which in
50. The propriety of these assumptions, which appear to have been based on no evidence
other than the fact that a male harasser had made a sexual advance toward a female target, will
be discussed below in Part [lI.D.2.
51. 413 F. Supp. at 654.
52. Id. at 659 n.6.
53. As will be discussed below, infra Part H, this is somewhat of an oversimplification of
this limit on attraction theory. The theory will work for bisexual harassers as long as they are
"preferential," as opposed to "purely" bisexual.
54. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
55. Id. at 989 n.49 (describing supervisor as allegedly "amorous" and "heterosexual"); see
also id. at 990 (describing supervisor as being motivated by "sexual desire[]").
56. Costle, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55.
57. As will be discussed more fully in Part ILI.D.2, another important feature of these cases
is that they do not appear to have required any special proof that the conditions for attraction
theory were present--that is, that the harassers were motivated by attraction or that they were
heterosexual. Rather, these facts seemed to be assumed from the fact that a male had made
sexual advances toward a female.
58. See 568 F.2d at 1048.
59. 600 F.2d at 212 n.l.
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turn relied directly on Costle for its conclusion regarding causation. 60 And in Horn v.
Duke Homes, the Seventh Circuit asserted, "But for [the target's] womanhood, [the
' 61
harasser] would not have demanded sex as a condition of employment.
The only
62
Costle.
to
citation
a
was
reasoning offered for this assertion
All of these earliest cases were "quid pro quo" cases.63 Quid pro quo harassment
occurs when a supervisor (or someone else in a position of power) makes an
unwelcome request to engage in sexual relations with the target, and where the request
is accompanied by an express or implied threat.64 Because it is, by definition, a request
60. 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). Bundy was a hostile environment case that relied directly on Costle for its
conclusion regarding causation. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7 (citing Costle, 561 F.2d at 990
n.55). Henson also refers to the case of the bisexual harasser which also suggests that the court
was relying upon attraction theory to find causation. 682 F.2d at 904.
61. 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 604.
63. Miller, 418 F. Supp. 233 (male supervisor fired female employee who rejected his
sexual advances); Tomkins, 568 F.2d 1044 (male supervisor made advances toward female
subordinate accompanied by economic threats and physical force); Costle, 561 F.2d at 983
(female plaintiffs job abolished after rejecting sexual advances by male supervisor); Saxbe, 413
F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part,and vacated inpart sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (female plaintiff fired after spurning sexual advances by male
supervisor); see also Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated
without op., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (male supervisor terminated two female employees
who rejected his sexual advances). The term "quid pro quo" was apparently coined by Professor
MacKinnon. See Note, Sexual HarassmentClaims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1454 n.27 (1984).
64. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 746 ("The essence of a quid pro quo

claim is that the individual has been forced to choose between suffering an employment
detriment and submitting to sexual demands."); see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503,512 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Implicit quid pro quo harassment is ...
far more likely to take place than is the explicit
variety.").
Quid pro quo cases may involve promises rather than, or in addition to, threats. E.g.,
Miller, 418 F. Supp. 233 (supervisor promised plaintiff a better job if she would be sexually
cooperative and fired her when she refused). The causation issue is the same irrespective of
whether the advance is coupled with a threat or a promise. Thus, here I will use the more
standard definition, involving employment detriment.
Although it might be suggested that, unlike a threat, there is no harm from a promise (as
long as there is no accompanying threat), one could certainly find harm in the effect such a
proposition would likely have on the target. For example, a great deal of research has shown
that sexual propositions in the workplace may lead to feelings of self-doubt or lack of worth, as
well feelings of disgust, anger, anxiety, hurt, depression, sadness, or guilt. See Barbara A.
Gutek, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 71 (1985) (disgust, anger, anxiety, hurt, depression, sadness,
or guilt); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,83 CORNEiL L. REv.
1169, 1230 n. 159 (1998) (intense self-doubt is a major theme among women who speak about
their experiences of harassment); Susan Grover, The FirstStone in Retrospect: An Outsider's
Observations on The Book and Its Critics, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 257 n.32 (1996) (book
review) (discussing studies suggesting that harassment victims feel lack of self-worth); Sharyn
Lenhart, M.D., Physical and Mental Health Aspects of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND AcADEMtA-PsYcIuATmC ISSUES 21, 24-25 (Diane K.
Shrier, M.D. ed., 1996) (discussing a 1992 study showing that sexual violation, especially
harassment, causes self-doubt). Moreover, harm to the target's dignity can be found in the fact

that a request for sexual relations coupled with a promise of gain from engaging in such
relations is akin to a request to engage in prostitution-and a suggestion that the target might be
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to engage in sexual relations, quid pro quo harassment inevitably involves sexual
advances. 65 Moreover, in virtually all of these early cases, the harasser was male and
the target was female. 66 Based on the fact of the advance (from which the courts were
willing to infer attraction) and the male-to-female configuration (from which the courts
were willing to infer heterosexuality), the courts came to routinely find causation in
quid pro quo cases based on attraction theory.67
Soon, though, courts were confronted with another type of case, called a "hostile
work environment" case. In such a case, there is sexual conduct, but no threat. Hostile
environment harassment has come to be broadly defined, essentially as any sexual
conduct inthe workplace that is not quid pro quo harassment. 68 Hostile environment
harassment may, but need not, involve sexual advances. 69 However, virtually all early
hostile environment cases involved sexual advances-again by males against
females. 70 Thus the courts could-and did-deal with causation in these cases in the
same way that they did in the early quid pro quo cases: They applied attraction theory
(and assumed that its conditions were present based on the fact of male-to-female
sexual advances). 7 '
The leading hostile environment case was Bundy v. Jackson.72 In that case, the
willing to do so. See Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080 (Md. 2000) (quid pro
quo harassment violates public policy against solicitation for prostitution).
65. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 746 ("[A] claim of quid pro quo
harassment necessarily involves unwelcome sexual advances.").
66. E.g., Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4, 1048-49; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982); Miller, 600 F.2d 211; Costle, 561 F.2d at 990; Garber v. Saxon Bus.
Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 654.
67. In quid pro quo cases, there are often two causation issues. The first, addressed by this
Article, is whether the harasser selected the target for sexual advances based on the target's sex.
The second causation issue arises where the target rejects the sexual advance and is subjected to
adverse employment action, such as termination or demotion. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc.,
302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002). In such cases, it is also necessary to show that the adverse
employment action occurred "because of" the rejection. If this latter type of causation is proven,
the adverse employment action is seen as being "because of sex" based on a causal chain-that
is, the adverse action occurred because of rejection of the sexual advance; the rejection occurred
because of the advance; and the advance occurred because of the target's sex.
68. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)
(2003) ("[Hostile environment harassment includes] conduct of a sexual nature... [that] has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."); 1 LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 781 (hostile environment harassment may be by a co-worker and
does not require any threat).
69. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 781 (Hostile environment
harassment "is not limited to sexual advances or even to sexual behavior targeted at the
complainant.").
70. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (female employee repeatedly
propositioned by male co-worker; held to violate Title VII); Henson, 682 F.2d 897 (same);
Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); B.T. Jones v. Flagship Int'l,
793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
71. The only difference between these early hostile environment cases and the quid pro quo
cases that the courts dealt with before was that the advances in the hostile environment cases
were by co-workers instead of supervisors, or were not seen as involving any threats or
promises. In these cases, the courts seemed to be concerned primarily with the question of
whether there was harm-not whether there was discriminatory causation.
72. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

2004]

RECONSIDERING ATTRACTION

court concluded, "[The target] was invited [to engage in sexual relations with the
harasser] only because she was a woman. 7 3 The only explanation offered for this
assertion is a citation to Costle-74 -which, as discussed above, was based on attraction
theory. After Bundy, many courts in hostile environment cases simply cited Bundy to
find causation in hostile environment cases.75
At approximately the time that Bundy was decided, there occurred another
important development in sexual harassment law: The EEOC, the agency charged with
enforcing Title VII, 76 promulgated a set of guidelines regarding sexual harassment (the
"Guidelines"). 77 These Guidelines asserted that Title VII was violated by unwelcome
"conduct of a sexual nature," where such conduct was accompanied by work-related
threats (quid pro quo) or adversely affected the target's work environment (hostile
environment). 8
There is no mention of discriminatory causation in the Guidelines. But the
Guidelines seem to assume causation based largely on attraction theory. In
promulgating those Guidelines, the EEOC relied on Costle and other cases that found
causation based on attraction theory.79 Moreover, at the time that the EEOC Guidelines
were promulgated, almost all of the sexual harassment cases that had been litigated had
involved the male-to-female-advance paradigm. As noted above, in such cases, the
courts-and quite possibly the EEOC--tended to presume causation based on
attraction theory.
Almost immediately, courts began to adopt and approve the EEOC guidelines.
Where there was any question as to the correctness of the Guidelines, this question was
generally resolved by the application of attraction theory.
Bundy appears to have been the first case to cite the Guidelines with approval. 80
73. Id. at 942.
74. Id.

75. E.g., Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749; Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983);
Ferguson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1197 (D.Del. 1983).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
77. EEOC Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11). As explained in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, "these Guidelines, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 477 U.S. 57,
65 (1986) (quotations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. In addition to Costle, the EEOC cited Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp.
1382 (D. Colo. 1978), Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977), and Kyriazi
v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). In Heelan, the court simply relies on
Costle, and on another case that in turn relied on Costle and Saxbe. Heelan, 451 F. Supp. at
1388 (citing Costle and Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 465-66 (E.D.
Mich. 1977), which in turn cites Costle and Saxbe). Garberis a per curiam case that does not
discuss its reasoning in finding causation, but appears to assume causation based on the male-tofemale advance paradigm. 552 F.2d at 1032.
Interestingly, Kyriazi, upon which the EEOC relies for its definition of hostile environment
harassment, is not really a sexual harassment case. Rather, it is primarily a sex discrimination
case that uses evidence of certain sexual conduct to support its conclusion that the plaintiff class
had been denied promotions and other benefits because of their sex. That case does not appear
to be based on attraction theory. However, it also does not appear to rely upon the sexual nature
of conduct to find that the conduct was motivated by sex, and thus does not necessarily support
the EEOC's position.
80. 641 F.2d at 947.
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And, as noted above, that case was based on attraction theory. And in Katz v. Dole, the
Fourth Circuit accepted the EEOC Guidelines with little comment. 81 However, the
court there remarked, "In cases involving claims of sexual harassment, on the other
cases], the sexual advance or insult
hand [as opposed to standard sex discrimination
82
will almost always" be because of sex.
Perhaps the most significant early citation to the EEOC Guidelines was by the
Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee.8 3 In that case, the court cited the
Guidelines, arguably with approval, for the proposition that sexual harassment could
violate Title VH.84 In discussing why sexual harassment could violate Title VII,
Henson expressly relied on attraction theory:
In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a
female worker, it is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male
employees in a similar fashion. It will therefore be a simple matter for the
but for her sex, she would not have been subjected to
plaintiff to prove that
85
sexual harassment.
Moreover, the court notes that, "there may be cases in which a supervisor makes sexual
overtures to workers of both sexes" in which the conduct "would not be based upon
sex because men and women are accorded like treatment."8 6 Thus, Henson was clearly
based on attraction theory.
By this time, most commentators seemed to accept attraction theory as wellthough still largely without any significant analysis of how it worked or what its limits
might be. For example, in an influential note in the HarvardLaw Review, the editors
simply assumed causation, noting, "Unless a bisexual employer sexually harasses male
and female employees alike-a situation that has yet to appear in any reported case87
the sex of an employee is an implicit factor in the harasser's choice of a victim."
The final development in the rise of attraction theory occurred when the Supreme
Court held in MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson88 that sexual harassment could constitute
sex discrimination. In so doing, the Court was a little cagey regarding causation.
Instead of saying outright that there was causation in the case at bar, or how one could
prove causation in sexual harassment cases generally, the Court said simply that,
sex,
"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the 8subordinate's
9
that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex"--a tautology.

81. 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cit. 1983).
82. Id. at 255.
83. 682 F.2d 897, 903 (1lth Cir. 1982).
84. Id. Although Henson uses the EEOC Guidelines (as well as Costle) to bolster its
conclusion that sexual harassment can violate Title VII, the court conspicuously adds several
elements to the EEOC's definition-including a causation requirement. Id. However, in
Meritor,the Supreme Court characterizes Henson as being supportive of the Guidelines. Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
85. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (citing Bundy).
86. Id. (citing Costle).
87. Note, supra note 63, at 1454 n.28.
88. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
89. Id. at 64 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (1985), affrdsubnom. Meritor,477
U.S. 57 (alteration in original)). See also id. at 65 ("Title VII affords employees the right to
work in an environment free from discriminatoryintimidation, ridicule, and insult.") (emphasis
added); id. at 66 ("Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based on
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Even though the Meritor Court did not discuss how a plaintiff could prove
causation, it clearly assumed that a plaintiff could in fact do so-and may even have
assumed that the plaintiff in that case had done so. And this assumption seems to have
been based on attraction theory. Meritor, like virtually all of the other sexual
harassment cases up to that point, involved sexual advances by a male toward a
female. 90 Below, the D.C. Circuit had held that hostile environment harassment could
be discriminatory based largely on Bundy-that is, based on assumptions of attraction
and monosexuality from the male-to-female-advance paradigm. 91The Supreme Court
affirmed, appearing to endorse this reasoning. 92 Moreover, the Supreme Court
appeared to endorse the EEOC Guidelines, which, as discussed above, seemed to be
based largely on attraction theory.93 And the Court cited both Henson and Bundy with
approval,94 cases that, as discussed above, were solidly based on attraction theory.
Thus, Meritor could be understood as a strong endorsement of the use of attraction
theory-at least in the context of male-to-female
sexual advances.95 And, Meritorhas
96
way.
this
been widely understood
Thus, as of 1986, when Meritor was decided, the courts appear to have adopted
attraction theory as a method, if not the method, of proving causation in both quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment cases. And numerous commentators,
including feminists, seemed satisfied with this result.97
However, there were two problems lurking for attraction theory. First, the theory
appears to have been adopted almost entirely for its practical virtues--that is, for its
ability to demonstrate discriminatory causation, and therefore to provide victims of
discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited.") (emphasis added); id.
("[C]ourts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
enviromnent.") (emphasis added).
90. See id. at 60. Actually, this is a serious understatement; the male supervisor in that case
raped the plaintiff repeatedly.
91. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 145. The D.C. Circuit also relied on the EEOC's guidelines, which,
as discussed above, appear to be based largely on attraction theory.
92. Meritor,477 U.S. at 73. I say "appearing" because, as noted in the text, the Supreme

Court actually sidestepped the question of causation, stating only that sexual harassment would
be considered discriminatory where it was based on sex-a tautology. Id. at 64. However, the
Court did affirm the D.C. Circuit's ruling-which included a holding on causation that assumed
that the conditions for attraction theory were present based on the male-to-female-advance
paradigm.
93. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1723 ("[T]he Meritor Court broadly endorsed the EEOC
Guidelines, which the Court understood in sex per se terms"---that is, as allowing causation to
be assumed based solely on the existence of sexual conduct.).
94. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
95. Additionally, Meritor can be (or, at least, has been) understood as endorsing the
concept that the conditions required for the application of attraction theory (attraction and
monosexuality)-and thus causation-can be assumed, at least in cases involving male-tofemale advances, and quite possibly in all cases involving sexuality. That is, this case has been
largely understood as endorsing a sexuality proxy. See Schwartz, supranote 2, at 1723 (Meritor
"could well have been seen by lower courts as a suggestion that they might take the causation
element for granted and focus their attention on the other elements of the harassment claim.").
96. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1723.
97. See Note, supra note 63, at 1452-54, 1454 n.28 (expressing concern with plight of
women in sexualized workplaces and approval of court's adoption of anti-discrimination cause
of action-which, as discussed in the text, was premised largely on attraction theory).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:101

workplace sexual conduct with a remedy, in a streamlined and effective manner. This
theory did not offer any compelling conceptual reason why sexual conduct in the
workplace implicated anti-discrimination values. Thus, attraction theory was
conceptually unsatisfying, though practically useful.
Commentators seemed willing to forgive the theory its conceptual weakness as
long as it could fulfill its promise of practicality. However, the second problem lurking
for attraction theory was that it contained certain practical limitations. These
limitations were not apparent in most of the early sexual harassment cases involving
sexual advances by males toward females. However, they would soon become apparent
as the courts began to address new types of sexual harassment cases. These limitations,
or gaps, would form the primary basis for a torrent of virulent criticism of attraction
theory.
II.

COVERAGE GAPS AND THE FALL OF ATrRACTION THEORY

The fall of attraction theory began when a significant number of courts and
commentators came to realize that attraction theory would not work in all casesincluding cases that arguably involved core types of discrimination.
Most early sexual harassment cases had involved sexual advances, or actions that
courts interpreted as sexual advances, by men toward women. In such cases, courts
seemed willing to presume (1) that the harassers were motivated by sexual attraction,
and (2) that the harassers were monosexual (specifically, heterosexual). 98 Thus, the
courts could apply attraction theory to find causation. However, in the next wave of
sexual harassment cases, courts began to encounter fact patterns in which the
conditions required for the application of attraction theory were questionable or nonexistent. For example, in cases involving harassers and targets of the same sex, courts
often hesitated to find attraction or monosexuality. Courts also faced cases involving
bisexual harassers (that is, where the condition of monosexuality was absent), and
cases in which harassers' actions did not appear to be motivated by sexual attraction.
Because attraction theory had never been comprehensively articulated and its
boundaries had never been systematically explored, courts and commentators were illequipped to deal with these issues. When attraction theory is articulated and its
boundaries explored, it becomes apparent that the first issue (same-sex harassment) is
not problematic under attraction theory, and that the second and third issues (bisexual
harassers and harassment not motivated by attraction) simply represent limits on the
ability of attraction theory to show causation-coverage gaps.
Yet power-based theorists have seized on these issues as grounds for attacking
attraction theory. The thrust of this attack is that these
three issues render attraction
99
theory ineffective as a method of showing causation.
This Part will address these claims. Part A will argue that attraction theory is
perfectly viable in same-sex cases, and that the criticisms of the power-based theorists
in this area are not properly seen as criticisms of attraction theory. Parts B and C will
explore the bisexuality and non-attraction gaps respectively. And Part D will address
gaps that might result from the practical application of attraction theory, including
difficulties that might arise from trying to prove sexual orientation. This Part will
conclude that though these theoretical and practical gaps are real, and thus represent
98. Whether these presumptions make sense will be addressed infra in Part Il.D.2.b.
99. Power-theorist's alternative, normative critique, based on these gaps, is that these gaps
result in inequities among litigants. This critique will be explored infra in Part lIL.A.
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limits of attraction theory, they are not nearly so large as to render attraction theory
useless as a practical matter.
A. Same-Sex Cases Based on Attraction by Gays and Lesbians
One of the first areas in which courts and commentators experienced difficulty in
applying attraction theory involved so-called same-sex harassment cases--that is, cases
in which the harasser and the target were of the same sex. 1' ° Same-sex cases, like
opposite-sex cases, can be broken down into two categories: those based on sexual
attraction and those not based on sexual attraction. This Section will deal with
attraction-based same-sex cases.' 0 ' It will demonstrate that attraction theory is perfectly
capable of dealing with same-sex attraction-based cases. The only real issue that arises
in this area is with presumptions that the courts have applied regarding the sexual
orientation of harassers-presumptions that are not mandated by attraction theory.
Critics of attraction theory have found fault in its supposedly limited ability to deal
with same-sex harassment cases, even where those cases involved attraction. These
criticisms have tended to point to the hesitancy of several courts to adopt a cause of
action in same-sex cases. However, it is important to understand that this hesitancy
arose from two distinct sources-neither of which suggests a limit on the useftilness of
attraction theory.
One group of courts hesitated to provide a cause of action in same-sex cases
irrespective of causation (and thus, irrespective of attraction theory). Some of these
courts believed that Congress did not intend Title VII to apply to such cases. 102 Others
feared that providing a cause of action in such cases would effectively render sexual
orientation a protected characteristic under Title VII, a result they saw either as
undesirable or contrary to Congress's wishes. 0 3 Both views were ultimately repudiated
100. See Michael R. Triplett, Sexual Orientation:Same-Sex Harassment and Gender
Identity Are Hot LitigationIssues,ABA PanelistsSay, 56 Daily Labor Report (Bureau of Nat'l
Affairs, Wash. D.C.) Mar. 22, -2002, at C2 (same-sex harassment is significant area of
litigation).
101. Same-sex non-attraction-based cases will be addressed along with opposite-sex nonattraction cases infra in Part H.C.
102. E.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. 111. 1988) (Congress only
intended to protect persons from an environment that was anti-male or anti-female.); Garcia v.
Elf Atochem, 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. 1452);
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (agreeing with
Goluszek "that Title VII is aimed at a gender-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression
by a 'dominant' gender"); Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) (adopting reasoning
from Garcia, Vandeventer, and Goluszek); see also Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99
F.3d 138, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1996) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (Congress was concerned with
equality between men and women; same-sex harassment not within ambit of Title VII). But see
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 1, 1995) (criticizing view of Congressional intent espoused in Goluszek and its progeny).
103. See, e.g., Carreno v. Local 226, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Civ. A. No. 89-4083-S,
1990 WL 159199, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990) ("In this case, the harassment suffered by the
plaintiff was not encountered because of his sex; rather this harassment was encountered
because of his sexual preference."); see also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567 (7th
Cir. 1997) (citing district court Order at 3-4) (same), vacatedby City of Belleville v. Doe, 523
U.S. 1001 (1998); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (1lth Cir. 1997)
(Defendant argued that, to hold for same-sex plaintiff, was "in effect, to protect against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.").
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by the Supreme Court.' 4 But even while these views were still viable, disagreement
with them could not properly take the form of an attack on attraction theory-as
attraction theory had nothing to do with the courts' refusal to provide a cause of action
in same-sex cases.
A second group of courts (including the Supreme Court) have held that same-sex
cases can be actionable and that attraction theory may be used to show causation in
such cases. 0 5 The problem for these courts-and the focus of critics' attack on
attraction theory-is not the applicability of attraction theory in same-sex cases.
Rather, the problem concerns how a plaintiff can prove that the conditions for
attraction theory (particularly monosexuality) exist.
There is no doubt that attraction theory works in same-sex cases. Where the
conditions for the application of attraction theory exist, same-sex harassment is just
like opposite-sex harassment. Monosexuality (in same-sex cases, homosexuality)' °6 can
be used to show a habit of sex-based selection in the choice of sexual partners, and
attraction can be used to infer that the habit was germane to the case at hand. Thus, a
fact-finder 07can infer that the harasser selected the target based on sex-that is,
causation. 1

As most courts realized, the fact that Title VII might protect a plaintiff who happened to be
gay/lesbian or perceived as gay/lesbian was irrelevant. As long as the target was harassed
because of his or her sex, Title VII would be violated. E.g., Rene v. MGM Grand, 243 F.3d
1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510; Johnson v. Cmty. Nursing
Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 273 (D. Utah 1996) ("The fact that sexual preference may influence
the sexual harassment should not be reason to diminish, let alone invalidate, the fact that a
supervisor discriminated against an employee because of the employee's sex."); Tanner v. Prima
Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) ("Although Title VII does not
include a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation, homosexuals are just as
protected by Title VII's existing protections as anyone else.").

104. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
105. E.g., id.
106. As noted supra note 35, this Article uses the terms "gay" and "lesbian," rather than

"homosexual," as the latter term has come to carry certain negative connotations. However, in
discussing the state of being gay or lesbian, this Article will use the term "homosexuality." This
usage reflects the fact that the word "homosexuality," which is used as a clinical term in much
of the literature I address, does not seem to carry with it all of the negative connotations of the
word "homosexual"-and has not tended to be used as an epithet, as has the word
"homosexual." This usage also avoids the awkwardness of the extended phrase "state of being
gay or lesbian."
107. Early opposite-sex cases apparently recognized this, stating in dicta that their
reasoning (attraction theory) would apply--and causation would exist-in cases in which a gay
or lesbian harasser had made sexual advances toward a person of his or her own sex. E.g.,
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.3-4 and accompanying text (3rd Cir. 1977). Most early
commentators adopted a similar view. E.g., Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under
Title VIIfor Sexual HarassmentAfter Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1987 COLUM. L. REv.

1258, 1259 n.13 (Title VII covers both opposite-sex and same-sex harassment).
And most courts, when faced with actual same-sex cases, had no problem applying
attraction theory when they believed or were willing to assume that the harasser was gay or
lesbian. E.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus., 107 F.3d 443, 447-48 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[Ihis case

[involving male-on-male harassment] is as traditional as they come, albeit with a twist. It is
about an employee making sexual propositions to and physically assaulting a co-worker
because, it appears, he finds that co-worker sexually attractive. This is a scenario that has been
found actionable countless times over, when the aggressor is a male and the victim is a female.
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The issue in these cases has not been whether attraction theory works when its
conditions (monosexuality and attraction) are shown to be present; rather, the issue has
been how a plaintiff can show that these conditions are present. In opposite-sex cases,
courts often simply assumed (or maybe presumed) that sexual conduct was based on
sexual attraction and that the harasser was monosexual (heterosexual). Often, these
assumptions were made silently.' 08 Other courts were more candid regarding these
assumptions, justifying them based on the judges' (unsupported) assumptions about
"reality" or what "usually" occurs. For example, in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
&
Electric, Judge Neimeyer wrote:
When someone sexually harasses an individual of the opposite gender, a
presumption arises that the harassment is "because of' the victim's gender.
This presumption is grounded on the reality that sexual conduct directed
by a man, for example, toward a woman is usually undertaken because the
target is female and the same conduct would not have been directed toward
another male.'19
However, in same-sex cases, courts have been much more hesitant to assume attraction
and particularly monosexuality (homosexuality).' 10 As Judge Ellis put it in Tietgen v.

Brown's Westminster Motors:

Likewise, there is no serious question that the same scenario would be actionable in the less
typical case where the aggressor is a female and the victim is a male. Consequently, we find no
substantive difference between either of those situations and that present here."); see also
McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997); Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510;
Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752; Parrish v. Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co., No. 89 C4515, 1990 WL
165611, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990); Prescott v. Indep. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F.
Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
Eventually, the Supreme Court endorsed this view in Oncale, which held that a same-sex
plaintiff could show causation where he or she could show that the harasser is gay or lesbian
(and, presumably, that the harassment was motivated by attraction). 523 U.S. at 80.
108. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (asserting existence of
attraction and monosexuality with no discussion of evidence that would prove these facts);
Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4, 1048-49 (same); Costle, 561 F.2d at 990 (same); Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part, and vacated in part sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same).
109. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (Neimeyer, J, concurring) (emphasis added); see alsoTietgen
v. Brown's Westminster Motors, 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va. 1996) (in opposite sex
case, "the element of causation is self-evidently present"); id. at 1500-01 ("It is the essence of
sexual conduct between two individuals that the one initiating or inviting the conduct normally
does so because of the other's sex."). This reasoning appears to have been picked up by the
Supreme Court in Oncale. 523 U.S. at 80 ("Courts and juries have found the inference of
discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the
challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is
reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex.").
See infra Part H.D.2.b for a discussion of whether such a "presumption of heterosexuality"
makes sense.
110. Most courts in same-sex cases have focused on homosexuality, as opposed to
attraction, apparently willing to assume that sexual conduct by a gay or lesbian toward a samesex target must be motivated by attraction. Conversely, in same-sex cases where courts seemed
convinced harassment was based on sexual attraction, they have been willing to infer
homosexuality. Whether such inferences make sense will be addressed in Part I.D, infra.
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In the more typical cases noted above-where a male employer subjects a
woman to sexual touching, or to more harsh treatment than similarly
situated males-the element of causation is self-evidently present and
hence rarely disputed by the defendant. In same-sex harassment cases, by
contrast, causation is much less evident and may be difficult to prove. III
Several courts have declined to find causation where they have doubted that the
harasser was gay or lesbian." 2 And most courts that have found causation in same-sex
cases have done so only when presented with sufficient allegations (at the pleading
stage) or proof (at the summary judgment or directed verdict stage) that the harasser
was gay or lesbian.' 3
Effectively, these courts have adopted a presumption of heterosexuality. In
opposite-sex cases, this works in favor of the plaintiffs. Not only is monosexuality
(heterosexuality) presumed; attraction tends to be presumed as well in cases involving
sexual conduct by heterosexuals toward opposite-sex targets. However, in same-sex
cases, the presumption of heterosexuality serves as a significant barrier to plaintiffs.
Not only is homosexuality doubted; so is attraction. As Judge Niemeyer wrote:
[W]hen the harasser and the victim are the same [sex], the presumption
[regarding attraction] is just the opposite because such sexually suggestive
conduct is usually motivated by entirely different reasons.
Thus, when a male employee seeks to prove that he has been sexually
harassed by a person of the same sex, he carries the burden of proving that
the harassment was directed against him "because of' his sex."14
Judge Ellis similarly suggested that different presumptions are warranted in samesex cases "because the allegedly harassing conduct is often capable of being construed
not only as actionable harassment, but also, and perhaps more familiarly, as mere
locker room antics, joking, or horseplay." ' 15 Thus, he noted that, unlike opposite-sex
111. Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1501.
112. E.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 1995), rev'd,
90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no evidence of causation where there was no evidence
that the same-sex harassers were gay); Parrish v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C4515, 1990 WL
165611, at *3, *7 n.2 (N.D. 111. Oct. 16, 1990) (finding no causation where the plaintiff did not
allege that the same-sex harasser was gay).
Some courts went a step farther, holding that same-sex harassment could only be actionable
where the harasser was gay or lesbian. Compare Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d
138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996), with McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1195 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996). Such a position was tantamount to holding that the only way to prove
causation-at least in a same-sex case-is via attraction theory. The Supreme Court (correctly)
rejected this position. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
113. E.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 444, 448 (6th Cir.
1997) (emphasizing that the harasser was a "well known ... homosexual") (alteration added);
Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (Niemeyer, J., concurring); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94
Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983) ("since the evidence established the terminal
manager's homosexual proclivities, the harassment to which plaintiff complained was based
upon sex"); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. 1M. 1981); see
also Quick, 895 F. Supp. at 1297 n.7 (distinguishing cases where there was evidence that the
harasser was gay or lesbian).
114. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring).
115. Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1501.
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cases, where attraction would be presumed, plaintiffs in same-sex cases "must plead
and prove that the alleged harasser was sexually attracted to his victim or
homosexual."'116

The Supreme Court appears to have adopted a similar presumption in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, in which the Court stated: "The same chain of inference
[that is, attraction theory] would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex
harassment, ifthere were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.' 17 The
implication is that a same-sex plaintiff needs to present credible evidence of the
harasser's sexual orientation, while an opposite-sex plaintiff need not present any such
evidence.
This presumption of heterosexuality is potentially problematic. And critics of
attraction theory have spent a great deal of time attacking this presumption." 8 Part
II.D will address the issues that arise from this presumption. However, whatever
problems may be inherent in courts' presumption of heterosexuality, these problems
are not the product of attraction theory. Attraction theory merely requires either a
showing or an assumption regarding sexual orientation. The theory does not suggest
that sexual orientation should be assumed in some cases and not others, or that one
sexual orientation should be assumed and others accepted only with proof. In terms of
attraction theory, there is no reason that courts could not presume homosexuality,
heterosexuality, neither, or even both. Thus, it does not make sense to attack attraction
theory on the ground that, in applying that theory, courts have
adopted a set of
9
presumptions and nonpresumptions that may be problematic. 1
B. The Bisexuality Gap
Another category of cases in which courts and commentators have had trouble
with attraction theory involves harassers who are--or claim to be-bisexual. This Part
will demonstrate that these cases (unlike those involving same-sex harassment)
represent a true gap in the ability of attraction theory to demonstrate
discriminatory
20
causation. This gap will be referred to as the bisexuality gap.1
The possibility of a bisexual harasser has long occupied both courts and
theorists.12 ' However, as long as this possibility appeared to be purely theoretical, it
116. Id. at 1502.
117. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 735; Jane Gallop, The Lecherous Professor:A
Reading, DIFFERENCES: A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES, Summer 1995, at 1, 11.
119. In Part I.D.2.b, I will address the question of whether it makes sense to adopt some

kind of presumption regarding sexual orientation, either as an evidentiary matter or a policy
matter.
120. I use the word "gap" or "exception" to refer to a set of circumstances in which
attraction theory will not work. However, as we will see, many of the writers who discuss the
topic treat it as an exemption from liability under anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Charles R.
Calleros, Same-Sex Harassment,Textualism, FreeSpeech, and Oncale: Laying the Groundwork
for a Coherentand ConstitutionalTheory of Sexual HarassmentLiability, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 1, 39 (1988) (talking about "[I]mmunity under Title VII for the truly indiscriminate
harasser"); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333, 352 (1990). As I will discuss in the text, this is a
mischaracterization.
121. In early cases, several courts explained in dicta that, if they were to encounter a case
by a bisexual harasser, they would find no causation. The point, presumably, was to illustrate
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did not seem to cause much concern for feminists. Rather, the possibility of a

bisexuality gap was primarily the concern of a small group of conservatives who
opposed any treatment of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.1 At that
time, most feminists belittled the possibility of a bisexuality gap, arguing that the issue
was a "straw person" argument or "law professor's construct," with no practical
23
significance. 1
However, in modem times it has become apparent that there really do exist
bisexual harassers, or at least harassers who claim to be bisexual.124 Moreover, some of
the problems inherent in the issue of the bisexual harasser have appeared in the related
25
area of the so-called "equal opportunity" harasser.'
Perhaps as a result of this newfound practical significance, or perhaps as a result
of a broader normative agenda, modem feminist writers have joined the chorus of

(though not articulate) attraction theory--that is, the discriminatory nature of sexual conduct
(specifically, the sex-based selection of sexual partners) by monosexuals. See, e.g., Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805
F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n. 11 (11 th Cir.
1982) ("Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that
sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex."); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,990 n.55
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("These situations, like that at bar [where a man, who was presumed to be
heterosexual, made sexual advances toward a woman], are to be distinguished from a bisexual
superior who conditions the employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon
participation in a sexual affair. In the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual
favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female
employees alike.").
122. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("It would
be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was contemplated by the Act [Title
VII], because to do so would mean that if the conduct complained of was directed equally to
males there would be no basis for suit."). As will be discussed infra in Part IV.A.2, the
existence of a bisexuality gap is not a persuasive argument against an anti-discrimination
approach to sexual harassment (or against the use of attraction theory).
123. See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n. 11 (referring to the case of a bisexual harasser as
"exceedingly atypical"); Charles R. Calleros, The Meaningof "Sex": Homosexual andBisexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55, 77 (1995) ("purely bisexual harassment seems
to be exceedingly rare"); id. at 78 (referring to the case of a purely bisexual harasser as
"theoretical"); John J. Donahue, Review Essay, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1611 (1992) ("The case of the
bisexual harasser is a law professor's construct, not a serious basis for making policy."); Note,
Sexual HarassmentClaims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1449, 1454 n.28 (1984) (describing bisexual harassment as "a situation that has yet to appear in
any reported case"); see also MACKINNON, supranote 1, at 203 (suggesting the possibility of a
bisexual harasser should not be a matter of concern).
124. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 2000); Shepherd v. Slater
Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F.
Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (defendant claiming the harasser was bisexual); see also
Hopkins v. BaltimoreGas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 835 (D. Md. 1994) (plaintiff alleging
that the harasser was bisexual, presumably to be able to claim attraction despite the fact that the
harasser was married and had also harassed females).
125. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994)
(defendant alleging that the harasser abused both men and women). The bisexual harasser cases
may be thought of as a subset of "equal opportunity" harasser cases-that is, equal opportunity
harassment cases that involve sexual attraction.
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those concerned with the possibility of a bisexuality gap, using such a gap as a primary
basis for their attack on attraction theory. The thrust of their argument is that this gap
significantly diminishes the practical utility of attraction theory.126
Despite the fact that numerous writers have discussed the possibility of a
bisexuality gap--and despite the fact that such a gap has been at the core of an ongoing
debate about the viability of attraction theory, and even the viability of sexual
harassment law itself--the bisexuality gap has been vastly undertheorized and largely
misunderstood. This Part will attempt to fill this void, addressing the existence, size,
and significance of the bisexuality gap in attraction theory. First, this Part will show
that the gap is real-contrary to the arguments of many theorists who have attempted
to resist the notion that there is such a gap. It will then address the size of the gap,
concluding that the gap, while significant in some cases, is not nearly so large as to
diminish the practical utility of attraction theory.
1. The Existence of the Bisexuality Gap
A cottage industry has arisen in debating the existence of the bisexuality gap. Let
the debate end here: There is a bisexuality gap within attraction theory-though not
within sexual harassment law itself.
This gap is a result of the conditions required for attraction theory to demonstrate
discriminatory causation. One of the conditions required for the application of
attraction theory is monosexuality. That is, the harasser must be either heterosexual or
gay/lesbian, as opposed to bisexual. Where the harasser is bisexual, there is no habit of
sex-based selection in choosing sexual partners from which a factfinder might infer
causation.127 Thus, in such cases, attraction theory will not be available to demonstrate
causation. This is not to say that a bisexual cannot engage in sex discrimination. It is
only to say that attraction theory will not work to show causation in such cases; where
the harasser is bisexual, some other theory will be necessary to show causation.
Several writers have resisted the idea that there is a bisexuality gap. Some appear
motivated by a desire to find causation in specific cases. Others seem motivated to
defend attraction theory or even sexual harassment law itself, believing (erroneously)
that such a gap would be a serious or fatal blow to the enterprise. Six basic approaches
have emerged in this enterprise. This Part will briefly address each of these
approaches. Although some of these approaches are more promising than others, none
of these approaches seriously call into question the fact that there is a bisexuality gap
in attraction theory.
a. The "Doubting Bisexuality" Approach
Many courts and commentators, faced with the possibility of a bisexual harasser,
have simply expressed doubt that a particular harasser is in fact bisexual.' 28 This
126. See infra Part II.B.2.
127. It is possible, maybe likely, that bisexuals are not a monolithic group. Many social
scientists believe that some bisexuals are not "purely" bisexual in the sense that they generally
prefer either same-sex or opposite-sex partners. This issue will be dealt with infra in Part II.B.2.
128. See, e.g., Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1010 (doubting the defendant's characterization of
the harasser as bisexual); Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1463-64 (same); Chiapuzio,.826F. Supp. at 1337
("This Court would not so much characterize Bell as a bisexual harasser, but simply as an
'equal-opportunity' harasser whose remarks were gender-driven."); see also La Day v. Catalyst
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approach does not call into question the existence of the bisexuality gap. If anything,
this approach acknowledges the gap and simply tries to avoid the gap as a factual
matter.
A variation of the doubting bisexuality approach is the adoption of a presumption
of monosexuality-that is, to require defendants to prove bisexuality as an affirmative
defense. As discussed above, the courts have expressly adopted such a presumption in
opposite-sex cases.' 29 And, though not explicit, such a general presumption of
monosexuality may explain the "doubting bisexuality" approach taken by some courts
in same-sex cases. 130 However, this approach, like the basic doubting bisexuality
approach, does not call into question the existence of the bisexuality gap. Rather, it
assumes that the gap exists and tries to reduce its practical significance by shifting the
31
burden to the defendant to prove that the case falls within the gap.
b. The "If You Don't Like the Definition Change It" Approach
A second approach that writers have taken to resist the bisexuality gap is to
broaden the meaning of the phrase "because of sex" to include sexuality. Professor
Donahue, for example, asserts:
Sex is both a gender and a function or activity. A bisexual individual who
singles out employees for bad treatment because of their sexual attributes
is concerned with sex as a function or activity. Even if the bisexual

harasser violates equal numbers of men and women, it is not unthinkable
to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated badly
because of their sex. 132
The problem with this argument is that the courts have made it quite clear that "sex" in

anti-discrimination statutes refers to biological sex-not sexual activity. 133 Thus, this
argument does not refute the existence of a bisexuality gap in attraction theory.

Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that evidence of sexual advances is
sufficient to give rise to an inference of monosexuality--that is, to rebut a claim of bisexuality);
Holman, 211 F.3d at 406 (Equal Opportunity Employment Commission arguing that "the facts
could show that Uhrich harassed Karen out of spite because he was jealous of her relationship
with her husband (with whom Uhrich really wanted to have sexual relations) and thus was not
really an 'equal opportunity' [that is, bisexual] harasser").
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the
Development of Sexual HarassmentLaw, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 822 (2002) (suggesting that courts

have adopted this approach). Part II.D, infra, will argue that such a general presumption of
monosexuality is a good idea.
13 1. Whether such a presumption makes sense will be addressed infra in Part H.D.2.b.
132. Donahue, supra note 123, at 1611 n.134.
133. See, e.g., Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 751 (holding that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination

solely on the basis of whether the employee is a man or a woman); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,600 (7th
Cir. 1997) (Manion, J., dissenting) ("Thus, when Congress outlawed discrimination 'because of
such individual's sex,' it proscribed differentiating among individuals because of the
employee's status as a man or woman.").
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c. The "Same Harm" Approach
A third approach that writers have taken to resist the bisexuality gap is to focus on
the harm suffered by targets. These authors argue that the harm suffered by targets of
sexual harassment is the same whether the harasser is monosexual or bisexual. Thus,
bisexual harassment should be treated the same as targets
the argument goes, targets of
1 34
of monosexual harassment.
The problem with this argument is that it fails to account for the causation
requirement in anti-discrimination law. To make a claim of sex discrimination, a
plaintiff needs to show more than just harm; the plaintiff needs to show that the harm in
question occurred "because of'sex. The fact that the harm in question may have been
quantitatively or qualitatively similar to harm suffered by someone else who can show
causation does not itself suggest causation-it only suggests harm. Thus, this approach
does not refute the existence of a bisexuality gap in attraction theory.
d. The "There Might Be Causation" Approach
A fourth approach that some writers have taken to resist the bisexuality gap is
merely to speculate that there might be causation in such cases. For example, one court
has suggested that "it is not unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed
is being treated badly because of gender," that is, sex.135 Another writer has suggested
that it is possible that "a bisexual harasser harasses men because they are men, and
women because they are women."' 36 The problem with these statements is that the
authors do not explain themselves; they do not analyze the decisionmaking process. To
prove causation, it is necessary to understand the decisionmaking process--that is, to
show how sex is used in that process. Merely speculating that sex might be used in the
process is not helpful. Such speculation does not seriously call into question the
bisexuality gap.
The four approaches discussed above do not seriously attempt to understand the
decisionmaking process of a harasser, and thus cannot effectively argue about
causation in disparate treatment-which focuses on the decisionmaking process. Two
additional, more promising approaches do attempt to analyze the harasser's
decisionmaking process. However, neither of these approaches relies on attraction
theory to do so. Thus, neither casts doubt on the bisexuality gap in attraction theory.
e. The "Proving Causation by Other Methods" Approach
One promising approach to dealing with the bisexuality exception has been to
argue for causation using theories other than attraction theory. For example, in an early
(and prescient) piece on sexual harassment, Kerri Weisel argued that "although a
bisexual supervisor may not have a sexual preference for women, he might still harass

134. E.g., Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole
in Title VII Sexual HarassmentCases, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1014-15 (1996).

135. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993)
(quoting Donahue, supra note 123, at 1610-11).
136. Cathleen Marie Mogan, Note, CurrentHostile EnvironmentSexual HarassmentLaw:
Time to Stop Defendants from Having Their Cake and Eating It Too, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmcs & PUB. POLY 543, 574 (1992).
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only women in response to the prevailing stereotype."' 137 In other words, Ms. Weisel
went beyond merely speculating that a bisexual harasser might engage in sex-based
selection; she suggests a mindset-stereotyping-that would represent sex-selective
decisionmaking, and thus disparate treatment. 38 Recently, this type of mindset has
39
received a great deal of attention as a way of demonstrating disparate treatment. 1
Thus, this might be a promising theory.
Other writers have suggested that causation might be proven if a bisexual harasser
can be shown to have engaged in quantitatively different conduct toward men and
women-that is, targeted men and women disproportionately.140 Such an approach may
simply be a way of showing that the harasser is not in fact bisexual-that is, a variation
of the doubting bisexuality approach discussed above.' 4' But it may also be seen as an
argument that the target of a bisexual harasser may be able to show causation by
reference to comparative or statistical evidence.
However, these arguments are not about attraction theory. To the contrary, these
writers are suggesting ways to prove causation without using attraction theory in order
to avoid the bisexuality gap in attraction theory. Thus, these arguments do not refute
the bisexuality gap in attraction theory.
f. The "Secondary Discrimination" Approach
The last approach that writers have taken to resisting the bisexuality gap involves
suggestions that the harasser has engaged in qualitatively different conduct toward men
and women. 42 This might simply amount to an argument that the harasser is not in fact
bisexual-that is, yet another variation of the doubting bisexuality approach addressed
above. 143 Alternatively, this approach might be based on the (more promising)
argument that a bisexual harasser could engage in what I call "secondary
discrimination."
Secondary discrimination is the idea that, while a perpetrator may not select
targets for mistreatment based on a protected characteristic, once the targets have been
selected, the perpetrator may decide how to mistreat them based on protected
characteristics. For example, consider a perpetrator, H, who decides to harm all
persons who stand in the way of his professional ambitions. In such a case, H has not
selected targets to inflict harm upon based on race or sex, or any other characteristic
that would be prohibited by anti-discrimination law; he has selected targets based
137. Weisel, supranote 48, at 137 n.63.
138. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(holding that stereotyping based on gender is discrimination under Title VII).
139. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd
en banc, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).
140. See Calleros, supra note 120, at 39 (suggesting bisexual harassers may harass men
and women "with different frequency").
141. See supra Part II.B.1.a. Alternatively, this argument may be meant to suggest that the
harasser is not "purely" bisexual, as Professor Calleros argues in a later article that the
bisexuality exception will only apply to "pure" bisexuals. See Calleros, supra note 123, at 72.
This argument is addressed in Part II.B.2 infra.
142. See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 123, at 72 (suggesting a bisexual harasser might harass
men and women "in such different ways or to such different degrees" as to prove causation); see
also Calleros, supra note 120, at 39 (suggesting a bisexual harasser may "harass men and
women in different ways").
143. See supra Part H.B.I.a.
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solely by reference to a non-protected characteristic (the fact that the targets stand in
the way of H's career progression).
Suppose, however, that in deciding how to harm his targets, H chooses a method
of harm for each target that is based on protected characteristics of the already-selected
targets. For example, suppose that H decides to display lynching pictures to an African
American who stands in his way, or swastikas to a Jew who stands in his way. In such a
situation, the latter decision-that is, the selection of a method of harm-is based on
the protected characteristic. That is, the perpetrator considers the protected
characteristic to determine the method of harm to inflict on his or her already-selected
targets. 144 In such a case, even if the harasser cannot be seen as engaging in disparate
treatment in choosing targets, the harasser may be shown to have engaged in disparate
treatment in deciding how to treat targets once they have been chosen.
This concept might be applied to sexual harassment by a bisexual harasser. The
bisexual harasser may choose targets without reference to their sex; but once a target
has been chosen, the harasser may engage in qualitatively different conduct toward the
target depending on whether the target is male or female. For example, a bisexual
harasser may "wine and dine" men, but take a more direct approach with women. Or
145
the harasser may engage in more demeaning conduct toward one sex than the other.
This approach, while potentially promising in terms of suggesting a method for
proving discriminatory causation in cases involving bisexual harassers, 146 does not
involve attraction theory. Rather, like the proving-causation-by-other-methods
approach, this approach suggests a method of proving causation other than attraction
theory. It does not contradict the fact that attraction theory will not work in cases
involving bisexual harassers.
In summary, despite numerous attempts to resist this conclusion, there exists in
attraction theory a bisexuality gap.
2. The Size of the Bisexuality Gap
Another group of writers has acknowledged that there is, in fact, a bisexuality gap
in attraction theory, but have debated the size-and thus the significance--of the gap.
This debate starts from the premise that attraction theory will not work when the
harasser is bisexual, and proceeds to argue over who counts as bisexual for this
purpose. If the definition of bisexual were expansive, the bisexual gap would be
significant, limiting the usefulness of attraction theory. But if the definition were
narrow, the bisexual gap would be small, increasing the utility of attraction theory.
144. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a dispute begun over a commission resulted in discriminatory sexual harassment).
145. This may be what Professor Calleros is suggesting when he talks about proving
causation in cases involving bisexual harassers by showing that they harass men and women in
"different ways" or to "different degrees." See Calleros, supra note 123, at 72 ("Even a bisexual
harasser can run afoul of Title VII if he or she harasses in such different ways or to such
different degrees that an employee is subjected to different terms or conditions of employment
based on the employee's gender."); see also Calleros, supra note 120, at 39 ("[Tlhe [bisexual]
harasser is much more likely to harass men and women in different ways, with different
frequency, or to different degrees. In any such case, the plaintiff would have the opportunity to
show that the differential treatment exposed him or her to conditions of work to which members
of the other sex were not subjected.").
146. Of course, a plaintiff would presumably need to come up with some proof that the
harasser engaged in secondary discrimination.
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The debate over who counts as bisexual arises from the suggestion by social
scientists that sexual orientation is not a set of three discrete categories (heterosexual,
bisexual, gay/lesbian), but rather is a continuum.147 More specifically, these scientists
suggest, bisexuality is not monolithic. Some bisexuals might be truly indifferent to the
sex of potential sexual partners. These individuals can be thought of as "pure"
bisexuals. But other bisexuals, though willing to engage in sexual relations with both
men and women, might have a preference for partners of one sex. These individuals
can be thought of as "preferential" bisexuals.
Perhaps the best known of these social science researchers, Alfred Kinsey, has
derived a seven-point scale (from 0 to 6) to describe sexual orientation.148 Those who
are purely heterosexual are at the 0 end of the scale, those who are purely gay/lesbian
are at the 6 end of the scale. The points on the scale from I to 5 represent bisexuals
with varying degrees of sex-based preference for sexual partners. A person who is a 1
would strongly prefer opposite-sex partners, but be attracted in some cases to same-sex
partners; a 2 would have a slight preference for opposite-sex partners; a 3 would be
completely indifferent; a 4 would have a slight preference for same-sex partners; and149a
5 would have a strong, though not exclusive, preference for same-sex partners.
Based on the Kinsey scale, we can refer to Os as "pure heterosexuals," 6s as "pure
gay/lesbians," 3s as "pure bisexuals," and Is, 2s, 4s, and 5s as "preferential bisexuals."
The issue for attraction theory is whether the bisexuality gap applies to
preferential bisexuals (that is, Kinsey Is, 2s, 4s, and 5s), or only to pure bisexuals
(Kinsey 3s). As discussed above, attraction theory clearly works where the harasser is
purely monosexual (Kinsey Os or 6s).150 It is also clear that attraction theory will not
work-that is, there is a gap in attraction theory-where the harasser is purely bisexual
(Kinsey 3s).I51 Thus, the issue is whether attraction theory works--or wheth6r the
bisexuality gap extends to-preferential bisexuals (Kinsey Is, 2s, 4s, and 5s). Legal
writers have debated-or, at least, made assertions regarding--this issue for some time
now.
Some writers, including Charles Calleros, have asserted that attraction theory will
work anytime the harasser is not "purely bisexual" (Kinsey 3s)-that is, that it will
work where the harasser is preferentially bisexual. 15 2 Professor Calleros' s point is that

147. See, e.g.,

ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638-55

(W.B. Saunders Co. 1948) [hereinafter KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN MALE]; Schrof &Wagner, supra
note 34, at 74 (discussing a recent sex survey) ("[Jlust 2.8 percent of men and 1.4 percent of
women say they are gay. When the question is broader, 10.1 percent of men and 8.6 percent of
women either identify themselves as gay, say they have had a sexual experience with someone
of the same gender or claim to have some physical attraction to members of the same sex."). See
also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 589 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Few people are either
entirely heterosexual or homosexual in orientation, for example-zeros or sixes on the Kinsey
scale.... Many people who are heterosexual have had one or more homosexual experiences in
their lives, although that does not make them gay, and likewise many gay and lesbian
individuals have had heterosexual experiences.").
148.

KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN MALE,

supra note 147, at 638-55.

149. Id.
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. See supra Part II.B.1.
152. See Calleros, supra note 123, at 77 (arguing that attraction theory will not work where
the harasser is "purely bisexual"); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996)
(same). Actually, these writers are not self-consciously describing a limit of attraction theory;
rather, they are talking about the limits of sexual harassment law itself. However, they seem to
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the bisexuality gap is small; that because the gap only applies in cases of "purely
bisexual" harassers, which he claims are
"exceedingly rare," it does not significantly
153
reduce the utility of attraction theory.
Other writers, however, have taken the opposite position. Professor Franke, for
example, asserts that attraction theory will not work in cases involving preferential
bisexuals-that the theory will only work in cases involving harassers that are "pure"
heterosexuals (Kinsey Os) or "pure" gays/lesbians (Kinsey 6s). 154 Similarly, Judge
Rovner suggests that attraction theory will55 only apply to harassers who are exclusively
heterosexual or exclusively gay/lesbian.1
The point of writers such as Professor Franke or Judge Rovner is to criticize
attraction theory. As Judge Rovner put it, "Few people are either entirely heterosexual
' 56
or homosexual in orientation, for example-zeros or sixes on the Kinsey scale."'
These writers assume that a small percentage of the population falls within these
groups and that the utility of attraction theory is therefore extremely limited. They
therefore argue that attraction theory needs to be either supplemented or discarded. 157
Neither side in this debate has engaged in significant analysis. The following two
Subparts will provide this analysis. They will conclude that, though neither side in this
debate is completely correct, attraction theory is not as limited as its opponents have
suggested. Attraction theory will sometimes work where the harasser is preferentially
bisexual.
a. Preferential Bisexuals (Kinsey Is,2s, 4s, or 5s): Attraction-Based Conduct
Consistent with Preference
Whether attraction theory will work for preferential bisexuals (or whether the
bisexuality gap extends to this population) depends in large part on the degree-ofcausation that is required under the anti-discrimination doctrine of disparate
treatment-an issue currently debated among the lower federal courts and undecided
by the Supreme Court.158 There are at least four possible positions on this issue.
assume that sexual harassment law is co-extensive with attraction theory.
153. Calleros, supra note 123, at 77-78.
154. E.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 737 ("As a logical matter, this reasoning [attraction
theory] works only in a world populated exclusively by Kinsey Ones and Kinsey Sixes, that is,
people who are exclusively heterosexual or exclusively homosexual."). Though Professor
Franke refers to "Kinsey Ones and Kinsey Sixes" as being "pure" heterosexuals and
homosexuals respectively, she apparently means Kinsey Os and 6s.
155. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 589.
157. There might appear to be a certain irony in feminists making arguments that there are
large coverage gaps in attraction theory. After all, if courts were to accept these arguments, more
victims of sexual harassment would fall within these gaps. Thus, victims who might otherwise
prove causation through attraction theory would need to find some other way to prove
causation. Second-generation feminists seem unconcerned about this possibility, presumably
based on the fact that they have proposed alternative theories of causation that they hope will
provide universal coverage. However, as discussed in Part IV infra, it is not clear how confident
we should be that any theory offered so far would provide such universal coverage.
158. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
537 U.S. 1099 (2003), afd, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (2003) (describing a circuit split on issues of the
degree-of-causation required to prevail in a disparate treatment case and the level of proof
required to shift the burden to the defendant to prove an absence of this level of causation);
Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment DiscriminationLaw Revisited: A Brief
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One position would hold that disparate treatment doctrine requires no particular
perpetrator
degree-of-causation. That is, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the
1 59
considered sex-that is, took sex into account-in his or her decision.
If such a low degree-of-causation is sufficient, then attraction theory will work for
all preferential bisexual harassers. Preferential bisexuals may be seen as having a nonexclusive habit of selecting sexual partners based on their sex. That is, the habit either
does not apply in all cases or does not control all cases in which it applies. But it is
nonetheless a habit of sex-based selection. Accordingly, we can infer in any particular
case that the harasser did consider sex. That is, we can prove a low degree-of-causation
in cases involving preferential bisexuals using attraction theory.160 The bisexuality gap
would apply only to pure bisexuals (Kinsey 3s).
A second, intermediate position on degree-of-causaton would hold that disparate
treatment doctrine requires some heightened degree-of-causation (but not an outcomedeterminative level of causation). That is, a plaintiff must show not only that the
perpetrator considered sex in his or her decision, but also that sex played some
threshold level of significance in the decisionmaking process. For example, it might be
necessary for the plaintiff to show that sex played an "important" or "significant" role
in the perpetrator's decision. 16' However, under such an intermediate degree-ofcausation requirement, it would not be necessary to show that sex played an outcomedeterminative (for example, "but for") role in the decision.
Under such an intermediate degree-of-causation requirement, an argument can be
made that attraction theory would work for some, but not all, preferential bisexuals.
Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REv. 651,658 (2000). The Supreme Court in Costa
addressed the type of proof necessary to obtain a "mixed motive" instruction, which seems to
provide for liability based on a low level of causation, but permit defendants to avoid some
damages by showing a lack of "but for" causation. Costa, 123 S. Ct. at 2153-55. However, the
Court did not address the precise level of causation necessary under either the "mixed-motive"
or "single-motive" approach, or how to determine which approach is appropriate in a particular
case. This Article will not take a position on these issues; rather, it will describe the effect of the
various possible outcomes of the debate on the applicability of attraction theory to preferential
bisexuals.
159. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,242 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(observing that "gender may not be considered"); id. (noting that the decisionmaker may not
"take [sex] into account"); id. at 241 (noting that a plaintiff must show that sex was "a factor" in
the decision); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (stating that a
plaintiff must show that sex was "a motivating factor" in the decision-a phrase used by the
Hopkins plurality).

160. One might argue that, at some point, the harasser's preference could become too weak
to serve as evidence of habit. For example, one might suggest that attraction theory might prove
a low degree-of-causation in cases involving Kinsey Is and 5s, but not Kinsey 2s and 4s.
However, this argument misses the point that a sexual orientation of Kinsey 2 or 4 is, by
definition, a habit of engaging in sex-based selection. Where the habit is weak, a factfinder
might conclude that it was not applied in a particular instance--that is, that the person did not
act according to his or her habit. See FED. R. EvID. 406 (a jury may conclude, from evidence of
habit, that a person acted in conformity with that habit on the occasion in question-suggesting
that a jury might also decline to reach such a conclusion). However, that would seem to be a
jury question. As long as only a low degree-of-causation is required, a jury could reasonably
find causation in cases involving all types of preferential bisexuals.
161. See, e.g., Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion) (noting that stereotyping played
"an important part of the Policy Board's decision"); Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco,
741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that sex was a "significant factor").
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Some bisexuals' preference for partners of a particular sex might be so low that sex
could not be thought of as sufficiently "important" or "significant" to their
decisionmaking process to satisfy an intermediate degree-of-causation requirement.
Such persons might be referred to as being "weakly preferential" bisexuals (perhaps
roughly analogous to Kinsey 2s or 4s). 162 Other bisexuals, in contrast, might have a
sufficiently strong preference for partners of a particular sex that sex could be seen as
being sufficiently causal in the decisionmaking process. Such persons might be
referred to as "strongly preferential" bisexuals (perhaps roughly analogous to Kinsey
Is or 5s). Thus, under an intermediate degree-of-causation requirement, attraction
theory would work for strongly preferential bisexuals, but not weakly preferential
bisexuals. That is, the bisexuality gap would apply only to pure bisexuals (Kinsey 3s)
and weakly preferential bisexuals (roughly, Kinsey 2s and 4s), but not to strongly
preferential bisexuals (roughly, Kinsey Is and 5s).
A third position on degree-of-causation would hold that a decision can only be
disparate treatment where sex plays an outcome determinative role in the decision-for
example, where sex can be said to be a "but for" cause of the decision. 163 (Such
position will be referred to as a high, or "but for," degree-of-causation requirement.)
Under a "but for" standard, attraction theory would not apply to preferential bisexuals.
Because, by definition, preferential bisexuals are willing to engage in sexual relations
with males or females, it would appear impossible to say that, but for being of a
particular sex, the target would not have been selected. Thus, under such a standard,
attraction theory would work only for purely monosexual harassers (Kinsey Os and
6s)-and the bisexuality gap would apply to all bisexuals, pure or preferential (Kinsey
Is,2s, 3s, 4s, or 5s).
A fourth position on degree-of-causation is a variation of the third ("but for")
position. This position would hold that "but for" causation is ultimately required, but
would also hold that a plaintiff need not show "but for" causation. Rather, by showing
some lower degree-of-causation (e.g., low-level causation), the plaintiff can shift the
burden to the defendant to show a lack of "but for" causation.16 4 Such a burden-shifting
position would, like a "but for" requirement, preclude the use of attraction theory for
preferential bisexual harassers. However, if a plaintiff could produce proof that a
harasser was either exclusively monosexual or preferentially bisexual (that is, anything
other than purely bisexual), the burden would shift to the defendant to show that the
harasser was not exclusively monosexual.
162. Dr. Kinsey does not appear to have tried to calibrate his categories to any particular
degree-of-causation. I do so only for purposes of drawing a rough analogy.
163. See, e.g., Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I disagree with
the plurality's dictum that the words 'because of do not mean 'but-for' causation; manifestly
they do."); see also Franke, supra note 3, at 731-32 (suggesting that disparate treatment requires
showing of "but for" causation-and, interestingly, referring to attraction theory as "but for"
doctrine).
164. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stating that liability attaches upon a showing by a
plaintiff that sex was "a motivating factor," but a defendant can avoid some damages by
showing that it would have reached the same decision without considering sex); see also Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2154-55 (2003) (holding that there is no need to
introduce heightened quantity or quality of evidence to shift the burden).
Note that such a burden-shifting scheme might either allow the defendant to avoid all
liability, see Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 242, or attach liability upon a showing of at least low-level
causation, and merely limit damages where the defendant demonstrates less than "but for"
causation, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2001).
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b. Preferential Bisexuals (for Example, Kinsey Is, 2s, 4s, or 5s): Attraction-Based
Conduct Contrary to Preference
The previous Subpart demonstrated that, depending on the degree-of-causation
required by disparate treatment doctrine, attraction theory may demonstrate causation
in all, some, or no cases involving preferential bisexual harassers. However, even
under degree-of-causation regimes that would permit the use of attraction theory for
some or all preferential bisexuals, an additional qualification is necessary. This is
because most anti-discrimination laws require two basic elements: harm and
causation. 165
Whether there is harm will depend, at least in part, on whether the harasser's
conduct is consistent with, or contrary to, the harasser's sexual preference. For Kinsey
Is or 2s, who would prefer opposite-sex partners, selection of an opposite-sex target
would be consistent with that preference, while selection of a same-sex target would be
contrary to that preference. For Kinsey 4s and 5s, who prefer same-sex partners,
selection of a same-sex target would be consistent with that preference, while selection
of an opposite-sex target would be contrary to that preference.
Where a preferential bisexual harasses consistent with preference, there will be
harm, as well as causation (depending on the degree-of-causation required). However,
where a preferential bisexual harasses contrary to his or her preference, there will be
no harm caused by the selection process.
To illustrate this point, suppose that a male harasser who is a Kinsey 5 (that is, has
a strong preference for same-sex partners) makes unwelcome, attraction-based sexual
advances toward a same-sex (male) target. The harasser might have considered making
advances toward a female target, but, by definition, he will prefer a male target. Thus,
if the harasser selects a male target, we can say that the harasser's sexual166preference
contributed to the fact that the advance-and thus, the harm-occurred.
165. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (a plaintiff must show both harm (e.g., termination or
failure to hire) and causation ("because of" a protected characteristic)).
166. 1 am assuming that there is harm from unwanted requests for sexual activity-at least
where they are unwelcome and severe or pervasive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993) (holding that conduct must be unwelcome and severe or pervasive to be sexual
harassment); 1LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supranote 21, at 785-805 (same). This requirement is
apparently a way of assuring that there is some minimal level of harm.
There has been some excellent research on the harms caused by various forms of sexual
harassment. See BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 71 (1985) (victims of sexual
harassment often experience disgust, anger, anxiety, hurt, depression, sadness, or guilt);
Abrams, supra note 5, at 1197 n.159 (intense self-doubt is a major theme among women who
speak about their experiences of harassment); Grover, supra note 64, at 249 n.32 (book review)
(discussing studies suggesting that harassment victims feel a lack of self-worth); Lenhart, M.D.,
supra note 64, at 24-25 (discussing a 1992 study showing that sexual violation, especially
harassment, causes self-doubt).
In quid pro quo cases, where requests for sexual relations are accompanied by a threat,
there is additional harm. The target is placed in the position of having to choose between
unwanted sex and adverse consequences-analogous to rape. And even if the request is
accompanied by a promise of some benefit for compliance, with no express or implied threat of
adverse consequences, we may still say that there is harm above and beyond hostile environment
harassment: Such an advance insultingly suggests that the target would trade sexual favors for
job benefits-that is, that she is a prostitute. See Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d
1080, 1086-87 (Md. 2000) (holding that quid pro quo harassment violates public policy against
solicitation for prostitution).

2004]

RECONSIDERING A TTRA CTION

However, suppose that a male Kinsey 5 has made an unwelcome, attraction-based
advance toward a woman. 167 Because the harasser prefers partners of one sex over the
other, we may conclude that he took sex into account when he made his decision
(which should be sufficient to show causation under a low or intermediate degree-ofcausation regime). However, the way in which the harasser took sex into account
favored the female target. That is, the harasser's habitual selection process would
reduce the likelihood that a woman would be selected for an unwelcome attractionbased advance (that is, harmed), even though, as it turned out, a woman was selected.
This is analogous to a white job applicant who fails to obtain ajob at an employer
that discriminates against minority applicants in favor of whites. The white applicant
was favored by the employer's discrimination-albeit not enough to avoid the harm in
question (in this case, failure to obtain the job). Similarly, the woman harassed by the
male Kinsey 5 was favored by his discrimination in selecting sexual targets, albeit not
enough to avoid the harm in question (here, the unwelcome advance). In this sense,
while there may have been discriminatory causation (for example, the protected
characteristic was considered), there was no harm.
It might be argued that there is harm based upon the simple fact that the target
experienced the advance as unwelcome. However, such an argument fails to account
for the fact that there needs to be a relationship between the decisionmaking process
that is being challenged and the harm. 16 8 If the process increases the probability of
ultimate harm, the process can be said to cause harm. However, if the process
decreases the probability of ultimate harm, the process cannot be said to cause harmeven though the ultimate harm may well occur notwithstanding that the process had
decreased the risk.
The same is true in the case of the white job applicant rejected despite the
application of an anti-minority hiring process. The white applicant was hurt, not by the
decisionmaking process, but by the fact that the process did not favor him enough.
Similarly, a person who is targeted for attraction-based conduct contrary to preference
by a preferential bisexual is hurt, not by the fact that the harasser considered sex in the
decisionmaking process, but,by the fact that the harasser did not consider sex enough
to avoid selecting the target. In such a case, the target cannot be considered to have
been harmed by the decisionmaking process, and thus, cannot maintain an action under
disparate treatment law.
3. The Significance of the Bisexuality Gap
In summary, there is a bisexuality gap. Attraction theory will not work to show
causation where the harasser is purely bisexual under any circumstances. If disparate
treatment doctrine requires a low degree-of-causation, the bisexuality gap will only
extend to purely bisexual harassers (Kinsey 3s). If disparate treatment requires an
intermediate degree-of-causation, the bisexuality gap will also extend to weakly
preferential bisexual harassers (roughly, Kinsey 2s through 4s). And if "but for"
causation is required, the bisexuality gap will extend to all bisexuals-pure, weakly
167. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-10,
Talbot v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (D.C. Idaho 1997) (No. CIV 96-0406-S-EJL) (on file with
author) (female plaintiff claiming that sexual conduct by gay male coworker might have been
sexual advance toward her).
168. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (suggesting that an adverse decision-that is,
harm-must be because of sex in cases of disparate treatment).
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preferential, and strongly preferential (Kinsey Is through 5s).
The question remains: Under any of these degree-of-causation regimes, does the
bisexuality gap limit the utility of attraction theory to the point where it is no longer
worth considering? The answer is no. While it is difficult to know exactly what
percentage of the population-much less what percentage of harassers-falls within
any particular Kinsey category, it appears that, under any degree-of-causation
requirement, a substantial portion of the population will fall within categories covered
by attraction theory.
Under the most stringent degree-of-causation requirement, attraction will work for
Kinsey Os and 6s. Social scientists estimate that between 89% and 90% of adults are
exclusively monosexual (Kinsey Os or 6s).169 Thus, even under a "but17for"
standard, the
0
bisexuality gap should only affect between 10% and 11% of cases.
If an intermediate degree-of-causation were required, the bisexuality gap would
shrink further. Social scientists estimate that between 92% and 96% of adults are
exclusively or predominantly monosexual (Kinsey Os, Is, 5s, and 6s).171 Thus, under an
169. See KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN MALE, supra note 147, at 653 (85.0% of males 16-55 are
Kinsey Os; 5.0% are Kinsey 6s; total 90.0%); ALFRED C. KINSEY, SEXuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE 499 (1953) [hereinafter KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN FEMALE] (roughly 87.6% of
females 20 and over reporting sexual contacts or responses are Kinsey Os; 1.1% are Kinsey 6s;

total 88.7%); see also Schrof & Wagner, supra note 34, at 74 (discussing a recent sex survey)
("10.1 percent of men and 8.6 percent of women either identify themselves as gay, say they have
had a sexual experience with someone of the same gender or claim to have some physical
attraction to members of the same sex"--suggesting that 89.9% of men and 91.4% of women
describe themselves as exclusively heterosexual, and thus monosexual).
It may be noted that this research is based almost entirely on self-reporting. From a
scientific perspective, self-reporting is problematic and may well lead to systematic underreporting of certain sexual orientations. However, under-reporting seems to be less of an issue in

terms of determining the significance of the bisexuality gap in attraction theory. If harassers
self-report as (that is, admit) being within a category of sexual orientation for which attraction

theory works---even if they do so erroneously--then the gap in attraction theory will be small.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (admissions by party opponents do not constitute hearsay). And
while there might be different incentives to self-report in a lawsuit than in a scientific study, two
facts suggest that these differences will be small. First, the incentives to change self-reporting to

See

avoid liability in a lawsuit are relatively weak, since employers, rather than employees are liable
in such lawsuits. See Falbaum v. Pomerantz, Nos. 00-9039, 00-9049, 2001 WL 1019616, at *4
(2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) (holding that no personal liability exists under Title VII); Wathen v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295,
1313-14 (2d Cit. 1995) (same). Second, the incentives to report as monosexual remain strong in
this context. See Laurie Schaffner, Female Juvenile Delinquency: Sexual Solutions, Gender
Bias, and Juvenile Justice, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 18-20 (1998) (discussing "the social
stigma and marginalization arising from homophobia"); see also Linda M. Laarman, Employer
Health Coveragefor Domestic Parmers-Identifyingthe Issues, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 567,
569 (1993) (acknowledging that the social stigma attached to homosexuality makes the abuse of
domestic partner benefits unlikely). In fact, such incentives might be even stronger in the
context of a lawsuit, where anonymity is not as likely as it would be in a scientific survey.
170. The analysis in this Subpart assumes that the orientation of the population of harassers
mirrors that of the general population. It also does not take into account harassment contrary to
preference.
171. See KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN MALE, supra note 147, at 653 (85.0% of males 16-55 are
Kinsey Os; 1.4% are Kinsey Is; 0.7% are Kinsey 5s; 5.0% are Kinsey 6s; total 92.1%); KINSEY
ET AL., HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499 (87.6% of females 20 and over reporting sexual
contacts or responses are Kinsey Os; 6.1% are Kinsey Is; 0.9% are Kinsey 5s; and 1.1% are
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intermediate degree-of-causation requirement, the bisexuality gap should only affect
between 4% and 8% of cases.
Moreover, if only a low degree-of-causation were required, the bisexuality gap
would shrink even further. Social scientists estimate that between 98% and 99% of
adults are exclusively or preferentially monosexual (Kinsey Os, Is, 2s, 4s, 5s, and
6s).172 Thus, under a low-level degree-of-causation requirement, the bisexuality gap
should only affect between 1% and 2% of cases.
In addition, it is arguable that the figures used here underestimate the utility of
attraction theory. These figures address the percentage of the general population that
fall within a particular Kinsey category or categories. However, in many sexual
harassment cases, it may often be possible to limit the relevant population. For
example, in an opposite-sex attraction case, we can eliminate the possibility that the
harasser is purely gay/lesbian (Kinsey 6). Thus, to determine the likelihood that
attraction theory would work in such a case, we would need to look only at the
percentage of the remaining population (Kinsey Os through 5s) that fall into the
particular Kinsey category or categories required for attraction theory.
This percentage
73
will tend to be even higher than the percentages discussed above. 1
Thus, under any degree-of-causation requirement, the bisexuality gap should not
sufficiently diminish the utility of attraction74theory-much less provide an argument
for marginalizing or scrapping that theory.
C. HarassmentBased on Motivations Other Than Sexual Attraction
A final area in which courts and commentators have run into the limits of
attraction theory-and, as a result, have come to question the theory-are cases in
Kinsey 6s; total 95.7%); see also Schrof & Wagner, supranote 34, at 74 (discussing recent sex
survey) ("10.1 percent of men and 8.6 percent of women either identify themselves as gay, say
they have had a sexual experience with someone of the same gender or claim to have some
physical attraction to members of the same sex."); San Francisco Public Library Gay & Lesbian

Center, GLBT Demographics:How Many Lesbians and Gay Men Are There? (June 1999), at
http://sfpl.lib.ca.us/librarylocations/main/glc/ glbtdemo.htm (surveying literature; noting that
Kinsey estimated that roughly 10% of men were Kinsey 5s or6s and 2-6% of women were more
or less exclusively gay/lesbian) (last visited Jan. 12, 2004); Pierre J. Tremblay, The
Homosexuality Factorin the Youth Suicide Problem app. A, 6th Annual Conference of the
Canadian Association for Suicide Prevention, Banff, Alberta, Canada, October 11-14, 1995, at
http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/youth/tre mblay/main.html (surveying literature; concluding that
the best estimate of those who are gay/lesbian or predominantly gay/lesbian is in the 5% range)
(last visited Jan 12, 2004).
172. See KINSEY Er AL., HUMAN MALE, supra note 147, at 653 (85.0% of males 16-55 are
Kinsey Os; 1.4% are Kinsey Is; 4.9% are Kinsey 2s; 0.8% are Kinsey 4s; 0.7% are Kinsey 5s;
5.0% are Kinsey 6s; total 97.8%); KINSEY Er AL., HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499
(roughly 87.6% of females 20 and over reporting sexual contacts or responses are Kinsey Os;
6.1% are Kinsey Is; 2.4% are Kinsey 2s; 1.1% are Kinsey 4s; 0.9% are Kinsey5s; and 1.1% are
Kinsey 6s; total 99.2%); see also BusINEss WoMEN's NErWORK, WOW! FACTS 2002, at 618 (3d
ed. 2002), available at http://www.ewowfacts.comlpdfs/chapters/62.pdf (study among gay,
lesbian, and transgendered population indicating that 91% self-report as gay, lesbian, or
homosexual, while only 6% self-report as bisexual).
173. This project will be undertaken in Part II.D.2.b.(1).
174. A separate issue is how a plaintiff could prove---or a factfinder could infer-that a
particular harasser is within a particular category of sexual orientation. This issue is addressed
infra in Part ll.D.2.
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which the courts have been unsure that sexual conduct was based on sexual attraction.
.Recall that one of the conditions necessary for the application of attraction theory
is sexual attraction. If the conduct in question is not based on sexual attraction, there is
no basis for inferring that the perpetrator's habit of sex-based selection in choosing
sexual partners (that is, his or her sexual orientation) was applicable to the decision in
question. Thus, where there is no evidence that the conduct in question was based on
sexual attraction, attraction theory will not work to show causation. That is, just as
there is a bisexuality exception to attraction theory, there is also a "non-attraction
exception" to that theory.
As with the bisexuality exception, this is not to say that there can be no
discriminatory causation in cases that do not involve sexual attraction.75It is only to say
that, in such cases, some other theory of causation will be required.1
Early feminists understood this limit of attraction theory. Catherine MacKinnon,
for example, in urging the adoption of a power-based theory instead of an attractionbased theory, pointed out that, "male sexual advances may often derive as much from
fear and hatred of women and a desire to keep them in an inferior place as from a
genuine positive attraction or affection."' 1 76 In other words, Professor MacKinnon
seemed to understand that, if attraction theory were the only theory of causation in
sexual harassment cases, many critical cases of discrimination might be left uncovered.
In most early sexual harassment cases, this distinction was not an issue. These
cases generally involved sexual advances by males toward females. And the courts
seemed quite willing to presume attraction in those cases. 177 But occasionally, the
courts faced cases in which attraction was less clear. Perhaps the most important cases
of this type, and the cases that seem to have started the second-generation movement,
were the cases
of Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 178 and Robinson v. Jacksonville
79
1
Shipyards.
In Rabidue, "male employees from time to time displayed pictures of nude or
scantily clad women in their offices and/or work areas."'' 8 0 There was no indication that
these pictures were directed toward the plaintiff, Ms. Rabidue. Nor was it clear that
these pictures were directed to women in general. Because this conduct had not been
directed toward Ms. Rabidue, the court assumed that it was not based on attraction
toward her.18 ' And while some sexual conduct was directed toward Ms. Rabidue, that
conduct primarily involved profane sexual language and epithets, as opposed to sexual
advances. Thus, the court assumed that this conduct too was not based on attraction. In
fact, it seemed quite unlikely that any of the conduct in question was based on sexual
8 2
attraction, given that the primary protagonist appeared to intensely dislike Rabidue.1
Similarly, in Robinson, there was a staggering array of misogynist conduct,

175. See e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 106-18 (suggesting a theory of causation that
is not dependent on sexual attraction); Abrams, supra note 5, at 1188-1220 (same); Franke,
supra note 3, at 771-72 (same); Schultz, supra note 4, at 1755-69 (same).
176. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 199.
177. See supra Parts I.B, H.A.
178. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
179. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
180. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
181. Id.; see also Fox v. Sierra Dev. Corp., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (D. Nev. 1995)
(questioning causation where conduct was directed to a general workplace population).
182. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615 ("[T]he plaintiff and Henry, on the occasions when their
duties exposed them to each other, were constantly in a confrontation posture.").
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including the posting of a "Men Only" sign.'8 3 Much of this conduct was highly4
sexualized, including the posting of a vast amount of pornographic material.'8
However, it was not clear that any of this conduct was based on sexual attraction
toward the plaintiff, Ms. Robinson. As in Rabidue, this conduct seemed to have more
to do with hatred or debasement of women than with attraction toward a particular
woman.
The outcomes in these cases were quite different. In Rabidue, neither the district
court nor the majority on appeal seemed to focus on causation. Rather, they focused on
85
the question of whether the conduct was sufficiently severe to be actionable.
However, both the lower court and majority appellate opinion made a point of noting
that there were no allegations of sexual advances or attraction' 86-suggesting that the
outcome might have been different in an attraction-based case. In contrast, Robinson
that attraction
and the dissent in Rabidue did focus on causation, apparently realizing
87
theory would not work and looking at other theories of causation.'
Irrespective of the outcomes of these cases, second-generation feminists focused
on them as a basis for attacking attraction theory.' These writers seemed to
understand that attraction theory would not work in such cases. Accordingly, they
started looking for other ways to show causation. Yet, as with the bisexuality
89
exception, some used this gap in coverage as an indictment of attraction theory.
Another wave of cases seemed to provide further ammunition: cases of same-sex
(generally male-on-male) sexual conduct that did not seem to involve sexual
attraction. 9 Moreover, unlike cases such as Rabidue or Robinson, there was no
evidence of antipathy toward a particular sex-for example, misogyny. Thus, not only
was attraction theory unavailable; another major theory of causation (evidence of a
negative attitude or antipathy toward one sex) seemed to be unavailable. As a result,
the courts struggled mightily with causation.
Important cases of this type include Quick v. Donaldson Co.,' 9 1Doe v. City of
Belleville, 192 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. 193 In each of these cases, a
group of men engaged in extreme sexual conduct toward male plaintiffs, including, in
some cases, physical touching or grabbing of genitals and even threats of rape. 94 Yet,

183. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1498.
184. Id. at 1495-98.
185. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622; Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419,433 (E.D.
Mich. 1984).
186. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622 ("[T]he plaintiff neither asserted nor proved a claim of
'sexual advances,' 'sexual favors,' or 'physical conduct."'); Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 431
(noting a lack of physical conduct).
187. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 823-28 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23.
188. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 696.

189. See, e.g., id.
190. See Triplett, supra note 100.
191. 895 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1995), rev'd, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).

192. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
193. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
194. Doe, 119 F.3d at 567 (harassers threatened to rape target and grabbed his genitals,
ostensibly to see if he was male); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19
(5th Cir. 1996) (harassers pushed a bar of soap into target's anus, placed their penises on
target's neck and arm, and threatened to rape him); Quick, 895 F. Supp. at 1292 (harassers
engaged in practice called "bagging," which involved grabbing and squeezing the target's
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despite the sexual nature of this conduct, there was no suggestion that this conduct was
based on the harassers' sexual attraction toward the plaintiffs. Rather, the harassers,
who claimed to be heterosexuals, seemed to pick on their targets based on the fact that
the harassers either perceived the targets to be gay or lesbian, or perceived them as not
measuring up-to the harasser's male stereotype.' 95 Because there was no evidence of
attraction, attraction theory was unavailable to show causation in these cases. As a
result, the courts struggled with causation-often without any satisfactory
96
conclusion. 1
The primary response to this "non-attraction gap" in attraction theory has been to
point out (correctly) that attraction is not the only way to prove causation' 97 and to try
to develop alternative theories for proving causation in cases that do not involve
attraction. 198 That is, these writers have not contested the notion of a non-attraction
gap. Rather, they are developing theories that could fill this gap.
However, the second-generation feminists have gone beyond trying to find
alternative theories of causation to fill the non-attraction gap. As with the bisexuality
gap, second-generation feminists have used the non-attraction gap as an indictment of
attraction theory. 199 They have argued that the gap is large; that most, if not all, of
sexual harassment is based on power, not attraction, and is thus not amenable to proof
of causation by attraction theory. 200 On this basis, second-generation feminists have
testicles).
195. See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 120, at 40-41 (suggesting that the "bagging" in Quick
might have been motivated by the perpetrator's "position of authority in the male hierarchy").
Several courts and theorists have developed some promising theories ofcausation based on
stereotyping that might apply in these situations. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243
F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001).
196. In Doe, for example, the majority of the panel and a concurring/dissenting judge spent
the better part of 43 double-column pages debating the issue. See generally Doe, 119 F.3d 563.
At the end of this effort, the court determined little. Essentially, the majority seemed to base its
holding on a stereotyping theory (for example, that the plaintiffs had been harassed because they
failed to meet a sex-based stereotype, and thus because of their sex), but spent most of its efforts
attempting to defend a sexuality proxy under which any sexuality would suffice as proof of
causation. Judge Manion, in partial concurrence and partial dissent, argued that a sexuality
proxy was flawed; that in cases outside the male-to-female-advance paradigm, some other
evidence of causation, beyond the mere fact that the conduct in question was sexual, would be
necessary. Id. at 604-06 (Manion, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Similarly, in Quick,
there was a significant--and largely unresolved---dispute regarding causation. Quick, 895 F.
Supp. at 1293-97.
197. See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 n.9 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80) ("[A] harasser need not be motivated by sexual desire to
satisfy the 'because of sex' element. It is simply one evidentiary route available to a plaintiff
seeking to establish same-sex [or any] harassment."); Doe, 119 F.3d at 590-92; Abrams, supra
note 5, at 1227-28; Estrich, supra note 3, at 858-60; Franke, supra note 3, at 762-63; Schultz,
supra note 4, at 1755.
198. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1227-28; Franke, supra note 3, at 762-63.
199. Abrams, supra note 5, at 1188-91; Franke, supra note 3, at 743-44; Schultz, supra
note 4, at 1773-74.
200. See Franke, supra note 3, at 743 ("[M]en engage in sexual conduct in the workplace
primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire."), quoted in Schwartz, supranote 2,
at 1721; see also Doe, 119 F.3d at 588 (quoting Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[H]arassment, like other forms of victimization, is often
motivated by issues of power and control on the part of the harasser.")); MACKINNON, supra
note 1, at 1 ("Central to the concept [of sexual harassment] is the use of power derived from one
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attacked attraction theory.
To understand how significant the non-attraction gap might be, it is helpful to
divide harassers into three categories: (1) Those who are motivated solely by sexual
attraction, (2) those who are motivated by some combination of sexual attraction and
factors other than sexual attraction, and (3) those who are motivated solely by factors
other than sexual attraction.
In the first category (harassers motivated solely by sexual attraction), there is no
attraction gap. Attraction theory will work.
And there seems to be little reason to doubt that attraction theory will work in the
second category (harassers motivated by a mixture of attraction and other factors). This
category seems like a simple case of mixed motives. The harasser acts from multiple
motives, some of which are discriminatory (e.g., attraction, if the harasser is
monosexual) and some of which are arguably not discriminatory (e.g., power, as long
doctrines are fairly clear that such
as it is not sex-based). 20 ' Current anti-discrimination
202
mixed motivations are sufficient for liability.
Thus, attraction theory will work in the first two categories-that is, anytime
sexual attraction plays a role in the harasser's decision. The non-attraction gap is
limited to the third category---cases in which attraction plays no role in the harasser's
decision. Although there may well be cases in this category, the body of reported
sexual harassment cases, as well as my experience litigating these cases, would seem to
suggest that sexual attraction-perhaps along with other motivations, such as powerplays a role in a significant portion of sexual harassment cases. 20 3 That is, the nonnot appear to pose a significant danger of rendering attraction
attraction gap 2does
4
theory useless.

0

social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another."); Estrich, supranote 3,at 820
(sexual harassment is about men exercising power over women). Alternatively, it has been
suggested that sexual harassment may be caused by a feeling of disempowerment by men. See
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, PluralistMyths and PowerlessMen: The Ideology of Reasonablenessin
Sexual HarassmentLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1227-28 (1990).
201. Second-generation feminists have argued persuasively that many exercises of power in
the workplace are sex-based. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 3, at 820. If this is the case-and can
be proven--then there is no mixed motives problem; all of the motives (i.e., attraction by a
monosexual or a sex-based desire to exercise power) would be discriminatory. In such a case,
causation could be shown either through attraction theory or through proof that the exercise of
power was sex-based.
202. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (liability attaches
any time sex is "a motivating factor," even where other factors may have also gone into the
decision in question).
Damages might be limited in cases where a defendant can prove that the motive in question
(attraction, which indicates reliance on sex under attraction theory) played only a small role in
the outcome of the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). However, the point here is that
liability will attach in these cases.
203. I do not purport to know--and do not take any position on-what portion of sexual
harassment is motivated by sexual attraction, power, or some combination of these (or other)
factors. My only point is that it seems likely that attraction plays at least some role in a
significant proportion of sexual harassment cases.
204. This part does not address the issues that might arise in trying to prove that a
particular harasser was motivated, at least in part, by sexual attraction. That issue will be
addressed immediately infra in Part II.D.1.
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D. PracticalIssues in the Application of Attraction Theory
The previous Subparts have demonstrated that, as a theoretical matter, the
coverage gaps in attraction theory should not be significant. As a theoretical matter,
attraction theory appears to provide a streamlined, effective method of proving
causation in a broad range of cases. Thus, it does not make sense to criticize attraction
theory based on its theoretical utility.
But how practical is attraction theory? How can plaintiffs demonstrate attraction
and monosexuality, as necessary to prove causation using attraction theory? And to
what extent should courts presume attraction, monosexuality, or both? If attraction
theory were unworkable as a practical matter, this might suggest that the theory should
be scrapped. This Part will demonstrate that attraction theory is useful as a practical, as
well as a theoretical, matter.
1. Proving Attraction
How can a plaintiff prove that particular conduct is based on sexual attraction?
Attraction may arguably be inferred from the fact of a sexual advance. A sexual
advance, by definition, is a request to engage in sexual relations. Such a request may
suggest that the person making the request (in a sexual harassment case, the harasser)
is sexually attracted to the target. Thus, from the fact of a sexual advance, a factfinder
may find sexual attraction.
This is not to say that sexual attraction is the only reason a harasser might make
sexual advances toward a target. Such advances may be based not on sexual desire, but
°
on a desire to exercise or demonstrate power. 205
Moreover, power and sexual desire
may become merged-that is, power may provide a "turn on" for a harasser who was
not otherwise sexually attracted toward the target. 206 These possibilities would seem to
prevent a conclusion that sexual advances are always motivated by sexual attraction.
The point here, however, is that sexual attraction is a possible-and maybe even a
likely-motivation for sexual advances. Put differently, a sexual advance may be seen
as making the existence of attraction more likely than it would otherwise be, thus
providing relevant evidence of attraction. 20 7 Accordingly, where a factfinder believes
that conduct is part of a sexual advance, it would seem to be permissible for the
factfinder to conclude that it was motivated, at least in part, by sexual attraction.
Of course, this may simply beg the question of when particular conduct by a
harasser is part of a sexual advance. Some sexual advances may be express. Others
may be more subtle. However, this question would seem to be a simple question of
fact.
On this point, a word of warning may be in order. Some courts seem to infer that
sexual conduct is a sexual advance (and, hence, based on attraction) where the harasser
is sexually oriented toward persons of the target's sex-for example, where a
heterosexual harasser engages in sexual conduct toward a person of the opposite sex,
205. See sources cited supra note 200.
206. I am indebted for this insight to my colleague Nancy Ehrenreich. Support for this
proposition may be found in instances of rape of males by other males who are ostensibly
heterosexual, particularly in prison settings. In such cases, even though there might be
manifestations of attraction, such as sexual arousal, one might have a difficult time suggesting
that the perpetrator was motivated by sexual attraction.
207. See FED. R. EvID. 401 (defining "relevant evidence").
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or a gay or lesbian harasser engages in sexual conduct toward a person of the same
sex. 208 However, there are two potential problems with this reasoning. First, as will be
seen below, sexual orientation is likely to be harder to prove than attraction. Thus, the
idea of proving attraction based on sexual orientation may not make much practical
sense. Second, as evident in cases like Robinson and Rabidue, sexual conduct-even
by those who might be sexually oriented toward persons of the target's sex--does not
necessarily indicate sexual advances or attraction.
2. Proving Monosexuality
Several writers have questioned the efficacy of any theory that requires proof of
sexual orientation. 20 9 Though early sexual harassment cases simply assumed
monosexuality (heterosexuality) in cases involving male-to-female sexual advances, we
have seen reluctance by courts to make such assumptions in same-sex cases. These
assumptions have been challenged in cases involving harassers who are or claim to be
bisexual.
These issues raise two questions, which will be addressed in the following
Subparts: First, if the courts are not willing to assume monosexuality, how might
plaintiffs establish this requirement of attraction theory? 210 And second, does it make
sense-as an evidentiary matter or as a policy matter-to adopt some kind of
presumption regarding sexual orientation?
a. How Plaintiffs Can Prove Monosexuality
It should be noted at the outset that the very act of trying to prove (or even
assume) a litigant's sexual orientation raises extremely serious privacy issues. These
issues will be addressed in Part III.D. The present Subpart will focus only on issues of
efficacy-that is, whether there are effective ways by which plaintiffs can establish
208. See, e.g., La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478-80 (5th Cir. 2002)
(inferring homosexuality from indications of attraction toward a same-sex target); Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting a jury might infer
homosexuality from sexual attraction); see also Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255,
261 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T] here is some authority indicating that an earnest sexual solicitation by a
harasser will support an inference that the harassment was because of the plaintiffs sex.") (citing
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
This seems to be what courts are talking about when they say they talk about the "obvious"
nature of causation in male-to-female-advance cases, or that they would find causation in cases
involving same-sex sexual conduct by a gay or lesbian harasser. E.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir. 1996); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(1lth Cir. 1982).
209. See, e.g., Daniel C. Sanpietro, "Gradually Triumphing Over Ignorance": Rhode
Island's Treatment of Sexual OrientationDiscriminationin the Workplace, 30 SuFOLK U. L.

REv. 439,478 (1997) (arguing that sexual harassment law should not rely on sexual orientation
due to difficulty of proving sexual orientation); Karen L. Steinbach, Employment Law, The
Maryland Survey of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuitfor the 19951996 Term, 56 MD. L. REv. 1103, 1121 (1997) (same) (construing McWilliams v. Fairfax
County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)).
210. This Subpart will not distinguish gradations of bisexuality. Unless otherwise noted, it
will use the term "monosexuality" to describe whatever categories of sexual orientation are
sufficient to show causation under the relevant degree-of-causation standard. See supra Part
II.B.2.
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monosexuality, and thereby show causation through attraction theory. It will conclude
that there are viable ways in which plaintiffs are likely to be able to demonstrate
monosexuality in a large number-possibly a large majority---of cases.
(1) Self-Reporting by Harassers
Perhaps the most effective way for plaintiffs to prove monosexuality would be to
rely on self-reporting by harassers. Plaintiffs might simply ask their harassers to
disclose their sexual orientation--that is, request self-identification, or an admission of
monosexuality. Alternatively, some harassers might have made extra-judicial
statements regarding their sexual orientation, upon which a plaintiff might rely.2 ' If
the harasser self-identifies as monosexual toward the target's sex, there would
generally be no need to litigate the issue any further. In such cases, the harasser has
admitted monosexuality. As a statement against interest in the litigation, such an
admission carries with it indicia of accuracy.212 And the plaintiff has no incentive to
contest it.
There are reasons to believe that self-reporting of monosexuality will be high. As
noted in Part II.B.3, a high percentage of the population tends to self-report as
monosexual. Depending on the degree-of-causation required by disparate treatment
doctrine-and thus the proper definition of monosexuality for purposes of attraction
theory-the percentage of the population that self-reports as monosexual appears to be
somewhere between 89% (assuming a narrow definition of monosexuality, including
only Kinsey Os and 6s) and 99% (assuming a broad definition of monosexuality that
covers all categories other than Kinsey 3s).23
We might expect a particularly high level of self-reporting as monosexual in
opposite-sex cases. A high proportion of the population tends to self-report as
heterosexual generally-estimates seem to cluster around the 90% range. 21 4 The
unfortunate social stigma that remains associated with homosexuality and bisexuality
might provide a strong incentive to self-report as heterosexual. Moreover, while a
harasser who self-reports as heterosexual may help a plaintiff prove causation, and
thus, ultimately, liability, the harasser is not likely to be held individually liable. 216 So
211. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) (admissions by party opponents do not constitute
hearsay).
212. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3) (a statement against interest is admissible over a hearsay
objection).
213. See supra notes 165, 167, and 168.
214. See KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN MALE, supra note 147, at 653 (85.0% of males 16-55 are
Kinsey Os; 86.4% are Kinsey Os or Is; 91.3% are Kinsey Os, Is, or 2s); KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN
FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499 (roughly 87.6% of females 20 and over reporting sexual
contacts or responses are Kinsey Os; 93.7% are Kinsey Os or Is; 96.2% are Kinsey Os, Is, or 2s);
see also BusiNEss WOMEN's NETWORK, supra note 172, at 624 ("Gay lesbian and bisexual
employees make up anywhere from four to 10% of the workforce."); San Francisco Public
Library Gay &Lesbian Center, supranote 171 (surveying literature); Tremblay, supranote 171
(surveying literature; concluding that best estimate of those reporting homosexuality or
bisexuality is in the 10% range).
215. See Schaffner, supra note 169, at 18-20 (discussing "the social stigma and
marginalization arising from homophobia"); see also Laarman, supra note 169, at 569
(acknowledging the social stigma attached to homosexuality makes the abuse of domestic
partner benefits unlikely).
216. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (prohibiting
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the legal consequences of admitting heterosexuality are likely to be relatively small,
while the social benefits may be large. Thus, it seems likely that many harassers will
self-report as monosexual in opposite-sex cases.217
Although some of these incentives might initially suggest that many harassers
would not admit monosexuality (that is, homosexuality) in the same-sex context, this
may not be the case. In such cases, where there is strong evidence that the conduct in
question was a same-sex advance based on attraction, the harasser will not credibly be
able to self-report as purely heterosexual. Thus, he or she would be likely to report
either as gay/lesbian (which would support a finding of causation) or bisexual (which
would not). And there are reasons to believe that a significant number of persons in
this position would self-report as gay/lesbian. There is evidence that, in the gay,
lesbian, and bisexual community, there is a stigma associated with bisexuality.2 18 In
any event, within these communities, a far greater percentage of persons self-report as
gay or lesbian than bisexual. 2 19 Thus, in same-sex cases, as well as opposite-sex cases,
it would seem likely that many, if not most, plaintiffs would be able to rely on
perpetrators' self-reporting to establish monosexuality.
Of course, self-reporting on matters of sexual orientation is notoriously inaccurate.
22
In many cases, people cannot even engage in accurate self-assessment in this area. 0
And even where a person has accurately assessed his or her own orientation, there are
22 1
numerous reasons why he or she might report that orientation inaccurately.
However, in this context, where plaintiffs are seeking party admissions, selfreporting-not self-awareness-is relevant. And many of the incentives to self-report
falsely as monosexual in the social science context (e.g., social stigma) 222 are also
discrimination by "employers"); Falbaum v. Pomerantz, Nos. 00-9039, 00-9049, 2001 WL
1019616, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 6,2001) (holding that no personal liability exists under Title VII);
Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400,405 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66
F.3d 1295, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
217. This reasoning would seem to be confirmed by the fact that, in the vast majority of
opposite-sex cases, the harasser does not claim to be bisexual.
218. See Rover, BisexualAll of 'Em, at http://www.geocities.com/rovi5 lusbisex.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2003) (In many gay communities, more stigma is attached to bisexuality than to
pure homosexuality.).
219. See BusiNEss

WOMEN'S NETWORK,

supra note 172, at 618 (study among gay, lesbian,

and transgendered population indicates that 91% self-report as gay, lesbian, or homosexual,
while only 6% self-report as bisexual).
220. See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principlesand Anti-DiscriminationLaws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 189, 364

(1999) (noting the distinction between the "status" of same-sex sexual orientation and the
"conduct" of engaging in same-sex sexual behavior is likely to be important in analyzing issues
regarding sexual orientation); Tremblay, supra note 171, app. A (explaining that many subjects
"are not ready to even admit their homosexual desires/identity to themselves, much less to
anyone else").
221. San Francisco Public Library Gay & Lesbian Center, supra note 171 ("(T]he actual
number of gay men and lesbians living in the United States has been significantly and
consistently underreported ... due to social taboo, religious censure, legal statutes, real or
perceived risk of jeopardizing jobs, housing, reputations, and family situations.").
222. See Laarman, supra note 169, at 569 (acknowledging that the social stigma attached
to homosexuality makes the abuse of domestic partner benefits unlikely); Schaffner, supranote
169, at 18-20 (discussing "the social stigma and marginalization arising from homophobia").
Such stigma not only tends to encourage self-reporting as exclusively heterosexual, it also may
encourage non-heterosexuals to self-report as exclusively gay/lesbian. See Rover, supra note
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likely to be present in the litigation context.223 In fact, these incentives may even be
heightened in the litigation context, in which anonymity may be lacking.
(2) The Harasser's Sexual History
If the harasser does not admit to being monosexual, a plaintiff might conceivably
try to prove monosexuality by looking for a pattern in the harasser's selection of sexual
targets, either within the workplace or more generally. The idea would presumably be
that if most or all of the targets are the same sex as the plaintiff, a factfinder might infer
monosexuality.
Such an approach would be highly problematic as a normative matter, as it would
involve a dramatic invasion of privacy (even more so than simply asking about, or
relying on past extra-judicial statements about sexual orientation). And it would also be
subject to attack on at least three evidentiary grounds.
First, there is not likely to be enough data to draw any meaningful conclusions
from a statistical point of view. Suppose, for instance, that there were evidence that a
male harasser had relationships with three men and no women. 224 This distribution
might or might not be representative of the entire universe of the harasser's sexual
relationships. In general, in order to show that an observed sample is representative of
the universe we are trying to measure, we use statistical analysis to demonstrate the
reliability of the sample. 225 Second, aside from lack of sufficient sample size, there are
reasons to doubt that a harasser's observed/discoverable sexual conduct will be
representative of the universe of his or her sexual conduct. Since most sexual conduct
occurs in private, and since there are incentives to conceal certain types of sexual
conduct (or to report them inaccurately),226 we should be particularly circumspect
about assuming that the harasser's observable or discoverable sexual conduct would be
representative of the entire body of his or her sexual conduct. In other words, in this
area, we should be particularly wary of reporting and observation bias.
Finally, even if we could assume that the sample of observed conduct was
representative of the universe of actual conduct, conduct is not the issue; the issue is
the harasser's decisionmaking process-specifically, whether the harasser has a habit
of engaging in sex-based selection. The problem is that patterns in the harasser's
conduct may not be representative of patterns in the harasser's thinking. Put
differently, an individual's conduct may have little to do with his or her actual sexual
orientation-that is, with his or her feelings of sexual attraction. 227 The harasser might
have feelings of attraction that he or she would simply not act upon (or would not act
upon in any way that would be discoverable).
Thus, a plaintiff who relied solely on inquiries into a harasser's sexual history in
218.
223. I do not mean to endorse false self-reporting or lying under oath, even about such a
sensitive topic as sexual orientation. The ethics of this issue are beyond the scope of this Article.
My point is only that, in litigation, many plaintiffs may reasonably expect to obtain the evidence
they need to show causation using attraction theory--that is, proof of monosexuality-in the
form of an admission.
224. See, e.g., La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478-80 (5th Cir. 2002).
225. See 1LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 90 ("tests of statistical significance
determine the probability" that the observed distribution was the product of chance).
226. See supra note 218.
227. San Francisco Public Library Gay and Lesbian Center, supra note 171 ("The
distinction between behavior and identity can be wide ... ").
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order to prove monosexuality would likely face high hurdles to discovering and
presenting persuasive evidence. And whether such evidence would ultimately be
admissible might be an open question.
Despite its analytical flaws, evidence of sexual history might still be seen as
making the fact at issue (monosexuality) more likely to exist than would be the case
without the evidence, and thus relevant from an evidentiary point of view. 228 And if it
were seen as relevant, it might also be seen as sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that the harasser was monosexual, and thus sufficient to
resist summary judgment for the defense on this issue.229 Some courts appear not only
to allow this type of evidence, despite (or without considering) its flaws, but to hold
that it precludes summary judgment on the issue of causation-at least
when the
2 30
evidence suggests sexual interest toward targets exclusively of one sex.
On the other hand, many courts might consider excluding such evidence on the
ground that it is substantially more prejudicial than probative.231 Moreover, if the
harasser's sexual history is mixed--that is, shows attraction toward both male and
female targets-plaintiffs will be in the position of trying to argue, based on sexual
history evidence, that the harasser is predominantly, though not exclusively,
monosexual. In such cases, courts
may be particularly likely to focus on the analytical
232
weaknesses of such evidence.
Thus, it would seem to be risky (as well as normatively problematic) for plaintiffs
to attempt33 to prove monosexuality by attempting to discover harassers' sexual
2
histories.

(3) The Fact of an Attraction-Based Conduct
What can a plaintiff do where the harasser does not admit monosexuality and the
plaintiff cannot prove monosexuality based on the harasser's sexual history? Does the
mere fact of an attraction-based sexual advance, or other attraction-based conduct, give
rise to an inference of monosexuality? Several courts seem willing to draw such an
inference-both in opposite- and same-sex cases. 2 34 However, the validity of such an
228. FED. R. EvID. 401 (Evidence is relevant if it tends to makes the existence of a relevant
fact, such as monosexuality, more probable than it would be absent the evidence.).
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
230. See, e.g., La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474,480 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that homosexuality can be inferred from proof that male harasser made advances toward three
men). This willingness of courts to make conclusions based on statistics that are of questionable
value may stem from the powerful perceptive effect of "the inexorable zero." See Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
231. See FED. R. EvID. 403 (providing that "evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice").
232. See Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating male
plaintiff "fails to come to grips with the fact that female employees (including his original coplaintiff Susan Willis) also lodged similar complaints regarding [the male harasser's] behavior.
This fact undercuts [plaintiff's] claim [that the harasser is gay] to a substantial extent.").
233. If the courts adopt a presumption of monosexuality, such that it falls on defendants to
prove bisexuality, these problems would then fall on defendants. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Slater
Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding pure bisexuality not conclusively
proven by fact that harasser made sexual advances toward both women and men).
234. As discussed above, courts have expressly inferred heterosexuality from opposite-sex

advances. See supra Part I.B, H.A. And several courts seem to have approved an inference of
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inference may be open to question.
Even if we assume that a sexual advance was based on sexual attraction,235 it is not
entirely clear why this would suggest monosexuality. Attraction suggests only that the
harasser's sexual orientation includes attraction toward persons of the target's sex. But
this would not seem to help a factfinder determine whether the harasser is monosexual
or bisexual. For example, suppose that a man made an attraction-based sexual advance
toward a woman. A factflnder might be able to eliminate the possibility that the
harasser was purely gay. But five other possibilities would remain: The harasser could
be (1) purely heterosexual, (2) strongly preferentially heterosexual, (3) weakly
preferentially heterosexual, (4) purely bisexual, or (5) preferentially gay (weakly or
strongly). The first one, two, or three possibilities would permit the application of
attraction theory (depending on the degree-of-causation requirement); the others would
not.
Similarly, consider a same-sex case in which a female harasser made an attraction
based advance toward a woman. In such a case, a fact-finder might be able to eliminate
the possibility that the harasser was exclusively heterosexual. But again, five other
possibilities would remain: The harasser could be (1) purely lesbian, (2) strongly
preferentially lesbian, (3) weakly preferentially lesbian, (4) purely bisexual, or (5)
preferentially heterosexual (weakly or strongly). Again, the first one, two, or three
possibilities would permit the application of attraction theory (depending on the
degree-of-causation requirement); the others would not. Yet, if the only available
evidence were attraction toward the target, there would seem to be no way to determine
which of these possibilities was the correct one. Thus, attraction seems to shed little
light on whether monosexuality is present, as necessary for the application of attraction
theory.236
This is not to say that evidence of attraction-based conduct is meaningless. In both
opposite-sex and same-sex cases, such evidence limits the possible sexual orientations
of the harasser. The problem in each case is how to choose between the remaining
possible sexual orientations. And, at least without some sort of presumption, it does not
seem possible to do so based solely on evidence of attraction-based conduct.

homosexuality from same-sex advances. See, e.g., La Day, 302 F.3d at 479 (stating that
homosexuality can be inferred from indication of attraction toward same-sex target); Shepherd,
168 F.3d at 1010 (holding that jury might infer homosexuality from sexual attraction); see also
Lack, 240 F.3d at 261 ("[Tjhere is some authority indicating that an earnest sexual solicitation
by a harasser will support an inference that the harassment was because of the plaintiffs sex.")
(citing Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (E.D. Va.

1996)).
235. As discussed above, sexual advances are not necessarily based on sexual attraction.

See supra Part I1.C. Yet, as also discussed above, it does seem possible to infer attraction from
sexual advances. See supra Part I.D. 1.
236. Courts seem to have missed this point, in the same-sex context as well as the oppositesex context. See, e.g., La Day, 302 F.3d at 479 (holding that homosexuality can be inferred from
indication of attraction toward same-sex target); Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1010 (holding thatjury
might infer homosexuality from sexual attraction); see also Lack, 240 F.3d at 261 ("[T]here is
some authority indicating that an earnest sexual solicitation by a harasser will support an
inference that the harassment was because of the plaintiffs sex.") (citing Tietgen, 921 F. Supp.
at 1502).
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b. Presumptions Regarding Sexual Orientation

We have seen that, in a large number of attraction-based cases, plaintiffs will
likely be able to rely on self-reporting by harassers to prove monosexuality. And,
though problematic from both an evidentiary and a privacy point of view, plaintiffs in
other cases may be able to prove monosexuality by inquiring into harasser's sexual
history. However, the practical utility of attraction theory might be maximized-and
the privacy concerns generated by this theory minimized-by adopting some kind of
presumption of monosexuality.
As discussed above, courts have tended to presume heterosexuality in cases
involving opposite-sex advances. 237 It might also be possible either to reverse the
presumption (for example, to presume homosexuality), or adopt a broader presumption
of monosexuality. This Subpart will recommend
that the courts should adopt such a
238
broad presumption of monosexuality.
(1) Arguments for a Presumption of Monosexuality
A presumption of monosexuality would have several benefits. First, such a
presumption would make it easier for plaintiffs to prove sexual orientation, and thereby
increase the practical utility of attraction theory.
Granted, such a presumption will also make it more difficult for defendants to
resist a showing of causation based on attraction theory, as they would have to
disprove monosexuality (or attraction). However, shifting this burden makes sense as a
matter of discovery policy, given that most of the information that bears on the fact in
question-that is, the harasser's sexual orientation-lies within the control of the
harasser, who is generally more closely aligned with the defendant than the plaintiff.
Such a presumption would also provide at least some protection for the privacy of
accused harassers. This is because the presumption gives the accused harasser at least
some control over whether or not there will be an inquiry into his or her sexual
orientation. The accused harasser can choose to contest the presumption of
monosexuality, in which case sexual orientation will be at issue; or choose to accept
the presumption, in which case sexual orientation will not be at issue.
This is not to say that choice is not invasive or coercive. Such a presumption
presents bisexual harassers with a Hobson's choice: if they accept the presumption of
monosexuality, they may feel that they are being dishonest-or that they are forced to
deny their self-identity, which can be damaging.239 Moreover, by accepting the
presumption of monosexuality, they are giving up a valid defense to causation, and
237. See supra Parts I.B, II.A.
238. Catherine MacKinnon has suggested (approvingly) that courts have effectively
adopted such a bilateral presumption of monosexuality. See MacKinnon, supra note 130, at 822.
However, in light of Oncale, such a description seems doubtful. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (requiring plaintiffs seeking to use attraction theory in
same-sex cases to introduce "credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual").
239. See Heidi Joy Schmid, Decriminalizationof Sodomy Under South Africa's 1996
Constitution: Implicationsfor South African and U.S. Law, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L.
163, 189 n. 150 (2000) (The criminalization of sodomy in private between consenting males is a
"severe limitation ... of the gay man's" rights to privacy, dignity, and freedom. The harm
caused by the provision can, and often does, affect his ability to achieve self-identification and
self-fulfillment.). See generally Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice, 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:101

thus to liability. And while liability will likely fall on the harasser's employer, many
employers might be less than understanding of an employee who subjects them to
liability needlessly (at least from the employer's point of view). On the other hand, if
the harasser seeks to rebut the presumption, he or she will be subjected to highly
invasive discovery. And whatever choice the harasser makes-and whether the
harasser is bisexual or monosexual-he or she is essentially forced to make a public
statement concerning his or her sexual orientation. Accepting the presumption will feel
much like a self-report of monosexuality; rejecting it involves self-reporting as
bisexual.
However, even though such a presumption may present alleged harassers with a
Hobson's choice, at least it presents them with a choice. Thus, it gives the alleged
harasser at least some degree of control over the privacy issues that are likely to arise
from litigating over sexual orientation.
A final argument that might support a presumption of monosexuality-at least in
opposite-sex cases-might be based on empirical research that has been performed on
the distribution of sexual orientation within the population. To understand this
argument, first consider a case involving opposite-sex, attraction-based conduct.
In an opposite-sex attraction case, we can eliminate the possibility that the
harasser is exclusively gay or lesbian (Kinsey 6). Then, based on population statistics,
we may be able to assess the likelihood that the harasser falls into any one or more of
the remaining possible sexual orientations (Kinsey 0 through 5). 240 Among the
population of Kinsey 0 through 5's, social scientists estimate that:
(1) roughly 89% to 90% self-report as exclusively heterosexual
(Kinsey 0),241 as would be required to show causation under the
stringent "but for" degree-of-causation requirement;
(2) roughly 92% to 95% self-report as exclusively or predominantly
heterosexual (Kinsey 0 or 1),24 2 as would likely be required to show
causation under an intermediate degree-of-causation requirement;
and
(3) roughly 97% self-report as exclusively or preferentially
heterosexual (Kinsey 0, 1, or 2),243 which would be sufficient to
240. This analysis is slightly different than the analysis above regarding the likelihood of
obtaining a self-report of monosexuality in any given harassment case. See supra Part
lI.D.2.a.(1). That analysis looked at the whole population, asking what percentage of that
population fell into various categories of orientation. The instant analysis, by contrast, looks
only at the population of non-6's, since the facts eliminate the possibility that the harasser is a
Kinsey 6, and asks what percentage of that more-limited population falls into various categories
of orientation.
241. KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499; KINSEY ErAL., HUMAN MALE,
supranote 147, at 635; see also Tremblay, supra note 171 (surveying literature; concluding that
best estimate of those reporting homosexuality or bisexuality is in 10% range); BusiNEss
WOMEN'S NETWORK, supra note 172, at 624 ("Gay, lesbian and bisexual employees make up
anywhere from four to 10% of the workforce."); San Francisco Public Library Gay & Lesbian
Center, supra note 171 (surveying literature). Of course, it is possible that the population of
harassers has a different distribution.
242. KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN FEMALE, supranote 169, at 499; KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN MALE,
supra note 147, at 635.
243.

KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN FEMALE, supranote

supra note 147, at 635.

169, at 499; KiNSEY

ErAL.,

HUMAN MALE,
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show causation under a low degree-of-causation regime.

These statistics would seem to support a presumption of monosexuality in opposite-sex
cases.
Another way to look at the statistical case for a presumption of monosexuality is to
consider how these statistics would affect the state of the evidence in such a case. If all
we know is that a harasser engaged in attraction-based conduct toward a person of the
opposite sex, we can place the probability that the harasser is monosexual at 89% or
higher. In this sense, we might be able to say that it is more probable than not that the
harasser is monosexual---or at least that the plaintiff has introduced relevant evidence
of monosexuality. 244 And if the defendant wants to contest this evidence, he or she
would need to adduce contrary evidence. That is, the defendant would have the burden
of coming forward with evidence of bisexuality---the burden shifts.
Though courts have provided no analysis when adopting their presumption of
heterosexuality in opposite-sex cases,24 reasoning from such population statistics
might support such a presumption. That is, it might make sense to treat a plaintiff who
has presented evidence of opposite-sex attraction-based conduct as having provided
some evidence of monosexuality-and thus to grant judgment for the plaintiff absent
sufficient evidence to the contrary. 246
However, an empirical argument for a presumption of monosexuality becomes
more difficult to make in same-sex attraction-based cases. In such cases, we can
eliminate the possibility that the harasser is exclusively heterosexual (Kinsey 0).
Statistics on the distribution of the population among non-heterosexual categories are
sparse. Some arguably suggest that a majority of those persons who are not exclusively
heterosexual are either exclusively or predominantly gay or lesbian. 2 47 However, other
evidence points to a contrary conclusion. For example, Dr. Kinsey's research shows
that, among the population of those who are not exclusively heterosexual, only
(1) roughly 3% to 8% self-report as exclusively gay or lesbian

244. See FED. R. EvID. 401 (stating that evidence is relevant if it tends to make the
existence of a material more probable than it would be absent the evidence).
245. Rather, such courts have usually based such a presumption on their view of "reality"
or what "usually" happens-with no further analysis. E.g., Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (Neimeyer,
J., concurring); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("Courts
and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual
harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit
proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been
made to someone of the same sex.").
246. E.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399,405-06 (7th Cir. 2000) (summary judgment
granted to defendant where plaintiff admitted in pleading that harasser was bisexual). But see
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs
speculation of harasser's bisexuality was irrelevant and that determination of bisexuality by jury
is proper). Whichever approach future courts might take, plaintiffs are less likely after Holman
and Shepherd to admit a belief that their harassers are bisexual.
247. See BUSINESS WOMEN'S NETWORK, supra note 172, at618 (study among gay, lesbian,
and transgendered population indicates that 91% self-report as gay, lesbian, or homosexual,
while only 6% self-report as bisexual); Tremblay, supra note 171 (surveying literature and
concluding that the best estimate of those who are gay/lesbian or predominantly gay/lesbian is in
the 5% range-that is, roughly 50% of the 10% estimated to be gay/lesbian or bisexual).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:101

(Kinsey 6),248 as would be required to show causation under the
stringent "but for" degree-of-causation requirement;
(2) roughly 4% to 15% self-report as exclusively or predominantly
gay or lesbian (Kinsey 5 or 6),249 as would likely be required to
show causation under an intermediate degree-of-causation
requirement; and
(3) roughly 24% to 45% self-report as exclusively or preferentially
necessary to show
4, 5, or 6), 25 asregime.
or lesbian
gay
under a(Kinsey
low degree-of-causation
causation
Thus, it is difficult to argue that a presumption of monosexuality (that is,
homosexuality) is empirically supported in same-sex cases.
This is not to say that courts should not adopt a bilateral presumption of
monosexuality. It is only to say that such a bilateral presumption, while supported by
numerous other compelling arguments, is not supported by population statistics.
(2) Arguments Against a Presumption of Monosexuality
Despite these benefits, such a presumption would raise several potential concerns.
First, there might be concerns about the non-individual nature of presumptions in
general. To the extent that a presumption is based on population statistics, it seems to
allow an inference about an individual's mindset (and, indirectly, the individual's guilt)
based on group behavior and inclinations. It does not seem a far cry from this
reasoning to suggest that if 51% of a population were thought to be inclined toward
theft, that a factfinder might infer (at least to a civil standard) that a randomly chosen
member of that population was inclined toward theft, and thus might have committed a
particular theft. This seems contrary to individualistic conceptions of justice.
Yet we seem to engage in similar reasoning in many areas of the law. For example,
we permit juries to convict criminals based on proof of motive--that is, proof that an
individual acted in a manner in which a large segment of humanity might have been
inclined to act under the circumstances. And in the area of anti-discrimination law, we
permit an inference of discriminatory intent where some of the more common reasons
for an employment action have been eliminated-which seems to reflect an assessment
that, in such circumstances, there is a significant probability that discrimination played
25
a role in the decision, even though there might be no other individualized proof. '
Another objection to presumptions in general might be raised on doctrinal
grounds: Disparate treatment doctrine-at least outside the area of sexual
harassment-has made clear that a plaintiff generally bears the burden of persuasion in
248. See KINSEY Er AL., HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499; KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN
MALE, supra note 147, at 635; see also Tremblay, supra note 171 (surveying literature and
concluding that the best estimate of those reporting homosexuality or bisexuality is in 10%
range; BusiNEss WOMEN'S NETWORK, supra note 172, at 624 ("Gay lesbian and bisexual
employees make up anywhere from four to 10% of the workforce."); San Francisco Public
Library Gay & Lesbian Center, supra note 171 (surveying literature). Of course, it is possible
that the population of harassers has a different distribution.
249. See KINSEY ET AL., HuMAN FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499; KINSEY Er AL., HUMAN
MALE, supra note 147, at 635; see also Tremblay, supra note 171, app. A.
250. See KINSEY Er AL., HuMAN FEMALE, supra note 169, at 499; KINSEY ET AL., HUMAN
MALE, supra note 147, at 635.
251. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
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showing discriminatory causation. 252 Thus, to the extent that a presumption of
monosexuality puts on defendants a burden of persuading the factfinder that the
harasser was bisexual, this might be doctrinally problematic. However, there are two
potential responses to this doctrinal issue.
First, in at least some disparate treatment cases (so-called "mixed motive" cases),
the burden of persuasion does shift to the defense upon a showing by the plaintiff that a
protected characteristic, such as sex, was a "motivating factor." 253 The problem is that,
as we have seen, absent some presumption, many plaintiffs will be hard-pressed to
prove that sex was a "motivating factor."
A second, and more promising, response is that presumption of monosexuality
may be characterized as shifting only the burden of coming forward with evidencenot as shifting the burden of persuasion. This characterization makes sense as an
evidentiary matter. As discussed above, based on population statistics, it would seem
possible for the plaintiff to create an inference of monosexuality (at least in oppositesex cases) based solely on a showing of attraction-based conduct. If the defendant does
not come forward with some evidence to rebut this inference, it might make sense to
find for the plaintiff on the issue. That is, based on the inference that can be raised
from the plaintiff's showing, it makes sense to require the defendant to present
evidence to rebut that inference.
Such evidentiary presumptions are consistent with general disparate treatment
law.254 Under the McDonnellDouglasframework, once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of causation, the defendant must come forward with evidence to rebut that
case. 255 One reason for shifting the evidentiary burden in McDonnell Douglas cases is
similar to one of the reasons that would underlie a presumption of monosexuality: The
information necessary to resolve the issue of causation is largely within the defendant's
control.256
(3) A Bilateral Presumption of Monosexuality
The benefits of a presumption of monosexuality discussed so far (increased
practical utility for attraction theory for plaintiffs, appropriate burden shifting to the
party with control over the relevant information, and increased privacy for accused
harassers) would exist even if the presumption were only a one-way presumption---that
is, even if only heterosexuality were presumed (as the courts currently do), or only
homosexuality were presumed, but not both. However, these benefits would be
increased if the presumption were bilateral-that is, if both heterosexuality (in
opposite-sex attraction cases) and homosexuality (in same-sex attraction cases) were
presumed. Simply put, such a bilateral presumption would apply, and therefore provide
252. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Hicks v.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). But see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e5(g)(2)(B) (2003) (stating that once plaintiff shows that sex was a "motivating factor," burden
switches to defense to show absence of "but for" causation); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa 123 S.
Ct. 2148, 2150 (2003).
253. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (stating that once plaintiff shows
that sex was a "motivating factor," burden switches to defense to show absence of "but for"
causation); Costa, 123 S.Ct. at 2150.
254. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507.
255. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07; Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
256. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[V01.79:101

its benefits, in more cases than would a one-way presumption.
In addition, such a bilateral presumption of monosexuality would avoid a number
of significant problems inherent in a one-way presumption. First, a one-way
presumption results in inequalities among victims (victims of same-sex harassment are
treated differently than victims of opposite-sex harassment) and harassers
harassers). A bilateral
(heterosexual harassers are treated differently than gay/lesbian 257
presumption of monosexuality would avoid these inequalities.
A second problem with a one-way presumption is that it may have the effect of
putting the courts' imprimatur on one sexual orientation (heterosexuality) over others.
Although the court might only be saying that heterosexuality is statistically more
common than other sexual orientations,258 such a presumption might (reasonably) be
perceived as saying that heterosexuality is somehow more normal, or even better than,
other sexual orientations. As Professor Franke aptly put it, such a message would be
"deeply heterosexist. ''259 A presumption of monosexuality would avoid such
would be no appearance of preferring heterosexuality over
heterosexism; there
26
homosexuality. 0
Courts have resisted a bilateral presumption-that is, hesitated to presume
homosexuality in same-sex cases. This resistance might have two bases. First, courts
may hesitate to presume homosexuality in same-sex cases based on the sense that, in
such cases, sexual conduct might be explained by factors other than sexual
attraction. 261 However, this is not a valid basis for resisting a presumption of
homosexuality in same-sex cases. The presumption would only come into play in cases
where a plaintiff had proven that the conduct in question was based on sexual
attraction (which should also be a precondition to application of the presumption in
opposite-sex cases). Thus, there seems no reason to treat same-sex cases any
differently than opposite-sex cases in terms of the possible explanations for sexual
conduct.
Alternatively, the courts' hesitance to presume homosexuality in same-sex cases
may be based on the population statistics discussed above. That is, while there seems
to be strong empirical evidence to support a presumption of heterosexuality in
opposite-sex cases, the evidence to support a presumption of homosexuality in samesex cases is less clear at this point. However, the significant benefits from such a
bilateral presumption seem sufficient to adopt262such a presumption on policy or fairness
grounds, even if not on evidentiary grounds.
257. Of course, even under a bilateral presumption, victims of monosexual harassers would
be treated differently than victims of bisexual harassers, and monosexual harassers would be
treated differently than bisexual harassers. These inequalities are discussed below in Part IV.A
which argues that these inequalities are not cause for concern.
258. See supra Part II.D.2.b.(l).
259. Franke, supra note 3, at 735.
260. Of course, a presumption of monosexuality might be seen as monosexist-that is,
preferring monosexual lifestyles over bisexual lifestyles. Although this concern is valid, the
benefits of such a presumption are many. And perhaps the courts (or legislatures) adopting such
a presumption could take extra steps to articulate that such a presumption is not intended, in any
way, to suggest such a preference; that it is purely intended as an evidentiary device.
261. E.g., Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va.
1996) (stating that in same-sex cases, sexual conduct might be explained "as mere locker room
antics, joking, or horseplay").
262. However, the lack of a solid evidentiary basis for a presumption of monosexuality in
same-sex cases might suggest a need for legislative, as opposed to judicial, adoption of such a
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E. Summary: The Significanceof Attraction Theory's Coverage Gaps

This Part has shown that attraction theory will work to show causation in a
significant number of sexual harassment cases, both as a theoretical matter and as a
practical matter. Although there are some theoretical gaps in attraction theory, notably
in the areas of bisexuality and conduct not motivated by attraction, such gaps do not
appear likely to affect a large number of cases. And although practical issues of proof
may prevent some plaintiffs from proving the conditions necessary for attraction theory
(especially monosexuality), there is good reason to believe that, in most cases,
plaintiffs should be able to prove these conditions where they do in fact exist.
Moreover, if the courts were to adopt a bilateral presumption of monosexuality, this
would further reduce the significance of the problem of proof.
In summary, coverage gaps in the applicability of attraction theory cannotjustify
the intense criticism that has been leveled at that theory by power-based theorists.
While it might make sense to criticize attraction theory if the gaps were so large that
they rendered the theory practically useless, this Part has shown that this is not the
case. To the contrary, despite its coverage gaps, there is good reason to believe that
attraction theory has-and will continue to have-great practical utility.
III. POTENTIAL NORMATIVE CRITIQUES OF ATTRACTION THEORY

Despite its practical utility, power-theorists have attacked attraction theory on
normative grounds. They argue that, despite its practical utility, attraction theory
should not be used, or that, at the very least,
plaintiffs should hesitate to use the theory
263
and courts should hesitate to accept it.
The following Parts will address the normative critiques that have been leveledand those that might be leveled-against attraction theory. This Part will conclude that,
while attraction theory is not without its normative problems, few of these problems
are insurmountable and none warrant marginalizing, much less discarding, attraction
theory.
A. Inequalities Resulting From Coverage Gaps
Several critics of attraction theory have been concerned about the fact that it may
result in inequalities among victims or among harassers.
1. Unequal Treatment of Victims
Critics have expressed concern that attraction theory treats different groups of
victims differently. 264 Actually, there are three potential reasons why attraction theory
might treat different groups of victims differently. But it turns out that only two of
these reasons are inherently the product of attraction theory.
Many critics of attraction theory focus on differences in treatment of victims that
presumption.
263. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 735-47 (containing extended discussion regarding
"what... is wrong with understanding sexual harassment as an expression of sexual desire"-that is, with attraction theory).
264. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1188-91; Estrich, supra note 3, at 819-20; Franke,
supra note 3, at 740-41; Schultz, supra note 4, at 1706-10.
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result not from attraction theory itself, but from the presumption of heterosexuality that
the courts have adopted in applying that theory. 26 Under this presumption, victims of
opposite-sex harassment may presume monosexuality (heterosexuality) and attraction;
while victims of same-sex harassment will need to prove these facts, which might be
quite difficult, possibly precluding the ability to use attraction theory or even to obtain
a remedy. However, as discussed above, 266 this one-way presumption is not a necessary
part of attraction theory. (And, as also discussed above, the courts would be well
advised to abandon this one-way presumption.) 267 Thus, the differences in treatment
among victims that result from the courts' presumption of heterosexuality are not valid
arguments against attraction theory.
There are, however, two other aspects of attraction theory itself that will have a
tendency to treat different groups of victims differently. First, even absent a
presumption of heterosexuality, inequalities may result from the practical aspects of
attempting to prove harassers' sexual orientation. As noted above, it may be more
difficult to prove homosexuality than it is to prove heterosexuality. 268 This inequality
might be alleviated if the courts adopted a bilateral presumption of monosexuality, as I
have suggested. 269 However, absent such a bilateral presumption, victims of same-sex
harassment might find it more difficult to prove monosexuality, and thus avail
themselves of attraction theory, than would victims of opposite-sex harassment. And to
the extent that such victims of same-sex harassment cannot prove monosexuality, and
cannot find another method of proving causation, they might find themselves without a
remedy for discriminatory conduct when victims of opposite-sex harassment might not.
A second form of inequality among victims results from the theoretical gaps in
attraction theory---that is, the bisexuality gap and the non-attraction gap. As a result of
these gaps, some plaintiffs are able to avail themselves of attraction theory, while
others are not. Victims of harassers motivated by attraction are treated differently than
victims of harassers motivated by factors other than attraction. Victims of bisexual
harassers are treated differently than victims of monosexual harassers. Those who fall
within its coverage gaps, and are therefore unable to use attraction theory, may face
increased difficulty in proving causation-and might even be unable to obtain a
remedy for discriminatory conduct.
To what extent should these inequalities be cause for concern? The answer is that,
while such inequalities should be cause for concern in the sense of trying to find other
theories of causation for use by plaintiffs who cannot avail themselves of attraction
theory, these inequalities are not a good reason to attack attraction theory.
It seems somewhat strange to attack attraction theory based on the fact that it will
only provide some plaintiffs with a way to show causation, and thus obtain a remedy.
Such an attack essentially suggests that we should prevent those plaintiffs for whom
attraction theory might work from using that theory, just because some other plaintiffs
might not be able to use the theory. This critique does not make sense.
The folly of this critique can be seen by an analogy to theories of proof of
causation under general disparate treatment law (outside the area of sexual
harassment). Under one such theory, plaintiffs can prove causation by showing
"pretext"-that is, that the defendant has been dishonest regarding the reasons he or
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

E.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 740-41.
See supra Part H.A.
See supra Part II.D.2.b.(3).
See supra Part lI.D.2.a.
See supra Part II.D.2.b.
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she took the action in question. 270 Based on such dishonesty, a factfinder might infer
that the defendant had engaged in a cover up and that what was being covered up was
discrimination. 271 Of course, not all victims of discrimination will be able to
demonstrate pretext. Yet no one has suggested that the pretext method of proving
discriminatory causation should be scrapped for that reason. Similarly, it makes no
sense to suggest scrapping attraction theory because it will not work in all casesdenying those plaintiffs that could use the theory the ability to do so solely because not
everyone will be able use the theory.
2. Unequal Treatment of Harassers
The flip side of the fact that attraction theory will work for some victims and not
others is the fact that attraction theory will work for some harassers and not others.
Depending on the presumptions applied regarding sexual orientation, some harassers
will find it easier than others to resist a showing of monosexuality, and thus causation,
as a practical matter. 272 And, irrespective of any presumptions that might apply, the
theoretical gaps in attraction theory will result in unequal treatment of harassers.
Attraction theory will work to show causation when the harasser is motivated by
attraction, but not when the harasser is motivated by factors other than attraction. And
attraction theory will work to show causation when the harasser is monosexual but not
bisexual. Several critics of attraction theory have been concerned about these
inequalities among harassers. These criticisms can be understood as addressing two
potential problems that stem from attraction theory's differential treatment of
perpetrators.273
a. Rule of Law Issues
Some critics have used attraction theory's arguably unequal treatment of
perpetrators to attack not just attraction theory, but to attack sexual harassment law
more generally-that is, the treatment of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination. 274 Richard Epstein for example, has claimed that sexual harassment law
is "bankrupt" because it cannot be used to hold a bisexual harasser liable. 275 Ellen
Frankel Paul has taken the argument further, suggesting that such unequal treatment of
perpetrators presents a rule of law problem. She argues that the rule of law precludes
different treatment of offenders for the same conduct, based solely on the status or
identity of the offender; and that when sexual harassment is treated as a form of sex
270. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); Hicks v.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502, 525 (1993) (Souter, J., Dissenting).
271. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 525 (Souter, J., Dissenting).
272. See supra Part II.D.
273. This part does not discuss different treatment of perpetrators that might result from a
one-way presumption of monosexuality (for example, a presumption of heterosexuality), such as
that adopted by the courts. Such a presumption is not a necessary part of attraction theory. The
desirability of such a presumption, as opposed to either a bilateral presumption of
monosexuality in all cases or the use of no presumptions at all, is discussed above in Part
II.D.2.b.
274. E.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 357-58 (Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
275. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 274, at 357-58.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:101

discrimination,
bisexuals are treated differently than monosexuals for the same
276
conduct.

These critics make two errors. First, they equate attraction theory with sexual
harassment law. They fail to recognize that attraction theory is only one way to prove
causation in sexual harassment cases. Thus, it makes little sense to criticize sexual
harassment law as a whole for an alleged shortcoming of one theory of causation.
Second, these critics confuse the concepts of proof and liability. The bisexuality
gap (the focus of both the Bork/Epstein criticism and the Paul criticism) is not an
exception to liability; it is only an exception to the applicability of one theory for
proving causation. If a bisexual harasser did what the law prohibits (for example, select
his or her targets based on their sex), and this could be proven, the harasser would be
held liable. There is no immunity based on the status or identity; 277
there is only a gap in
the applicability of one potential method of showing causation.
These critics might attempt to resist this distinction between proof and liability.
They might argue that if a bisexual and a monosexual engage in what appears to be the
exact same conduct (e.g. making coercive sexual advances), the law itself would
condemn the monosexual but not the bisexual-not just as a matter of proof, but as a
matter of liability. The problem with this argument is that the conduct is not exactly the
same for purposes of the law. The point of sex discrimination law is to not to punish
people for mistreating other people. Rather, the point of sex discrimination law is to
punish people for selecting other people to mistreat based on their sex. Thus, if a
bisexual harasser mistreats someone, but cannot be considered to have selected that
person for mistreatment based on that person's sex, the bisexual harasser has not
violated the law-not because the harasser is bisexual (status), but because the harasser
278
has not engaged in sex-based selection (action). There is no rule of law problem.
b. Potential for Evasion of Liability
Several courts and commentators have expressed concern that the gaps in
attraction theory-particularly the bisexuality gap-might present opportunities for
discriminators to avoid liability. There are two possible variations of this argument.
First, because of its gaps, certain types of discrimination are not amenable to proof
of causation by attraction theory. For example, suppose that a perpetrator engages in
destructive sexual conduct against women (but not men) based on animosity toward
women, as opposed to attraction toward women. As noted above, attraction theory will
not work to prove causation in such a case, even though the conduct in question is
discriminatory. Depending on the evidence available to show causation by other
means, in such a case there is a danger that it might not be possible to prove
causation-and that the perpetrator would escape liability.
The danger that perpetrators might escape liability as a result of plaintiffs'
inability to prove causation in cases where attraction theory does not apply is not really
a problem with attraction theory. If anything, this argument-that is, that, where
276. Paul, supra note 120, at 352.
277. The possibility that a monosexual harasser might escape liability by feigning
bisexuality will be addressed immediately infra Part Im.A.2.b.
278. This is not to say bisexuals cannot engage in sex-based selection of targets to harm. It
is only to say that, by definition, a bisexual does not engage in sex-based selection of potential
sexual partners based on attraction. Thus, if the decision at issue involves this type of selection,
there is no discrimination.
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attraction theory does not apply, some discriminators may get away with it-is a
testament to the effectiveness of attraction theory. It brings into focus the fact that
attraction theory provides a relatively effective method for proving causation; and that,
where this method is not available, discriminators may be able to avoid being proven
to have engaged in discriminatory causation.
Moreover, as with the criticism that attraction theory treats different groups of
victims differently, the argument that attraction theory should be discarded because it
treats different groups of harassers differently does not seem to make sense. If we can
detect and prove causation in cases against some discriminators using this theory, it
hardly seems to make sense to argue that we should scrap the theory because it will not
help us detect and prove causation against all discriminators.
However, other courts and commentators have focused on a second variation of
the evasion problem to criticize attraction theory. These writers are worried that
harassers may escape detection or liability by falsely claiming to fall within one of the
gaps in attraction theory. In particular, some critics of attraction theory are concerned
279
that monosexual harassers may feign bisexuality to escape detection. Worse, they
argue, such harassers may do so by harassing people they would not otherwise have
harassed.280
The first response to this criticism is that it is far from clear how likely it is that
many monosexuals would pose publicly as bisexuals-much less make sexual
advances toward people to whom they are not attracted-for the purpose of protecting
their employers from liability. 28 The social stigma that unfortunately continues to be
attached to bisexuality would seem to provide a major deterrent to such action-at
least in cases where the harasser is purely heterosexual,28 2 and quite possibly in cases
where the harasser is purely gay/lesbian.28 3 Moreover, to the extent that such evasion
were to take the form of making additional sexual advances, the idea of engaging in
sexual conduct toward those to whom one is not attracted would seem to be its own
deterrent. (And recall that a finding of causation under attraction theory would only be
avoided if the factfinder believed the harasser were either purely bisexual or preferred
partners who were not the same sex as the target.28 So a monosexual who set out to
avoid a finding of causation in this way would need to harass a substantial number of
persons to whom he or she was not attracted in order to make a convincing case.)
Finally, under most anti-discrimination laws, harassers themselves are not held liable;
liability attaches only to the employer. 28 5 Thus, any incentive the harasser might have
to feign bisexuality would seem small. This reasoning seems borne out by the fact that
there are very few reported cases in which harassers claim to be bisexual.
279. E.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994);
Ciapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1993).
280. E.g., Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464; Ciapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337-38.

281. This point has been suggested by Professor Calleros. Calleros, supranote 123, at 77.
282. Schaffner, supra note 169, at 18-20 (discussing "the social stigma and marginalization
arising from homophobia."); See also Laarman, supra note 169, at 569 (acknowledging the
social stigma attached to homosexuality makes the abuse of domestic partner benefits unlikely).
283. See Rover, supra note 218.
284. See supra Part II.B.2.
285. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination by "employers");
Falbaum v. Pomerantz, No. 00-9039, 2001 WL 1019616, at *14-15 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2001)
(finding no personal liability under Title VII); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400,405
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding no personal liability under Title VII); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d
1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding no personal liability under Title VII).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[V01.79:101

The second response would be that it does not seem to make sense to scrap a
method of proof because it may permit some individuals wrongly to escape its reach.
Again, an analogy to the pretext theory under general disparate treatment law seems in
order. Some defendants who in fact discriminated will likely be able to articulate
reasons for their actions, which a plaintiff might not be able to prove false. In such a
case, the defendant would, by his or her deception, (wrongly) avoid a finding of
causation under pretext theory. 286 But pretext theory-like attraction theory-works to
prove causation in countless other cases. It seems senseless to argue that either theory
should be scrapped because some people may wrongfully escape its reach.
In summary, the fact that attraction theory does not work in all cases suggests a
need to develop additional theories of causation that might cover those cases that
attraction theory cannot. Several writers have taken great strides toward developing
such theories. 2 87 But neither the coverage gaps in attraction theory, nor the inequalities
created by these gaps, provide an argument for doing away with attraction theory.
B. Accountingfor Power
Some authors have criticized attraction theory for failing to account for what they
believe is the true dynamic behind sexual harassment-that is, that sexual harassment
is ultimately about power, not attraction. 288 However, it is not clear exactly how this
argument serves as an indictment of attraction theory.
At one level, this criticism appears to be nothing more than a coverage gap issue,
or an issue with attraction theory's unequal treatment of victims or harassers. That is,
the critics of attraction theory are concerned that the theory is not capable of proving
causation where a harasser is motivated by power, as opposed to attraction. As
discussed above, while this is true (albeit only in cases where attraction plays no part in
the harasser's decision), 289 neither this coverage gap, nor the inequalities that result

286. In such a case, as in a case where a monosexual harasser successfully persuaded a
factfinder he or she was bisexual, other theories of causation would remain available. Only
pretext theory, or in the harassment context, attraction theory, would be unavailable as a result
of the perpetrator's deception.
287. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5; Estrich, supra note 3; Franke, supra note 3; Schultz,
supra note 4; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998)
(suggesting ways other than attraction theory by which plaintiffs might prove causation, such as
by comparative evidence or by evidence of a sex-based negative attitude that might be derived
from the conduct itself); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (stereotyping theory).
288. E.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 586 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that attraction
theory "betrays a fundamental misconception that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter of
sexual desire run amok-in other words, that the harasser is attracted to the victim and simply
cannot restrain himself"); Estrich, supra note 3, at 818 (stating that sexual harassment doctrine
based on attraction fails to account for the power dynamic between men and women in the
workplace); see also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1 ("Central to the concept [of sexual
harassment] is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or impose
deprivations in another."); Franke, supra note 3, at 743 ("[M]en engage in offensive sexual
conduct in the workplace primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire."
(emphasis added)); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1721 ("It has long been broadly acknowledged
'that men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the workplace primarily as a way to exercise or
express power, not desire."').
289. See supra Part II.C.
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29
from it, provide a good reason for discarding attraction theory. 0
But critics' concerns about attraction theory's inability to account for power-based
harassment seem to go beyond the fact that this represents a coverage gap, and beyond
the fact that this coverage gap may result in inequality between victims of power-based
harassment and victims of attraction-based harassment. Rather, critics seem concerned
that a theory based on attraction somehow misconceives reality. These critics insist that
harassment is about power-not attraction. 9
There are two possible variations of this argument. The strong version would be
that all sexual harassers are motivated solely by a desire to demonstrate or exercise
power, and that attraction plays no role. If this position were accurate, then there would
be no role for attraction theory. Attraction theory cannot work to show causation in
cases where there is no attraction; and, under the strong power hypothesis, such cases
cover the entire universe of sexual harassment cases.
However, such a strong position on power seems extremely problematic, since it
suggests, without the benefit of any convincing, systematic empirical research: (1) that
these writers have a pipeline into the mind of all sexual harassers; (2) that the entire
universe of harassers has a single, uniform motivation for their actions; and (3) that the
courts have been getting it wrong for the last twenty-five years.
In fact, it is not clear that anyone seriously takes this strong position. While most
critics of attraction theory use strong language about how it "betrays a fundamental
misconception" about the nature of sexual harassment, 292 most ultimately adopt a
weaker version of this argument: that is, that some significant portion-but not
necessarily all-sexual harassment is motivated by power. For example, Judge Rovner,
after talking about "fundamental misconception[s]," describes the misconception as the
belief "that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter of sexual desire run amok. ' 2 93 That
is, she is merely rejecting the argument that all sexual harassment is motivated by
attraction.
Yet, it is not clear how such a weak argument about the "reality" of sexual
harassment-that is, that it might be motivated by power, attraction, or both- serves
as an indictment of attraction theory. If the only criticism is that sexual harassers are
sometimes or even often motivated by power-while acknowledging that attraction
may sometimes play a role-then there would not seem to be a problem with attraction

290. See supra Parts II.C, E.
291. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1721 ("It has long been broadly acknowledged 'that
men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the workplace primarily as a way to exercise or
express power, not desire."' (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Doe, 119 F.3d at 588 ("[H]arassment,
like other forms of victimization, is often motivated by issues of power and control on the part
of the harasser."); Estrich, supra note 3, at 820 (discussing that sexual harassment is about men
exercising power over women); Franke, supra note 3, at 743 ("[Mien engage in sexual conduct
in the workplace primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire."); see also
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1 ("Central to the concept [of sexual harassment] is the use of
power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another.").
292. Doe, 119 F.3d at 586.
293. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 588 ("[H]arassment, like other forms of

victimization, is often motivated by issues of power and control on the part of the harasser.")
(emphasis added); Franke, supra note 3, at 743 ("[Mlen engage in sexual conduct in the
workplace primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire.") (emphasis added);
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1721 ("It has long been broadly acknowledged 'that men engage in
offensive sexual conduct in the workplace primarilyas a way to exercise or express power, not
desire."').
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theory. As noted above, this simply means that attraction theory will not work in all
cases. It is nothing more than a coverage gap argument, which, as discussed above, is
not a valid argument for rejecting attraction theory.
Moreover, it seems difficult to argue that a theory of causation, such as attraction
theory, misconceives reality-or anything else. Theories of causation either work to
prove causation or they do not. Attraction theory does not believe or disbelieve
anything; it does not believe, for example, that "sexual harassment inevitably is a
matter of sexual desire run amok.', 2 9 4 It simply provides a way of proving causation
where sexual desire does motivate the harasser, at least in part (and where the harasser
is monosexual). Thus, it does not make sense to say a theory, such as attraction theory,
misconceives the nature of harassment.
That being said, the doctrines developed and used within the legal system, even if
they work, and even if they do not have perceptions of their own, may often serve to
influence perceptions in two important ways. First, legal doctrines can influence the
perception of legal decisionmakers-both those who apply the law (e.g., lawyers,
judges, and juries) and those who are governed by it (e.g., employers and employees).
Second, legal doctrines can influence the perception of the lay public, as well as the
legal public, who, based on such perceptions, may ultimately come to support or
oppose the activity regulated by those doctrines. The following two Subparts will deal
with these issues respectively.
1. The Effect of Attraction Theory on Perceptions of Legal Actors
One possible criticism of attraction theory that might flow from the weak
argument about the "reality" of sexual harassment is that attraction theory might
somehow blind legal decisionmakers to the fact that some cases involve power, as
opposed to attraction. There are two possible variations of this concern.
First, the concern might be that judges, and possibly juries, will mistake attraction
theory for the entire law of causation in sexual harassment-and will thus treat
attraction as a required element in sexual harassment cases. Thus, victims of
discriminatory sexual conduct that was not based on sexual attraction would not have a
cause of action, or would inevitably lose in a sexual harassment case. It is true that
some early cases seemed to suggest that courts were making this error. And this
approach certainly misconceived the nature of harassment, as well as causation. But it
has been years since anyone seriously entertained the idea that causation could only be
proven by attraction theory. 295 And in case there was any doubt on the subject in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court has made clear that attraction theory is not the only
way to prove causation.296

294. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 586 (noting that attraction theory "betrays a fundamental
misconception that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter of sexual desire run amok-in other
words, that the harasser is attracted to the victim and simply cannot restrain himself').
295. E.g., id. at 577 (discussing that attraction theory is not the only way to show
causation); Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
296. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the Court held that
plaintiffs can prove causation in at least four different ways: (1) the presumption of
heterosexuality in opposite-sex cases (that is, attraction theory); (2) proof of homosexuality in
same-sex cases (that is, attraction theory); or other forms of proof, such as (3) comparative
evidence; or (4) inferring biased attitude from the nature of the conduct. Id. at 80-82. The last
two methods are clearly not attraction theory.
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An alternative, and more valid, concern may be that, even if courts and other legal
decisionmakers do not treat attraction theory as the exclusive way of showing
causation, the theory may distract them, diverting their attention and preventing them
from properly applying other theories of causation in certain cases. Vicki Schultz has
offered a compelling version of this argument. 297 She has shown that judges who focus
too much on attraction may fail to see sexual harassment as part of a broader
discriminatory attitude (such as misogyny), and may therefore fail to find causation for
discriminatory nonsexual conduct. 298 That is, judges who focus too much on attraction
may give too little weight to evidence of causation that is not based on attraction
theory. And employers and co-workers may do the same. As
a result, legal
299
decisionmakers may under enforce norms against discrimination.
A related argument is that a focus on attraction might have a tendency to
"normalize" harassing behavior. 300 That is, attraction theory, which is based on sexual
attraction, might cause judges, or others in society (including employers and potential
harassers) to associate sexual harassment with "normal" sexual attraction and its
"normal" manifestations-what might be thought of as the roses-and-chocolate model
of courtship. 30 As a result of this (mistaken) association, such individuals might not
see harassment for the deviant and harmful conduct that it is,
but might instead tend to
see it as somehow being normal, or not significantly harmful. 30 2 Legal decisionmakers
(or society more generally) might tend to belittle the evil of harassment by conceiving
it as simply "a matter of sexual desire run amok., 30 3 Any such thinking may have the
effect of increasing the prevalence of sexual harassment, causing courts to under
297. See Schultz, supra note 4.
298. See id. note 4, at 1689. Actually, Professor Schultz's criticism is not reserved for
attraction theory. Rather, her criticism is that focusing on sexuality has tended to blind legal
decisionmakers to other forms of discriminatory conduct. Id. The attraction-based paradigm
discussed in this Article is a subset of the conduct that concerns Professor Schultz. (In other
words, this Article assumes that some sexual conduct is based on attraction.)
299. Id.
300. See Franke, supra note 3, at 743 (discussing the "inclination to normalize sexual
harassment" by understanding it merely as the "inappropriate or boorish expression of otherwise
healthy or robust heterosexual or homosexual desire").

301. Sexual harassment, of course, is not "normal" in this sense. It does not involve the
type of simple sexual attraction that might be reciprocated and that might lead to fulfilling

personal relationships. By definition, sexual harassment involves unwelcomeness and
offensiveness, and thus unreciprocated feelings. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (discussing that conduct must be unwelcome to be sexual harassment). By definition,
sexual harassment involves severity or pervasiveness, and thus more than simple requests that
might turn out to be unwelcome. Id. It often involves harassers who see it as their right to
badger or, worse, coerce partners into sexual relationships or punish them for resisting.
302. In fact, some early judicial opinions suggested that this had occurred in the minds of
some judges, who had trouble finding liability for what they considered normal-or at least
inevitable--conduct between men and women. E.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 422 F. Supp. 553,556 (D.N.J. 1976); Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73,
1974 WL 10628 at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974). It is certainly possible that attraction theory, or a
more general focus on sexuality, contributed to this confusion.
303. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,586 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that attraction
theory "betrays a fundamental misconception that sexual harassment inevitably is a matter of
sexual desire run amok-in other words, that the harasser is attracted to the victim and simply
cannot restrain himself").
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enforce the proscription against discriminatory harassment, or both. 3°
Some critics have analogized this problem to early, misguided views of rape,
which viewed it as a crime based on sex, and not power. 305 These early views of rape
as being based on sexual attraction tended to normalize and legitimize rape in the
public mind-including in the minds of police, prosecutors, judges, and jurorsblinding them to the abnormal and heinous nature of this crime. Critics of attraction
theory have expressed a concern that a theory that expressly links sexual harassment
with sexual attraction may have the same blinding effect.
These arguments are essentially about a struggle for the perceptive resources of
legal decisionmakers and the public. They are arguments that, to the extent attraction
theory (or any other theory based on sexuality) fills the field of our perception, such a
theory may prevent us from recognizing the discriminatory nature of conduct that the
theory does not cover. Thus, for example, where conduct is based not on sexual
attraction, but on gender-based power, we may be so caught up in attraction theory that
we would fail to recognize the discriminatory nature of the conduct (or, worse, fail to
recognize the discriminatory nature of the gender-based power dynamic itself).
Yet even if these concerns are valid (and they seem to be), the question remains:
Do we forego the use of an effective theory of causation because of some of the
thinking it may encourage? Or do we try to encourage better thinking? My inclinations,
at least at this point, lie with the second option: education.
Arguments about the effects of attraction theory upon our perceptive resources
properly condemn our failure to focus our attention beyond attraction theory. These
arguments suggest a need to educate practitioners and judges, as well as employers,
about the nonattraction-based aspects of sexual harassment-including education about
the discriminatory manner in which power may be exercised in the workplace, both in
sexual ways and in nonsexual ways.
Education of this sort seems to be well underway. Articles like those written by
Professor Schultz and the other second-generation feminists seem to take a large step
in this direction. And many employers currently provide sexual harassment training to
their employees, much of which tries to clarify that harassment may involve
motivations other than attraction. Perhaps as a result of these efforts, it appears that
304. Conversely, Professor Schultz argues that focusing on sexual attraction-and thus
sexuality-may tend to cause over-enforcement of problematic norms against sexuality. That is,
by focusing on sexuality instead of discrimination, employers and courts may tend to punish or
prohibit nondiscriminatory sexual or expressive conduct that we should value. Vicki Schultz,
Talking About Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 417, 432 (2001) ("[B]anish[ing] all hints of
sexuality from the workplace... would not represent progress. On the contrary, I think it is part
of a feminist vision of progress to be able to express ourselves more freely and to be more fully
human while we are at work."). Actually, attraction theory, which is designed to be able to show
where sex-based decisionmaking has occurred, should never punish nondiscriminatory conduct.
And the requirement of harm that exists in other areas of sexual harassment doctrine-such as
the requirements that harassing conduct be unwelcome, offensive, and severe or pervasiveshould prevent sanctions from being imposed on consensual sexual and expressive activity.
305. E.g., Doe, 119 F.3d at 587 n.22 (citing United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 146566 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1996)) ("The notion that harassment is only actionable sexual harassment
when it can be attributed to the harasser's sexual interest in the victim is reminiscent of the now
discredited idea that rape is a sexual act, rather than an act of violence. Today we understand it
as the latter."); Estrich, supra note 3, at 820-21; Franke, supra note 3, at 740 ("To understand
sexual harassment primarily in terms of sexual desire is wrong for many of the same reasons that

it is a mistake to understand rape as primarily a crime of passion or lust.").
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there is less judicial distraction and confusion than there was twenty-five years ago,
which is encouraging. And while distraction and confusion likely still exist, this would
suggest a need for more education and more communication, not for marginalizing or
scrapping attraction theory.
If anything, a proper articulation and understanding of attraction theory and its
role may help in this enterprise. This Article should make clear that attraction theory is
only one way in which causation may be proven. From this should follow an
understanding that attraction, though helpful in proving causation, is not necessary.
And the very fact that attraction theory will not work in cases where harassers are not
motivated by sexual attraction should serve to focus attention on the fact that harassers
may occasionally, or even often, have other motivations-and to focus attention on
developing ways to prove these motivations and developing theories by which these
motivations may be understood as discriminatory.
At bottom, unless we believe our attention span is insufficient to comprehend
simultaneously both attraction theory and theories of causation that are not based on
attraction or sexuality, arguments regarding perception do not suggest a need to do
away with attraction theory. If we are concerned about the fact that attraction theory
might distract either judges or some other segment of society, the remedy for this
problem would seem to be to try to help the distracted individuals to focus properlythat is, to educate. It is not clear why an effective theory of causation should be
marginalized, or even scrapped, just because some people appear to be distracted by it.
2. Public Perceptions: The Narrative Appeal-or Lack of Narrative Appeal-of
Attraction Theory
A second possible criticism of attraction theory might flow from the weak
argument about the "reality" of sexual harassment, that is, that harassment may be
about power, as well as attraction. This argument relates to the effect of attraction
theory---or lack of effect--on public perceptions of sexual harassment. The public,
both inside and outside of the legal community, may ask themselves why the law
should be concerned with sexual conduct in the workplace. To the extent that sexual
harassment law seeks to create public norms, or survive as a public norm, it must tell a
compelling story as to why the public should be concerned about sexual harassment.
Unfortunately, attraction theory does not tell such a compelling story. The type of
sex-based selection that is covered by the theory does not look particularly evil. To the
contrary, as noted above, such conduct may look quite normal. Millions of monosexual
individuals throughout the country (indeed, the world) likely engage in the sex-based
selection of potential mates every day. Such conduct, by itself, may not seem
sufficiently egregious to give rise to a high degree of public concern.
And, without
36
such concern, sexual harassment law risks irrelevance or worse. 0
By comparison, the power-theorists offer a far more compelling narrative:
workplace sexual conduct is about power and its abuse. It is about keeping more than
half of the population down, about excluding women and others who do not meet the
requirements of entrenched stereotypes of masculinity from rewarding careers and
from the halls of power. It is about social justice. This compelling narrative-in
contrast to the lack of an appealing narrative in attraction theory-seems to motivate
many power-theorists' disdain for attraction theory.
306. Franke, supra note 3, at 762 (accusing current sexual harassment doctrines, including
attraction theory, of "trivializ[ing] the legal norm against sex discrimination").
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This Article will not even try to argue that attraction theory can compete with
power-based theories in terms of conceptual, or narrative, appeal. Attraction theory
focuses on causation independently from harm, leaving the often-substantial harm in
sexual harassment cases to be discussed in terms of other elements of the claim. As a
result, attraction theory will never likely have the narrative appeal of a theory, such as
those based on power, which conceptualizes the discriminatory nature of sexual
harassment in terms of the harm from sexual harassment.
But this was never the goal of attraction theory. Attraction theory was not
developed with an eye toward narrative appeal. Rather, it was developed as a response
to the practical problems of proving discriminatory causation in the cases that came
across lawyers' and judges' desks on a day-to-day basis-as a way to provide victims
of workplace sexual conduct with a remedy.
More importantly, in terms of the criticism of attraction theory's narrative
weakness, there is no reason why attraction theory needs to interfere with the narrative
told by power-based theorists or anyone else. Attraction theory, properly understood, is
just one way to show causation and provide a remedy. It does not seek to, and should
not be understood as, attempting to provide a conceptual basis-much less the
conceptual basis-for understanding the harm that results from sexual harassment.
Articulating such a basis is important. But it need not be done at the expense of
attraction theory.
C. Burdening Sexual and Other Minorities
A different perceptual problem may be cause for greater concern. Vicki Schultz
and Kenji Yoshino have suggested that a theory of causation that focuses on
sexuality-and which imposes sanctions based on sexuality-may tend to be applied
disproportionately against those who are perceived as being highly sexual, or those
who are perceived largely in terms of their sexuality. 30 7 Unfortunately, certain groups
in our society continue to be stereotyped in sexual ways, and therefore to be perceived
as highly sexual. Some of these groups are sexual minorities, such as gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transsexuals. Others are racial minorities. For example, African
Americans and Latinos continue to be stereotyped in terms of their sexuality. Thus, by
using attraction theory (or any theory based on sexuality), we might expect that
members of these and other minority groups could disproportionately become the
target of sexual harassment complaints, actions, and verdicts.
In some ways, this is a perceptual problem like the ones discussed in the preceding
Part. The focus of attraction theory on sexuality might cause people to make
unwarranted associations (stereotypes) or blind people to what is really going on in a
case. Like the associations and distractions discussed in the preceding Part, sexuality
stereotyping may be amenable to being addressed through education.
However, there seems to be something different about this problem from those
discussed in the preceding Part. Perhaps it is the consequence. The associations or
distractions discussed in the preceding Part would cause some wrongdoers to get away
with their wrongdoing. For example, if a court were unduly distracted by looking for
attraction, it might not find causation in the case of a harasser who is motivated by
power, and the harasser (or his employer) might escape liability. In contrast, the
perception problem of sexuality stereotyping may cause people to be held liable when

307. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 304, at 428; Yoshino, supra note 49, at 454-57.
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they should not-or to be held liable disproportionately. The difference is analogous to
the concern we often have in criminal law when we say it is better to let a guilty person
go free than to convict an innocent person.
But the sexuality-stereotyping problem may, in a sense, be worse than the
traditional dilemma of setting standards to balance between the likelihood of imposing
liability on innocents and ensuring that the guilty are caught. It may be more akin to the
problem we see in terms of the disproportionate application of criminal laws. For
example, though obviously different in degree, we might draw an analogy to critiques
of the death penalty based on disparate application. Even if all those sentenced to death
were in fact guilty, we might justifiably be concerned if guilty minority group members
were more likely to be sentenced to death than guilty nonminorities. °8
One way to approach the sexuality-stereotyping problem might be to focus on the
fact that, at this point, it seems to be "only" a theoretical problem. That is, no one I am
aware of has provided any empirical data to support the proposition that sexual or
other minority group members are disproportionately charged with or held liable (or
that their employers are held liable) for sexual harassment. Moreover, such data alone
might not be sufficient. Assuming that there were disparities in charging or
enforcement, one would still need to link those disparities to attraction theory, or other
sexually-based theories of causation. That is, to make this argument as an empirical
matter, one would need to show that, by eliminating the use of sexually-based theories
of causation, at least some disparity in charging or enforcement would decrease.
Yet such a response would not address the core of the theoretical argument that,
where we use a theory of causation that is based on sexuality, we might reasonably
expect disparate application of sexual harassment law. Questioning the empirical
validity of this expectation does not tell us what we should do if it is confined.
Another possible answer, at least in the context of sexual minorities, may be that
any potential disproportionality in charging or application of sexual harassment law
that may result from sexuality-stereotyping might be offset by the difficulty of proving
monosexuality, and thus causation, in same-sex cases. As discussed above, absent
some sort of bilateral presumption of monosexuality, it will likely be more difficult to
prove monosexuality in same-sex cases than it will be in opposite-sex cases. 3° 9 In
same-sex cases, the monosexuality that must be proven is homosexuality. That is, it
may be more difficult to prove causation in cases against gay and lesbian harassers
than it would be in cases against heterosexual harassers. Thus, while gay and lesbian
harassers may be socially disadvantaged by sexuality-stereotyping, they may have an
advantage in litigation over heterosexuals in terms of the difficulty of proving
monosexuality.
There are a few problems with such a balancing inequities response. First, it is not
clear that the fact that one aspect of a theory of causation decreases the chances of
being held liable under the theory can excuse the fact that another aspect of the theory
increases the chances of being held liable. Among other concerns, it is not clear that
the offset is comparable, or that it would apply to charges, as well as findings of
liability. Moreover, the argument that gays and lesbians may be less likely to be found
liable under attraction theory does not address the harm to other minority groups
predicted by the sexuality-stereotyping argument.
Thus, it is not clear that there is a good response to the sexuality-stereotyping
argument. If the argument is valid, and supported by the data, we would be faced with
308. But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
309. See supra Part I.D.
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a choice: on one hand, sexuality-based theories, such as attraction theory, might lead to
disproportionate charging and enforcement of anti-harassment laws-a significant cost.
On the other hand, as demonstrated above, sexuality-based theories of causation, such
as attraction theory, are likely to provide significant aid to plaintiffs seeking a remedy
for sexual harassment, where other theories may not-a significant benefit.
And the choice may be even more difficult. Note that, if sexuality stereotyping is a
problem, it is a problem not just for attraction theory, but for any theory of sexual
harassment that involves sexuality. Yet some commentators have argued persuasively
that sexuality is essential to understanding the harm caused by sexual harassment.31°
Thus, the choice may not be just between the efficacy of and harm that might arise
from attraction theory. The choice may be between the efficacy of any essential theory
of sexual harassment and the harm that might result from such theories.
This choice does not seem to be resolvable by any logical means. And trying to
resolve it is beyond the. scope of this Article. My point here is only to try to begin to
suggest what is at stake in this choice.
D. Privacy and Proofof Monosexuality

Several authors have expressed concern about the fact that attraction theory relies
on the sexual orientation of the harasser.3 1 1 Potential concerns in this area include both
(1) the loss of privacy for an accused harasser from investigation or discovery into his
or her sexual orientation, 312 and the related issue that (2) the threat that such invasions

310. See Estrich, supra note 3, at 820-21; see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the
Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of ForcedSex, 35 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 845,878-933 (2002)

(arguing for increased focus on sexuality to improve understanding of harm from and
motivation for rape).
311. Some writers have suggested that the sexual orientation of the recipient of the
advances may be relevant. Melissa Manaugh Feldmeier, Filling the Gaps: A Comprehensive
Review of the Debate Over Same-Sex Sexual Harassment,65 U. CIN. L. REv. 861, 882 (1997);
J. Banning Jasiunas, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate but Equal" Federal Statute
Adequately ProtectGays and Lesbiansfrom Employment Discrimination?,61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1529, 1539 (2000); Tamanna Qureshi & Anthony Vaupel, Should Sexual HarassmentBased
upon Sexual Orientation be Covered by Title VII or Prohibited?, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 679,
686 (2001). However, it is difficult to see why this would ever be the case. The supposed
relevance of the target's sexual orientation seems to be based on the theory that gays/lesbians
only make advances toward other gays/lesbians (and, by the same logic, heterosexuals only
make advances only toward other heterosexuals). Yet even if this were true (and there is no
evidence that this is the case, Boy George,I Think He's Got It, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 15, 1995, at
63; Danylo Hawaleshka, Gay Beeper, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 17, 2000, at 41; Geneva Overholser,
Getting Past Goofy Stories, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2000, at 13; David Rowan, Lastword: Glossary
for the 90s, GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 25, 1997, at 83), this would not render the recipient's

sexual orientation relevant. This is because most anti-discrimination laws, including Title VII,
do not protect against selection based on sexual orientation. Thus, the question is simply
whether selection was based on sex. Put differently, even where selection is based on both sex
and sexual orientation (or, at least, perceived sexual orientation), only the former is relevant.
312. John Davidson Miller III, Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentIs Actionable Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Is This the End of Horseplay as We Know it?, 29 SErON HAIL L.
REv. 787, 815 (1998); Wendy M. Parr, When Does Male-on-Male Horseplay Become
Discrimination Because of Sex?: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 25 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 87, 94 n.58 (1999); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After
Oncale: Defining the Boundaries ofActionable Conduct, 47 Am. U.L. REV. 677,678-79 (1998);
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of privacy (including the threat of "outing" a gay or lesbian harasser or falsely
suggesting that a harasser is gay, lesbian, or bisexual in a society that attaches stigma
to these orientations) 313 might place undue or dangerous leverage in the hands of a
314
plaintiff or potential plaintiff.
These concerns seem quite justified. Having litigated numerous harassment cases,
I have seen the invasive nature of investigation and discovery, as well as the coercive
aspects of these invasions first hand-even where sexual orientation
is not at issue.
5
And where sexual orientation is at issue, it only gets worse.3
To some degree, these privacy concerns may be ameliorated through the use of
presumptions regarding sexual orientation, limits on discovery, and procedural limits
on disclosure. This Subpart will discuss these methods, concluding that, while none of
these methods are likely to solve all of the privacy issues that arise from the use of
attraction theory, they may serve to reduce the impact of these issues.
1. Protecting Privacy by Presuming Monosexuality
One approach that courts might take to reducing privacy concerns inherent in
litigating over sexual orientation is to adopt presumptions regarding sexual orientation.
The benefits, as well as the potential problems from, such presumptions are discussed
above in Part II.D.2.b. From a privacy standpoint, the benefits from such a
presumption include reducing the number of cases in which harassers' sexual
orientations are likely to be at issue and giving accused harassers at least some
modicum of choice over whether to litigate over their sexual orientation (even if such
"choice" has a highly coercive aspect to it).
However, the use of such presumptions is not likely to ameliorate privacy
concerns completely. First, even if sexual orientation is not litigated, it is still
implicated. That is, even if the presumption lets an accused harasser avoid discovery
and litigation over his or her sexual orientation, the very act of presuming--even
discussing-his or her sexual orientation is likely to seem invasive. Moreover, the
presumption itself may highlight this invasiveness, since a "choice" not to contest the
presumption will feel a lot like a (coerced) public statement regarding one's sexual
see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (discussing Constitutional right of privacy);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing Constitutional right of privacy).
313. See Schaffner, supra note 169, at 18-20 (discussing "the social stigma and
marginalization arising from homophobia"); see also Laarman, supra note 169, at 569
(acknowledging the social stigma attached to homosexuality makes the abuse of domestic
partner benefits unlikely).
314. Locke, supra note 12, at 399 n.79.
315. While a moralist might argue that all of these concerns could have been avoided if the
harasser had simply refrained from harassing, this argument seems flawed in two respects. First,
when the harasser begins making advances, he or she may not know that the advances are
unwelcome-that is, that he or she is harassing. Unwelcomeness is not measured by the
subjective point of view of the specific defendant, but rather by a reasonable person standard.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). It is quite possible-particularly in samesex cases, where the privacy and extortion issues seem most serious-that a "reasonable"
(possibly homophobic) jury might find a single advance unwelcome, and even severe. Thus,
moral judgment might be unwarranted in some cases. Second, this argument ignores the fact
that, in many, if not most, cases involving same-sex advances, there is a serious question as to
whether the conduct in question was in fact a sexual advance. And, in addressing that question,
privacy and the potential for extortion become implicated.
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orientation. Courts may try to ameliorate this aspect of the presumption by making
clear in court documents and hearings that a decision not to contest monosexuality
does not amount to an admission of monosexuality--that declining to litigate an issue
is not the same as admitting to it. However, observers of this procedure might not
understand the difference. And at the end of the day, it may feel like such an admission
to an accused harasser.
Moreover, presumptions of monosexuality are not likely to apply in all cases. In
some cases, accused harassers will likely want to contest the presumption of
monosexuality, triggering an invasive inquiry into the harasser's sexual orientation.
And presumptions of monosexuality will not help alleviate concerns regarding
extortion, particularly in same-sex cases. In fact, if anything, a presumption of
monosexuality in same-sex cases enhances the extortionate effect of filing such cases
by adding the force of the presumption to a plaintiff's accusations of homosexuality.
These problems do not suggest that we should not adopt a bilateral presumption of
monosexuality. The benefits of such a presumption are significant. 316 And absent some
kind of presumption regarding sexual orientation, accused harassers would likely face
greater inroads on their privacy. The point is only that the use of presumptions
regarding sexual orientation will likely solve some, but not all, of the privacy issues
inherent in attraction theory.
2. Discovery and Procedural Protections for Privacy
Another way in which privacy and extortion concerns might be addressed, at least
in part, might be through the use of discovery and procedural tools. For example,
courts might permit inquiry into the sexual orientation of an alleged harasser only upon
some threshold showing by the plaintiff.31 7 Such a discovery procedure might allow an
alleged harasser to self-report regarding his or her sexual orientation, and only permit
discovery on the issue where, prior to discovery, the plaintiff can produce sufficient
evidence to suggest that the inquiry would be something more than a fishing
expedition-presumably evidence beyond the mere fact of the sexual advances toward
the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff might be required to submit a discovery plan
showing what information is sought and why.
The problem with this discovery approach is that it would stack the deck against
the plaintiff. The information that would be necessary for such a threshold showing
would likely be solely within the alleged harasser's control. Thus, such a rule would
compound the practical difficulties in proving sexual orientation that were discussed in
Part II.D.2-perhaps insurmountably.
Another possible (and more promising) approach would be resorting to existing
discovery procedures under Rule of Evidence 403 and Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
Rule of Evidence 403 allows exclusion of evidence where its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice.318 And discovery requests can
31 9
be denied where they are not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
As noted above, the most invasive form of discovery-that regarding accused
harassers' sexual history-will often tend to have low probative value 320 and high
316. See supra Part H.D.2.b.
317. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
318. FED. R. EvID. 403.
319. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

320. See supra Part II.D.2.a.(2).
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potential for prejudice. Thus, judges might reasonably limit the most invasive forms of
discovery.
Finally, in addition to limits on discovery, judges might consider using courtroom
and record-closing procedures to shield information that is discovered regarding sexual
orientation from public view. Courtrooms and deposition rooms can be closed during
testimony regarding sexual orientation. Transcripts of such testimony can be sealed, as
can briefs and motions reciting such testimony or making other statements regarding
sexual orientation. Parties can be ordered not to discuss
any of these materials or issues
32 1
publicly upon pain of being cited for contempt.
Such sealing and courtroom-closing procedures will not protect accused harassers
from facing disclosure of private information to the plaintiff and his or her attorneys.
But such procedures may at least protect the accused harasser from disclosure of
private information to the public.
Using such procedures, in addition to discovery limits and presumptions of
monosexuality, privacy and coercion concerns might be minimized, though not
eliminated. At the end of the day, because attraction theory relies on proof or
assumptions regarding sexual orientation, this theory will almost inevitably impinge on
the privacy of at least some accused harassers. These concerns, once again, require a
choice: On one hand, if courts or plaintiffs forewent the use of attraction theory to
prove causation, these privacy and coercion concerns might be eliminated. But in many
cases, this would likely mean that plaintiffs would be presented with a significant
additional burden by having to use a less effective and streamlined method of showing
causation. And in some cases, it would likely mean that plaintiffs who might have been
able to prove causation under attraction theory would not be able to prove causation,
and thus would have no remedy.
IV. THE EFFICACY OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF CAUSATION
So far, this Article has argued that attraction theory provides an effective method
by which plaintiffs can demonstrate causation in a large subset (if not the majority, or
even vast majority) of sexual harassment cases. It has also argued that, while this
theory raises some significant normative issues, none of these issues would seem to
justify marginalizing or foregoing the use of an otherwise effective theory of causation.
However, it may still be possible to argue that attraction theory should be
discarded if an alternative theory (or theories) of causation were available that does not
contain any normative problems and that would work to provide a remedy in all cases
that would have been covered by attraction theory. Some of the second-generation
feminists offer power-based theories of causation that seem to promise problem-free,
gap-free coverage. 322 Having offered such alternative theories, these writers seem to

321. These issues might become public through published judicial opinions. A debate is
currently going on about whether opinions must always be published. However, this problem
might be avoided through the use of aliases to avoid identifying a party.
322. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1227-28; Estrich, supra note 3, at 858-60; Franke,
supra note 3, at 762-63; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1697.
Other theorists have argued for the use of a sexuality proxy, or sex per se rule. E.g.,
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1697. This is essentially an argument that causation exists any time
that a harasser engages in sexual conduct in the workplace. A related concept, suggested by
Professor MacKinnon, is that causation should be presumed (subject to rebuttal) anytime a
harasser engages in sexual conduct. MacKinnon, supra note 130, at 813. However, a claim that
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3 23
argue there is no need for attraction theory anymore.
It is true that, if the promise of these alternative theories is realized, there may be
no need for attraction theory. However, it is far from clear that we are at the point
where we should assume that these alternative theories will work to show
discriminatory causation in all cases where such causation exists.
First, as some of the second-generation theorists have pointed out, some of these
theories cannot necessarily be expected to provide universal coverage as a theoretical
matter. 324 For example, Professor Franke criticizes attraction theory as providing
incomplete coverage and offers an alternative theory of causation based on the concept
that sexual harassment operates as a "technology of sexism"-that is, it "perpetuates,
enforces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize women and
masculinize men." 325 The promise seems to be that this theory does not contain gaps,
as attraction theory does. However, Professor Abrams (persuasively) criticizes the
technology-of-sexism theory on the ground that it does not seem to address cases in
which men are
harassed based on effeminacy-arguably a form of sex
326
discrimination.
Moreover, even if the second-generation feminists' alternative theories work as a
theoretical matter, these theories may contain significant gaps as a practical matter. For
example, it is unclear how a plaintiff-or a court-would apply Professor Franke's
"technology of sexism" theory to show causation. How is a plaintiff faced with sexual
conduct by his or her supervisor or co-workers supposed to show that the tormentors
were trying to enforce any norms, much less sexist, gender-based norms? The same
problem would seem to exist with Professor Abrams's theory that causation exists
because many harassers act to preserve male control over the workplace and keep
women out of traditionally male domains. 327 How is a plaintiff supposed to show that
this is what has motivated a particular harasser? Professor Schwartz tries to help by
suggesting that factfinders should look at unconscious, as well as conscious,
motivations.328 But how does a plaintiff prove such unconscious motivations?
Similarly, consider the theory, offered by Professor Estrich, that causation exists

the existence of sexuality inherently suggests discriminatory causation requires some
justification-that is, some theory or theories of causation that would support such an inference.
The arguments offered by the second-generation feminists, along with attraction theory, might
arguably support such a blanket inference. However, to date, there is no sufficient justification
for such a blanket inference of causation in all cases involving sexuality.
Still another group of writers, apparently recognizing the problems in showing causation in
all cases, have urged passage of sexual harassment laws that would be independent from antidiscrimination law-for example, a prohibition of all unwelcome sexual advances or all sexual
conduct in the workplace. Such authors do not offer a theory of causation, but rather suggest an
approach that would theoretically obviate the need to show causation. (However, such an
approach would still require some normative foundation, if it is not linked to anti-discrimination
law.)
323. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1205-20; Estrich, supra note 3, at 858-61; Franke,
supra note 3, at 762-64; Schultz, supra note 4, at 755-56.
324. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1173-1205 (claiming that theories offered by Professor
Franke and Anita Bernstein will not apply in all cases); Franke, supra note 3, at 714-20
(claiming that theory offered by Professor Estrich will not apply in all cases).
325. Franke, supra note 3, at 696.
326. Abrams, supra note 5, at 1190.
327. Id.
328. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1714-25.
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because women tend to experience sexuality differently than men. 329 To the extent that
this is a disparate treatment argument, the experience of victims would appear to be
irrelevant to causation. And to the extent this is a disparate impact argument, it is not
clear how a plaintiff would go about proving disparate impact. 330 Would experts be
needed? 331 If so, this would significantly raise the cost of bringing such a case. What
kind of showing would be required to show a disparate impact? Would a plaintiff be
required to show that the sexual conduct in question had a disproportionate negative
effect on women in the particular work unit or workplace? If so, there might be
problems with small sample size. Or could a plaintiff look at effects of the conduct on
men and women in some larger community? If so, what community? Moreover, 3in
disparate impact cases, damages are limited and jury trials may not be available, 1
possibly reducing the practical utility of such a theory.
Some plaintiffs may not be able to prove causation under these theories. Others
may be able to prove causation, but only with significant difficulty or at significant
expense. This stands in contrast to attraction theory, which in many cases permits a
streamlined, efficient way to prove causation.
Finally, in assessing the prospects of these alternative theories for providing
universal coverage, it may also be worth considering that, at least at this point, the
courts have had little experience applying these theories. Thus, it is not clear to what
extent the courts will be persuaded by these theories. And, as these theories are
applied, there might be gaps-either theoretical or practical--that have not yet been
anticipated.
The point here is not to suggest that the theories offered by these commentators
are unworkable. To the contrary, these theories, as well as others that have been
offered, appear to hold great promise. The point is only that, at this stage, we should
hesitate to assume-as a theoretical or practical matter-that these theories would
inevitably provide robust, universal coverage. Thus, there would seem to be a danger
in scrapping attraction theory based on the as yet unrealized promise of these
alternative theories of causation. If we scrap attraction theory and these alternative
theories cannot be used to prove causation in all cases in which it exists, many
plaintiffs might be left without a remedy-plaintiffs who might have had a remedy had
attraction theory been available to prove causation.
CONCLUSION

Sexual harassment doctrines based on sexual attraction have been largely
discredited in the academy, particularly among second-generation feminists. The courts
are increasingly being asked to discard the precepts of attraction theory in favor of
power-based theories that claim to provide a richer conceptual understanding of, and a
broader remedy against, sexual harassment. However, to address sexual harassment
cases effectively, the courts would be wise to continue to rely on attraction theory,
329. Estrich, supra note 3, at 819.
330. See generally Kearney, supra note 21.

331. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-07 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (describing where plaintiff brought in expert to testify regarding effects of pornography
on women).
332.42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l)-(2) (2003). See 2 LINDEMANN &GROSSMAN, supra note 21,
at 1822 n.245 ("The remedies and jury trial provisions of § 1981a do not apply to claims of
adverse impact discrimination.").
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which has provided, and will likely continue to provide, an effective and streamlined
mode of analysis in many cases.
To be sure, attraction theory can be revised at the margins. Indeed, the criticisms
of attraction theory suggest, not a need to abandon that theory, but a need to
understand it better, as this Article seeks to do. Even though power-based theories have
much to commend them, their failure to provide an effective approach to causation
leaves them vulnerable in practice. Although the courts should certainly acknowledge
and attempt to apply these power-based theories, they should not do so to the exclusion
of attraction theory. To do so would jeopardize the remedy that is currently available
for many victims of discriminatory sexual conduct at work.

